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Trump’s Ignorance of the Taliban Undermines America’s Negotiating Posture in Afghanistan

As we’ve explained, pursuing a diplomatic solution in Afghanistan after nearly 19 years of fighting makes sense, but only if we are clear-eyed and sober-minded about who the Taliban are and what they are about.

And only if we maintain a firm and steadfast commitment to the legitimately elected government of Afghanistan and are willing to walk away from negotiations if the Taliban renege on their agreements and act in bad faith.

Unfortunately, as we reported Monday, President Trump appears to have little to no understanding of the Taliban, and the only thing he seems firm and steadfast about are bugging out of Afghanistan and withdrawing U.S. troops there.

Weakness. Trump’s palpable and pathetic rhetorical weakness vis-à-vis the Taliban undermines America’s diplomatic leverage and make it immeasurably more difficult to secure an enduring and sustainable agreement which protects U.S. security interests and the Americans homeland.

This is especially true give that the Taliban do not view negotiations in the same way as we do. For the United States and other democracies, negotiations are a means to reconcile differences and arrive at a mutually beneficial accord or modus vivendi

Not so for the Taliban. As Gen. Jack Keane (Ret.), told the Heritage Foundation Jan. 28, 2020:

The Taliban leadership position is very clear. Their top priority is to get the United States to sign an agreement to withdraw completely. They are willing to make just about any statement to get that, any promise to get that.

They’ll do a ceasefire to get that. They’ll promise negotiations with the Afghans to get that. And why do they want that?

In their words, it’s a massive boost to the movement. It amounts to a  U.S. admission of defeat, and it guarantees the legitimacy of their Islamic Emirate, which is what they call Afghanistan.  

They believe the agreement will help tip the military and diplomatic balance in favor of the Taliban, and help them to eventually overthrow the Afghan government. [That is] something they have never, ever given up [on].

The [Taliban] leaders are explicit. The agreement with the United States is a means of taking control of the Afghan government, not reaching a political settlement…

They don’t want a political settlement. They don’t want to share power. They don’t want to participate in a democracy.

Why is that? They’re very practical. [Some] 85% of the country reject the Taliban [and have rejected them] for 19 years. This in the most unpopular insurgency in modern times.

“The Taliban,” writes Bloomberg’s Eli Lake, “has always considered itself Afghanistan’s legitimate government in exile. This is why it sends its minions to attack polling places during elections, as it did last year.”

In short, the Taliban are not a legitimate political faction that simply wants a place at the decision-making table. To the contrary: they are hardcore fanatics, who have never wavered in their goal of reconquering all of Afghanistan and establishing a so-called Islamic Emirate there.

Yet, Trump acts like the Taliban are just another negotiating partner; and that negotiating a peace deal with them is no different, really, than negotiating a real estate deal with a mob boss or union official in Atlantic City. You split the differences and everyone walks away happy and content.

Negotiations. But that’s not how the Taliban think. They think that negotiations are a way for them to impose their will on a weak American president who wants out of Afghanistan, and to overthrow what they see as an illegitimate government in Kabul that has no right to rule.

It would help America’s negotiating posture if Trump showed some indication that he understands this. Instead, he repeats discredited Taliban propaganda that they are “tired of fighting.”

No, Mr. President, the Taliban are not tired of fighting. The Taliban fight—and negotiate—to win. And their continued fighting is the real obstacle to peace in Afghanistan.

Feature photo credit: France 24.

Trump’s Afghanistan Peace Deal Could Possibly Work, But Not If He Indulges His Isolationist Fantasies

We’ve alluded before to the sharp divergence between President Trump’s reckless and counterproductive rhetoric about Afghanistan and his more careful and deliberative actions vis-à-vis the country.

Rhetorically, Trump is eager to bug out of Afghanistan and end so-called endless wars. Yet, his actions there have been far more sober and deliberative than his foolish rhetoric suggests.

The danger is that Trump’s isolationist instincts will win out and that the disaster we’ve seen unfolding in Syria as a result of Trump’s sudden bug out there will be repeated in Afghanistan, albeit with far worse results.

Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, this same dichotomy exists in the new peace agreement that the Trump administration signed with the Taliban Saturday. The early indications are that Trump intends go all-in on the deal and live out his isolationist fantasies.

Diplomacy. Of course, pursuing a diplomatic solution in Afghanistan is a good idea. As Michèle Flournoy and Stephen J. Hadley explain in the Washington Post, “What is the alternative? After more than 18 years of war, neither the Taliban nor the combined U.S., Afghan and coalition forces have been able to defeat the other.”

But for diplomacy to be successful and not simply a ruse for surrender and defeat, the United States has to be determined to walk away from the negotiations if the Taliban does not act in good faith and fails to meet its obligations under the agreement.

The Department of Defense and the Department of State clearly understand this. Which is why both the Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, and the Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, have both stressed that the agreement is “conditions-based.”

What Esper and Pompeo mean is this: If the facts on the ground in Afghanistan do not correspond with what was agreed to, then the planned withdrawal of U.S. troops will be called off.

“This deal doesn’t depend upon trusting anyone,” Pompeo told Face the Nation’s Margaret Brennan

It has a deep, complex, well-thought-out, multi-month-negotiated verification complex and mechanism by which we can observe and hold every member of the agreement accountable.

We’ll do that. It’s not about trust. It’s about what happens on the ground, not only yesterday which was an important day, but in the days that follow.

“This is a conditions-based agreement,” added Esper in the Washington Post

As this is a conditions-based agreement, if we assess that the Taliban is honoring the terms of the deal, the United States will reduce its military presence to 8,600 troops within a matter of months.

This drawdown will be part of a NATO-approved plan for commensurate reductions by other troop-contributing nations.

If progress on the political front between the Taliban and the current Afghan government continues, then the United States and its partners will further reduce our presence toward a goal of zero in 2021. If progress stalls, then our drawdown likely will be suspended, as well.

So far so good. The problem, as always, is the man at the top: President Trump, who is clearly singing a different tune.

Time-Based Deal. For Trump, the agreement is not conditions-based; it is time-based. Indeed, time, not conditions, are the determinative factor. We’ve been in Afghanistan for almost two decades, damn it, and, well, it’s just time to get out!

That’s a paraphrase of what Trump said, but it is an accurate paraphrase! Look for yourself. Here are Trump’s exact words, in full context, at a White House press briefing Saturday:

I’d like to congratulate all those incredible people that have worked for so long on our endless war in Afghanistan—19 years, going on 20 years

We’ve had tremendous success in Afghanistan in the killing of terrorists, but it’s time, after all these years, to go and to bring our people back home. We want to bring our people back home.

And, again, it’s been—it’s been a long journey in Afghanistan in particular. It’s been a very long journey. It’s been a hard journey for everybody. We’re very largely a law enforcement group; and that’s not what our soldiers are all about. They’re fighters. They’re the greatest fighters in the world.

As you know, we’ve destroyed, in Syria and Iraq, 100 percent of the ISIS caliphate. One hundred percent. We have thousands of prisoners. We have killed ISIS fighters by the thousands—and, likewise, in Afghanistan.

But now it’s time for somebody else to do that work, and that’ll be the Taliban, and it could be surrounding countries. There are many countries that surround Afghanistan that can help. We’re 8,000 miles away.

So we’ll be bringing it down to 8,000 [U.S. troops], to approximately 8,600 [U.S. troops]—in that vicinity—and then we’ll make our final decision [at] some point in the fairly near future.

But this was a very spirited agreement. There was a lot of—there was a lot of talk. There was a lot of everything. They’ve been trying to get this for many years. And just—it’s time.

So I just want to thank everybody. I want to congratulate everybody. I really believe the Taliban wants to do something to show that we’re not all wasting time.

If bad things happen, we’ll go back. I let the people know: We’ll go back and we’ll go back so fast, and we’ll go back with a force like nobody has ever seen. And I don’t think that will be necessary. I hope it’s not necessary.

Yes, Trump talks about going back into Afghanistan; but that presumes we leave altogether first and let things fall apart.

In other words, Trump is determined to get out first and ask the hard questions later: because, in his mind, “it’s time” and we can always go back in if we have to.

Naïveté. This is naive and dangerous talk from the Commander in Chief. Leaving Afghanistan and then going back are not nearly as easy as Trump glibly suggests. And letting Afghanistan fall apart poses a host of dangerous risks to American national security and the American homeland.

Trump’s reckless rhetoric also makes it much more difficult for him to achieve an enduring and sustainable peace agreement with the Taliban. They surely can sense, after all, Trump’s weakness and his palpable desire for a deal, any deal.

On the other hand, we do have 14 months under this agreement before U.S. troops would leave Afghanistan altogether.

A lot can and will happen between now and then. We can only hope and pray that Trump—or his successor—comes to his senses and recognizes the danger and folly of acting out his isolationist fantasies in Afghanistan.

Feature photo credit: Live Science.

Trump’s Careful and Deliberative Actions in Afghanistan Contradict His Reckless Rhetoric

We noted yesterday that President Trump is eager to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Yet, he’s been president for three years and hasn’t done so. Why? Clifford May, President and Founder of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies explains why in today’s Washington Times:

I suspect his advisers have painted a picture of what could happen were he to cut and run:

A historic Taliban victory and U.S. defeat; helicopters evacuating diplomats from the U.S. embassy; pro-American Afghans having their heads chopped off with videos going viral; America’s enemies around the world redoubling their efforts to hasten what would be seen as America’s imminent decline and fall.

Not the results Mr. Trump wants to produce—least of all in an election year.

Trump himself made this same point, essentially, during a July 1, 2019, interview with Fox News’ Tucker Carlson.

Trump told Carlson that he would “like to just get out” of Afghanistan; but “the problem is that it [Afghanistan] just seems to be a lab for terrorists… I call it the Harvard of terrorists..”

Trump noted that the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center in New York City were trained in Afghanistan; and that the country’s history as a terrorist training ground and terrorist base of operations makes withdrawing U.S. troops there problematic.

“I’ll give you a tough one, if you were in my position,” he told Carlson:

A great central-casting general walks up into your office. I say we’re getting out. “Yes, Sir, we’ll get out. Yes, Sir.”

I say, ‘What do you think of that?” “Sir, I’d rather attack them over there than attack them in our land.” In other word, them come here.

That’s always a very tough decision, you know, with what happened at the World Trade Center, etcetera, etcetera.

When they [U.S. military leaders] say that, you know, no matter how you feel…

When you’re standing there and you have some really talented military people saying “I’d rather attack them over there than have them hit us over here and fight them on our land”— it’s something you always have to think about.

Now, I would leave and will leave—we will be leaving—very strong intelligence, far more than you would normally think, because it’s very important. And we can do it that way, too. But we have reduced the forces very substantially in Afghanistan.

First off, kudos to Tucker Carlson for asking an important and straightforward question about Afghanistan and giving the president the time and space that he needed to answer that question fully and completely.

I am not a fan of Carlson. His snide anti-interventionist views do not comport with my own perspective, but credit where credit’s due.

Carlson, obviously, has earned Trump’s trust; and, as a result, Trump shares with him his thinking. This is something that Trump rarely does (at last in a serious and thoughtful way), and the result here is great journalism and a genuine public service.

Reassuring. Moreover, it is reassuring to know that Trump sometimes listens, seriously and with due respect and consideration, to his military advisers, and doesn’t always act out impulsively as he often seems wont to do.

It also is reassuring to hear Trump say that, so long as he is president, the United States will retain a robust intelligence apparatus in Afghanistan.

This almost certainly means that some number of troops will be kept there indefinitely to collect and analyze intelligence and ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a terrorist base of operations from which to attack the United States.

The fear with Trump, though, is that what he says one day he may not mean the next day. He can and does change his mind impulsively. Policy decision-making, consequently, can be inconsistent and erratic.

Syria. Look at what happened in Syria, for instance. Trump abruptly announced last fall that he was withdrawing U.S. troops. This set off an unnecessary military and humanitarian disaster.

The president then announced soon thereafter that he would keep some U.S. troops in Syria, ostensibly to “protect the oil,” but the strategic damage already had been done: U.S.- and allied-controlled territory had been ceded to Russian- and Iranian-backed regime forces; the Islamic State had been given a new lease on life; and chaos reigned—and still does.

However, at least with respect to Afghanistan, Trump seems to be proceeding carefully, cautiously and deliberatively, with greater situational awareness and understanding of the longer-term strategic ramifications of his actions and what these actions might mean for the safety and security of the American people.

Trump’s caution may be surprising in light of his more reckless rhetoric about wanting to leave Afghanistan. Yet it is nonetheless reassuring, and it makes Trump a more successful president. More importantly, the American people are better served—and better protected—as a result.

Feature photo: DoD/DVIDS via KNOP News.

‘Endless War’ Is an Inaccurate Talking Point that Imperils Our Safety and National Security

Isolationists and anti-interventionists on both the left and the right have scored a lot of political points by decrying so-called endless war. It’s a great polemical talking point. Who, after all, is for “endless war”?

The talking point resonates because the United States has been in Afghanistan for 19 years and in Iraq for almost as long. But the term “endless war” is misleading, and it obscures more than it clarifies. And, in so doing, it distorts the policy options and choices that lie before us.

The choice that we face as a nation is not between peace or “endless war.” The choice that we face is between: a) a proliferation of dangerous threats; or b) a steady and consistent military and diplomatic presence abroad that keeps those threats at bay.

No one, after all, is talking about launching another 2003-style Iraq War, another 2007-style Iraq surge, or another 2001-style “shock and awe” campaign in Afghanistan or anywhere else for that matter. Large-scale occupying forces are neither needed nor desired now.

That’s because we’ve learned a lot in the past two decades of ongoing military engagement. We’ve learned that a large and massive military footprint isn’t always ideal and in fact, can sometimes be counterproductive.

But we’ve also learned that small numbers of highly trained U.S. military personnel and advisers can have an extraordinarily beneficial and outsized impact.

They can seriously stiffen the spines of our friends and allies; dramatically strengthen and enhance our diplomatic and negotiating leverage; and, in general, keep a lid on things, so to speak, by containing threats that otherwise would imperil our national security and safety worldwide.

Iraq and Syria. We saw this, for instance, in Iraq and Syria, where small numbers of U.S. special forces, aerial intelligence assets, and American air power were instrumental in uprooting the Islamic State and destroying its so-called caliphate.

That’s why President Trump’s decision last fall to abruptly withdraw U.S. troops from Syria was so tragically misguided, counterproductive and dangerous: It undermined our diplomatic leverage there and gave our enemies an opening to attack our friends and allies and undermine our interests.

Trump has since redeployed some of those troops to other parts of Syria; but his oft-expressed desire to leave altogether has weakened our position and embolden our enemies.

Trump should have learned from Obama’s foolish decision to withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq. That decision led to the Islamic State, which, in turn, forced Obama to send U.S. troops back into Iraq.

Afghanistan. Yet, here are we are again, only this time in Afghanistan. A small contingent of U.S. forces there (roughly 12,000 troops), playing a key support role, have been critical in containing a witches’ brew of the Taliban, ISIS, al-Qaeda, and assorted other Jihadists. Yet, all Trump can do is talk about withdrawing U.S. troops and leaving Afghanistan.

“Time to come home,” he said Sunday. “They want to stop. You know, they’ve been fighting a long time. They’re tough people. We’re tough people. But after 19 years, that’s a long time.”

Yes, it is a long time. You know what also hasn’t happened in a long time? An attack on the United States that was planned and executed from a terrorist base in Afghanistan. Let’s keep it that way.

But the only way we’ll continue to protect the American homeland is not by “coming home,” but rather by keeping our foot on the enemy’s throat, so to speak, through a steady and consistent forward presence overseas.

A myopic and misplaced obsession with “endless war” obscures this reality. It’s long past time that we stopped—or ended, if you will—using the term altogether. As a policy option, it is inaccurate, and it doesn’t help or clarify the U.S. foreign policy debate.

What if Trump Used His Twitter Feed to Wage War Against ISIS?

Many critics, myself included, lament the fact that President Trump tweets so much. In truth, though, the problem is not that Trump tweets so much; it’s that so much of what he tweets is embarrassing, juvenile, and blatantly detrimental to his own political interests.

But just imagine, if you will, a president who had greater self-awareness, self-discipline, maturity, wisdom, savvy, and political smarts. Why, such a president could tweet regularly and often, but to much greater political effect. I thought about this when reading an excellent piece by Thomas Joscelyn in The Dispatch.

Joscelyn is a senior editor at the Long War Journal published by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. He notes that, according to fresh reporting by Martin Chulov and Mohammed Rasool in The Guadian, the Islamic State’s new leader is Amir Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Salbi, also known as Haji Abdullah; and he is not an Arab, but an ethnic Turkmen.

Salbi (or Haji Abdullah) became the leader of ISIS after their previous leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, blew himself up in a U.S. military raid in late October 2019. And the fact that Salbi is not an Arab, but an ethnic Turkmen is a real problem for the Islamic State: because it calls into question Salbi’s legitimacy as a ruler in the eyes of the jihadists whom he’s supposed to lead and command.

Why is that? Because ISIS’s claim to legitimacy its based on the fact that its rulers supposedly descend from the Prophet Muhammad; but such a claim is dubious, Joscelyn points out, if in fact, Salbi is not an Arab.

An earlier leader of the Islamic State, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, had much the same problem, he notes.

Jihadist critics argued that no one really knew Abu Omar’s true identity or background, so it was absurd for anyone to declare their fealty to him. Bin Laden had to answer this charge in both his private correspondence and public statements.

There’s more to the story, but the point is that this could be a real problem for the current Islamic State, which split off from al-Qaeda. But thus far the U.S. and its allies have done little to exploit it.

“If the U.S. and its allies were adept at messaging—and, trust me,” Joscelyn writes, “they are not—this is the sort of apparent discrepancy that would be trumpeted far and wide as part of a counterterrorist media campaign.”

Internecine Jihadi War. This is a great and under-appreciated point. Internecine ideological disputes within the Jihadist ranks are intense and very real—and taken quite seriously by the Jihadists themselves. The United States should be doing everything that it possibly can to exploit these divisions and keep the Jihadists divided and at war with themselves.

This is especially important because, as Joscelyn observes, ISIS is not yet dead. Indeed, despite the loss of its territory, the terrorist group retains an estimated 14,000 to 18,000 combatants in Syria and Iraq combined, including “key veteran personnel” such as Haji Abdullah.

Haji Abdullah, in fact, “is a founding member of the Islamic State’s first incarnation, with his jihadist biography stretching back to the days of al-Qaeda in Iraq (circa 2003-04),” Joscelyn writes.

An American President who understood this (not President Trump, obviously) could use his Twitter feed smartly and wisely to wage war agains the Jihadists.

And there is no need for heavy propaganda or editorializing either. Simply tweeting out a link to this Guardian article, for instance, and mildly asking some fair and legitimate questions about the ISIS leader would do the trick.

Unfortunately, Trump would rather tweet in juvenile and idiotic fashion about what he last saw on Fox News or how he was wronged by the “Deep State.” But the problem is not Twitter, which, in the right hands, can be used well and to good effect. The problem is the man—or the adolescent in a man’s body—behind the tweet.

Feature photo credit: The Guardian