Pretending otherwise will result in NATO negotiating with itself, appeasing Putin, and abandoning Ukraine.
Washington Post foreign policy columnist David Ignatius thinks the 1962 Cuban missile crisis might offer clues on how President Biden can simultaneously achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives in Ukraine, while also giving Russian dictator Vladimir Putin an “off-ramp,”or some “face-saving way out” of his dire predicament.
Ignatius, of course, is rightly concerned about Putin’s threat to use tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. However, the historical template that he cites is misplaced and decidedly unhelpful.
Simply put, 2022 Ukraine is not 1962 Cuba, and pretending that it might be will lead President Biden and other policymakers astray.
- For starters, Russian missiles in Cuba were a direct threat to the American homeland. Which means they were an existential threat to the United States. Tactical or battlefield nukes in Ukraine, by contrast, do not threaten the American homeland. Nor do they threaten any NATO country.
Russian tactical nukes do threaten Ukraine, obviously. But pretending that they spell worldwide armageddon is hyperbolic and untrue.
- Second, when Russia deployed nukes in Cuba, the West had reason to believe it was facing a formidable military and economic power. No one has any such illusions about Russia today.
As the Financial Times notes, “the Russian economy is not globally significant, though individual sectors such as oil and gas do matter.” The Russian military, meanwhile, has show itself in Ukraine to be utterly incompetent and incapable of waging war, and it now teeters on the verge of collapse.
Russia does have the world’s largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, and that is, indeed, worrisome. However, Russia never has launched a nuclear strike against a NATO country because it knows that would result in an immediate retaliatory strike against Moscow.
Deterrence worked throughout the Cold War and deterrence will work today—if President Biden and other NATO leaders do not waver and remain resolved and determined.
- Third, in 1962 Cuba, Russian dictator Nikita Khrushchev was looking for an off-ramp. In 2022 Ukraine, by contrast, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin, clearly is not—something Ignatius himself admits.
Instead, by word and by deed, Putin has demonstrated that he interested in gobbling up as much of Ukraine as he possibly can now, while husbanding his resources for its complete subjugation later.
Given this reality, it is beyond futile to try and give Putin something he clearly does not want. We end up negotiating not with Putin, but with ourselves. This results in more self-defeating self-deterrence and appeasement.
- Fourth, 1962 Cuba was a communist territory firmly ensconced in the Soviet orbit. 2022 Ukraine, by contrast, is a Western democracy valiantly and heroically seeking to free itself of Russian domination or attempted Russian domination.
For this reason, it arguably made sense for President Kennedy to pledge (as he did) that the United States would not invade Cuba or intervene in Cuban internal affairs in exchange for the removal of Russian missiles there.
But given the very different status of Ukraine today, any substantive concession that the United States or NATO pledges to Russia re: Ukraine will result in the unconscionable abandonment of that country and its people. This is and ought to be a nonstarter.
Ukraine’s entry into the EU and NATO, for instance, is more necessary and inevitable now than it was before the Russian invasion.
- Fifth, like many observers, Ignatius laments Ukraine’s determination to defeat Russia on the battlefield and drive Russia out of all of Ukrainian territory. He laments this because Ignatius would like to see Ukraine give Putin something Russian can crow about and call a victory. That, after all, would make a “face-saving compromise” possible.
But the only thing a “face-saving compromise” can possibly mean is giving some Ukrainian territory to Russia and abandoning millions of Ukrainians to the tender mercies of Russian rule and domination.
Given all that we know about Russian rule, this is truly unconscionable and wrong. It also violates a fundamental principle, the territorial integrity of nations, that underlies the international order.
The danger of rewarding Russian military aggression should be obvious. The precedent established will inevitably result in other countries (China perhaps) unilaterally using military might to redraw the world’s national boundaries and territorial claims.
- Sixth, Ignatius suggests that Ukraine is still poised to lose to Russia. He says that Ukraine “needs a reality check about its longer-term battlefield prospects”
This is a remarkable statement. It might have made sense back in February, when Western intelligence estimated that the Ukrainian Army would quickly crumble, Kyiv would fall within days, Zelensky would flee the country, and Russian rule would be established.
In fact, as we now know, nothing of the sort happened. In fact, the opposite has happened. David has heroically beaten back Goliath. And David might well defeat Goliath if America and NATO stop slow-walking their delivery of aid to the Ukrainian military out of an utterly misplaced fear of “provoking” or “cornering” Putin.
“Despite the large quantities [of military aid] flowing to Ukraine,” writes Eliot A. Cohen,
the fact remains that it is not enough, and that the logistical system can handle more…
Some capable countries, [i.e., Germany], are unwilling to give at scale…
Most other countries, including the United States, continue to refrain from the level of industrial mobilization necessary. It is too much business as usual…
Some of the hesitancy, too, has stemmed from a patronizing wariness about Ukrainian capabilities. Yet if we have learned anything in this war, it is that the Ukrainians, smart and driven as they are, can absorb even the most advanced systems fast, and exploit them shrewdly.
At this point, they know more about high-intensity warfare than we do.
Exactly. There is a time and a place to negotiate and to try and offer one’s adversary an “off-ramp” or a “face-saving way out.” That worked in 1962 Cuba. It will not work in 2022 Ukraine. The differences between these two times and places are too stark, and pretending that they’re not will lead President Biden and other policymakers astray.
What America and NATO must now do is accelerate their military aid to Ukraine to ensure Russia’s utter and abject defeat.
At the same time, the West must ensure that Russia is under no illusions. Russian use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine will result in the swift demise of the Russian military there via conventional NATO military means.
Then and only then can a real and lasting peace be achieved.
Feature photo credit: Russian dictators Vladimir Putin (2022) and Nikita Khrushchev (1962), courtesy of the The Telegraph.
