Commentators routinely say we know nothing. In truth, we know a lot—about the role of NATO, the fear of “escalation,” and Putin’s likely successor.
The ramifications of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s aborted rebellion against the Russian military are still playing out and won’t be fully known for many weeks and possibly many months. However, the rebellion underscores or illuminates three key points of longstanding historical significance:
- First, Putin’s war on Ukraine had nothing to do with NATO, NATO expansion, or phantom NATO threats to Russia.
- Second, fears that Putin might “escalate” the conflict if the West somehow “provokes” him by fully arming Ukraine are misplaced and misguided.
- Third, we can see the type of leader who might succeed Putin. The successor most likely will be an autocrat who is hostile to the West; but he also will be someone the West can tolerate or live with—provided Ukraine wins and Russia loses the war.
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First, Putin’s war on Ukraine had nothing to do with NATO, NATO expansion, or phantom NATO threats to Russia.
Many prominent observers have bought into this lie and it remains widely touted; but it was always a ruse used by Putin to try and legitimize his illegal and unprovoked war on Ukraine. Now, Prigozhin himself admits as much.
“The Armed Forces of Ukraine were not going to attack Russia with NATO,” Prigozhin admits in a video uploaded to Telegram Friday, June 23. “The war was needed for a bunch of scumbags to triumph and show how strong of an army they are.”
Prigozhin, reports the New York Times,
described his country’s invasion of Ukraine as a “racket” perpetrated by a corrupt elite chasing money and glory without concern for Russian lives. He also challenged the Kremlin’s claim that Kyiv had been on the verge of attacking Russian-backed separatist territory in Ukraine’s east when Russia invaded.
“The war wasn’t needed to return Russian citizens to our bosom, nor to demilitarize or denazify Ukraine,” Mr. Prigozhin said, referring to Mr. Putin’s initial justifications for the war. “The war was needed so that a bunch of animals could simply exult in glory.”
Second, fears that Putin might “escalate” the conflict if the West somehow “provokes” him by fully arming Ukraine are misguided and misplaced.
As we observed back in February, the Biden administration’s fear of “escalation” never made any sense. Russia has no real ability to “escalate,” militarily, and our objective ought to be to bring the war to a swift and decisive conclusion.
The real danger is a long, costly and drawn-out war or stalemate caused by American self-deterrence and our continued refusal to provide Ukraine with long-range precision weaponry, such as the the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and F-16 fighter jets.
This point has been underscored by Putin’s response to Prigozhin’s armed rebellion. As Michael McFaul points out:
Putin talked tough in his national address [June 24]. He sounded like someone preparing for a big fight. But when faced with the difficult decision of trying to stop Wagner mercenaries with major force, he backed down. In this game of chicken, we swerved off the road. He didn’t escalate. He didn’t need a face-saving off-ramp to declare victory.
When facing the possibility of really losing to Wagner mercenaries coming into Moscow, he instead capitulated. Rather than doubling down with overwhelming force to crush the mutiny, Putin accepted humiliation instead.
He was the rat trapped in the corner that so many Putinologists have told us to fear. But he didn’t lash out and go crazy. He didn’t take the riskier path of fighting a civil war. He negotiated…
The lesson for the war in Ukraine is clear. Putin is more likely to negotiate and end his war if he is losing on the battlefield, not when there is a stalemate.
Those who have argued that Ukraine must not attack Crimea for fear of triggering escalation must now reevaluate that hypothesis. The sooner Putin fears he is losing the war, the faster he will negotiate.
Third, we can see the type of leader who might succeed Putin. The successor most likely will be an autocrat who is hostile to the West; but he also will be someone the West can tolerate or live with—provided Ukraine wins and Russia loses the war.
No one has any illusions that a liberal reformer will emerge from the sewer of Russian politics. For the most part, the liberals have all fled the country. Russia, moreover, has no real liberal political tradition or history.
Even prominent dissident Alexei Navalny is a committed Russian nationalist, albeit, as Stephen Kotkin points out, “one who also says out loud that the war was a terrible idea and is hurting Russia.”
Navalny and Prigozhin, in fact, are two different types of nationalists who could could conceivably succeed Putin.
“…An authoritarian Russian nationalist who recognizes the war is a mistake and, whether fully intentionally or not, effectively ends the war, or at least the current active phase of it—that’s the one kind of person who could threaten [and succeed] Putin,” Kotkin explains.
This successor, he adds, would “recognize the separate existence of a Ukrainian nation and state”—not because he is a “good guy” or a liberal reformer, but simply because he bows to the political and military reality brought about by a war that his predecessor, Putin, and not he, foolishly started.
The bottom line: the role, or lack thereof, of NATO expansion in the run-up to the war; the significance, or lack thereof, of military “escalation” in the prosecution of the war; and the type of Russian ruler who succeeds Putin after the war—these three issues have all been brought into stark relief as a result of Prigozhin’s aborted rebellion against the Russian military.
Stay tuned. The best (or at least the most intriguing) is yet to come.
Feature photo credit: Russian dictator Vladimir Putin (L) and Wagner Group mercenary head Yevgeny Prigozhin (R), courtesy of the Toronto Star.
