Posts tagged as “War and National Security”

Israel Should Ignore Recent American Military Counsel Re: Gaza and Hamas

Israel Should Ignore Recent American Military Counsel Re: Gaza and Hamas

By John R Guardiano on November 11, 2023

U.S. military leaders are projecting their experience in Iraq and Afghanistan onto Israel in Gaza. But these are dissimilar conflicts with fundamentally different objectives.

What can Israel learn from the recent American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Much less than U.S. military leaders seem to think.

For example, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., told reporters recently that the complete destruction of Hamas is “a pretty large order.”

According to The Times of Israel, Brown said he worries that too many civilian Palestinian deaths might radicalize the Palestinian population and thereby create more terrorists.

“That’s something we have to pay attention to,” he said.

That’s why when we talk about time—the faster you can get to a point where you stop the hostilities, you have less strife for the civilian population that turns into someone who now wants to be the next member of Hamas.

This counsel of caution is bad and inapt military advice. The General is mistakenly projecting the recent American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan onto Israel in Gaza today. But this truly is an apples-to-oranges comparison.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military was waging a counterinsurgency campaign designed to legitimize, in the eyes of the populace, new and indigenous national and regional governments.

For this reason, creating more terrorists through excessive civilian deaths and excessive collateral damage was a legitimate concern.

Israel, however, is not waging a counterinsurgency campaign; it is waging a war to destroy Hamas. And the Palestinian population in Gaza already is radicalized.

“Children are marinated from birth in Jew hatred,” notes Andrew McCarthy. “Hamas,” he writes, “was elected by Palestinians because it wants to destroy Israel and murder” Jews.

Moreover, as recent videos from Gaza show, although the Palestinians in Gaza are radicalized and filled with genocidal hatred of the Jews, many Palestinians nonetheless seem to understand that Hamas is corrupt and living high off the hog while they suffer from Hamas-induced war and material deprivation.

Military Objective. This doesn’t mean that Israel should simply destroy Gaza. That would be wrong and immoral, and it would breed righteous diplomatic isolation of the Jewish State. Too many civilians would needlessly die as a result.

Simply destroying Gaza, of course, is not what Israel is doing. Instead, Israel is destroying Hamas, while going to extraordinary lengths to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage.

Gen. Brown to the contrary notwithstanding, destroying Hamas is a fully achievable military objective. Israel can destroy Hamas as a military force. It can destroy Hamas’ military infrastructure, capability, and wherewithal.

Hamas, obviously, may continue to exist as a political and ideological movement. That is much harder to extinguish. Destroying Hamas, politically and ideologically, is well beyond the purview and capability of the Israeli Defense Forces. But destroying Hamas as a military force is hardily a fanciful or farfetched objective.

As for who rules Gaza after Hamas, that really is not Israel’s concern. Unlike the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, Israel is not trying to establish a civilian government in Gaza: it simply is trying to eliminate a military threat there.

The post-Hamas civilian government will be established and administered by someone else, some other regional or international body—the Palestinian Authority, perhaps; maybe the Arab League; possibly the United Nations.

Israel, meanwhile, will be at the ready, fully prepared to eliminate any nascent military capability or threat that might again emerge in Gaza in the future.

‘Mowing the Lawn’. This is different from Israel’s previous approach to Gaza, which was to permit or allow establishment of a Hamas military base there while periodically brushing it back through military strikes. This was known as “mowing the lawn.”

Israel no longer will “mow the lawn.” Israel now will stop the lawn from ever being planted, even as many Palestinians in Gaza remain eager to grow new grass.

General Colin Powell famously said, “You break it; you own it.” That may have been true of Iraq and Afghanistan, but it is not true of Gaza. Gaza was badly broken before Israel invaded.

In fact, Israel invaded Gaza to fix it. Fixing Gaza, as far as Israel is concerned, means eliminating its military infrastructure, capability, and wherewithal, nothing more and nothing less.

The bottom line: Israel knows what it is doing, and what it is doing bears little resemblance to what the United States set out to do in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Israelis seem to understand this. The United States should, too.

Feature photo credit: the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr., courtesy of Task & Purpose (Eric Dietrich/U.S. Air Force).

What the Korean War Can Teach Us about Ending Russia’s War on Ukraine

What the Korean War Can Teach Us about Ending Russia’s War on Ukraine

By John R Guardiano on August 5, 2023

In Ukraine, President Biden is drawing exactly the wrong lessons from President Truman’s mishandling of the Korean War in 1951.

Opponents of American aid to Ukraine often tout the Korean War as a model for ending the war in Ukraine. The United States, it is argued, wisely refrained from “escalating” in Korea, instead signing an armistice that ended the conflict, thus allowing for a cold but endurable peace.

The Communists retained control of North Korea, but failed to achieve their objective of conquering all of Korea.

In the same way, argue the opponents of American aid to Ukraine, Russia should be allowed to retain control of Crimea, the Donbas, and other parts of southeastern Ukraine nominally or firmly in its control.

This will allow a free, sovereign, and independent Ukraine to coexist alongside Russian-occupied Ukraine—just as free, sovereign, and independent South Korea has coexisted for decades alongside Communist North Korea.

Then and only then, they insist, can the war end and peace be realized or achieved.

In fact, the Korean War is instructive to American policymakers, but not in the ways that opponents of American aid to Ukraine think.

The Korean War is an example of American self-deterrence that needlessly prolonged the war and the horrific human cost of that war. The United States eschewed a relatively quick victory for a bloody and prolonged stalemate or tie.

For this reason, the Korean War is a cautionary tale of what America should not do when aiding and abetting a country fighting for its survival against a tyrannical foe.

For starters, the war dragged on for three long, inconclusive, and interminable years in which American casualties mounted. Why? Because U.S. President Harry Truman refused to pursue victory out of a misguided fear of “escalation” and “World War III.”

Truman and Biden. Most historians today laud Truman’s caution and restraint in Korea—just as most observers today laud Biden’s caution and restraint in Ukraine. But Truman was wrong then and Biden is wrong today.

Truman is seen as wise because he is juxtaposed against U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who failed to anticipate the Chinese intervention in Korea, and whose insubordination and bellicosity subsequently resulted in his dismissal by Truman.

Biden, likewise, is seen as wise because he is juxtaposed against Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Putin and his henchmen often intimate that he might use nuclear weapons. Zelensky, meanwhile, is constantly beseeching Biden to send Ukraine more and more advanced weapons.

For this reason, Biden is often seen as wiser and more sober-minded than Putin and Zelensky. Truman, too, is typically remembered as more rational and level-headed than MacArthur.

Limited or Total War? But the choice between a prolonged war of indecision on the one hand and a global nuclear conflagration on the other hand is a silly and fallacious choice that did not exist then and does not exist now.

“Between the extremes of Truman’s restraint and the possibility of global war,” write Rep. Michael Gallagher (R-Wisconsin) and Aaron MacLean, “numerous options existed.

Truman’s decision to renounce nuclear threats and to restrict combat operations to Korea and its airspace prolonged the war and, paradoxically, extended the period in which it could have escalated.

In truth, shortly after MacArthur had been relieved of his command by Truman on Apr. 11, 1951, the United States was well on its way to routing the Chinese and North Koreans, reuniting the Korean peninsula, and ending the war with Korea wholly free and intact.

However, Truman and his military appointees on the Joint Chiefs of Staff put the kibosh on Lieutenant General James Van Fleet’s May 28, 1951, request “for a major offensive into North Korea to complete the destruction of the Chinese Armies,” reports Robert B. Bruce in Army History magazine (Winter 2012).

Instead of military victory, the United States pursued a negotiated solution in Korea and thus gave Communist forces a sanctuary in North Korea. As a result, the war dragged on for two more long years and at a horrific human cost.

In Ukraine, Biden, too, has called for a negotiated solution, while deliberately withholding from Ukraine advanced weapons—including, for instance, long-range precision artillery, tanks, jets, and aircraft, which would allow the Ukrainians to more quickly and aggressively attack Russian positions and drive Russian forces out of Ukraine.

Biden also has refused to use U.S. air and naval forces to safeguard the shipment of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. The reason: he fears “escalation” and “World War III.”

But in truth, Russia is exhausted militarily and is in no position to “escalate” its war on Ukraine.

Sure, Russia has nuclear weapons, but the use of tactical or battlefield nukes serves no military purpose and gives Russia no battlefield edge other than shock value.

Korea 1951. And the same was true of Chinese and North Korean forces in June 1951. They were exhausted, militarily, and did not even possess nuclear weapons. Russia, a North Korean ally and supporter, did have nuclear weapons, but in numbers dwarfed by the United States.

Moreover, although Russian leader Joseph Stalin conceived of the Korean War as a way to expand Communist influence and control, internationally, Russia was not directly involved in the Korean War and had no intention of becoming involved, as its focus was on Europe.

Ironically, as Gallagher and MacLean note, the Korean War ended only when former World War II Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected president (in 1952) and “contemplated and discussed the possibility of escalation, even approving the development of war plans that involved the use of nuclear weapons.”

Then, too, Stalin died on Mar. 5, 1953. This was significant because Stalin was the foremost obstacle to peace in Korea. He had “insisted that the war continue despite the misgivings of Chinese and North Korean leaders,” writes Mark Kramer.

Putin, likewise, is the foremost obstacle to peace in Ukraine. Thus his death, resulting in regime change in Russia, certainly would greatly enhance the prospects of a peace agreement.

The bottom line: President Truman’s mismanagement of the Korean War 72 years ago does, indeed, hold lessons for President Biden as he manages the war in Ukraine today. But those lessons teach Biden what not to do.

Unfortunately, our president is drawing the exact opposite conclusion and the result is a needlessly prolonged war of indecision at a horrific human cost to innocent Ukrainians.

One of the chief lessons of the Korean War is that the fear of “escalation” against a weak and exhausted military enemy is a catastrophic mistake. In truth, the risk of “escalation” rises if the war is allowed to drag on and the enemy is permitted to regroup.

Ditto “World War III”. That was not a realistic concern in 1951 and it is not a realistic concern today, in 2023. However, by allowing the North Korean regime to survive, Truman increased the risk of World War III significantly in the intervening decades.

Likewise, in Ukraine. If Russia is not clearly and explicitly defeated, militarily, and expelled from all of Ukraine, it will regroup and resume its fight in Ukraine at a later date when it is better prepared. “World War III” then becomes more likely.

In short, there is no substitute for victory and there is no reason not to pursue victory. That was true in Korea 1951 and it is true in Ukraine 2023.

Feature photo credit: President Biden (L), courtesy of the Associated Press and President Harry S. Truman (R), courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, published in NPR.

Why Winning—in Ukraine and Elsewhere—is Key to a Successful U.S. Foreign Policy

Why Winning—in Ukraine and Elsewhere—is Key to a Successful U.S. Foreign Policy

By John R Guardiano on March 1, 2023

Sending F-16s to Ukraine is critical for many reasons, but mostly because it underscores America’s commitment to ensuring Ukraine wins.

A successful American foreign policy hinges on winning and succeeding in the international arena. After all “nothing succeeds like success. Countries follow the strong or successful horse,” we’ve argued.

Conversely, failure breeds more failure. A good example of this is the Biden administration’s disastrous surrender of Afghanistan to the Taliban. That fiasco led directly to the Russia-Chinese “no limits” partnership and Putin’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine.

Moreover, a big reason China has not yet provided Russia with weapon systems and armaments is because Russia looks like a loser in Ukraine, and China is reticent to throw good money after bad.

But if it looks like Russia can hang on and effect a prolonged stalemate in Ukraine, then China is more likely to come to Russia’s aid. And, if that happens, a wider and larger-scale war in multiple theaters of operation—aka “World War III”—also becomes more likely.

Ukraine. For this reason, it is critical that the Biden administration overcome its misplaced fear of “escalation” and focus on winning in Ukraine.

That means moving expeditiously to arm Ukraine with the full suite of weapon systems—fighter jets, helicopters, long-range artillery, Predator drones, et al.—needed to conduct a combined arms offensive that will finish off the Russian military and end this war.

Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colorado), a former Army Ranger who now serves on the House Foreign Affairs and Intelligence committees, agrees. As he told CNN’s Erin Burnett yesterday (Feb. 28, 2023):

What I’m concerned about is the escalation of failure. If Russia wins this [war] and conquers Ukraine, what message does that send to autocrats, to dictators, around the world? To China? … If we fail, that’s escalatory in and of itself, and that’s not something I’m willing to accept.

F-16s. Crow is one of five military veterans in Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike, who have signed a letter urging the Biden administration to send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. The Ukrainians have pleaded for these aircraft, but the Biden administration has balked for fear of “provoking Putin.”

Team Biden says F-16s are too complicated to operate and will take too long for the Ukrainians to master in time for the current fight. But as Rep. Crow points out, U.S. military pilots who have actually trained with the Ukrainians say they can become proficient with the aircraft in three to six months.

That’s “much faster than I’ve been told by other folks in the administration,” Crow said.

And the reason we know this is because we have had a nine-year partnership between the California Air National Guard and the Ukrainian Air Force.

For nine years, they’ve been flying and training with the Ukrainians—over 1,000 training engagements in that time. And they’re telling us: ‘The Ukrainians know these systems. They know how to train. They’re capable of getting this done.’

Middle East. And it’s not only in Ukraine that the administration needs to focus on winning. Walter Russell Mead warns:

The U.S. is much closer to getting involved in another Middle East war than most in Washington understand… Minimizing this danger requires rapid and sweeping policy change from an administration still struggling to comprehend the most serious international crisis since the late 1930s…

The best way to avoid war, and to minimize direct American engagement should war break out, is to ensure that our Middle East allies have the power to defend themselves. We must make it unmistakably clear that we will ensure our allies win should hostilities break out. Nothing else will do [emphasis added].

As Vince Lombardi famously put it: “winning isn’t everything; it’s the only thing.” Certainly, it’s the critical and necessary thing to prevent war and preserve the peace.

Feature photo credit: Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colorado), courtesy of NBC’s Today Show.

What Does History Portend for Ukraine?

What Does History Portend for Ukraine?

By John R Guardiano on January 8, 2023

One’s view of the war in Ukraine depends largely on which historical precedent—World War I, World War II, the Cold War, or Iraq and Afghanistan—you think applies.

Michael Brendan Dougherty argues in National Review that American intervention in Ukraine is a “nearly utopian project with obvious, foreseeable risks and potentially ruinous costs.”

Dougherty’s analysis wildly misses the mark. Among his errors: he doesn’t believe the United States has a strategic rationale for seeking to cripple the Russian military in Ukraine, and he believes that by helping Ukraine, we are weakening our position in Taiwan vis-à-vis China.

In truth, of course, Russia has proven, by its actions over the past two decades, that it is an enemy of the United States. So crippling its military in Ukraine absolutely serves the American national interest.

And of course, by aiding Ukraine, militarily, we are exposing—and resolving—problems with our weapons production and supply chain bottlenecks that will redound, ultimately, to the benefit of Taiwan.

We are also learning valuable lessons about what types of weapons systems and tactical approaches might prove most effective at deterring a potential Chinese invasion.

Nonetheless, despite misfiring, Dougherty inadvertently shows how the misapplication of historical precedent has distorted our understanding of Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Iraq and Afghanistan. Although he himself does not explicitly say so, Dougherty, I think, sees the war through the prism of recent history, and specifically, the unsatisfactory American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus he calls American intervention in Ukraine “a nearly utopian project” that is “peripheral to U.S. interests.”

Of course, that’s how many critics saw and see the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—as quixotic and costly diversions from core American interests. And the fact that these wars dragged on interminably gives these critics standing in the minds of many Americans who now worry about U.S. involvement in Ukraine.

I do not believe this recent historical precedent is very applicable and for myriad reasons:

Europe is not the Middle East or Central Asia; one sovereign state (Russia) invading another sovereign state (Ukraine) is very different from a civil conflict within one state (Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively); and Ukrainians have demonstrated a fervent sense of nationalism and will to win that was often absent in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

For these and other reasons, the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan is, I think, an utterly inapt and unhelpful historical precedent—though, to be sure, there are lessons to be learned there.

For example, small numbers of American military advisers and battlefield intelligence can be dramatic force multipliers. That was true in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is true in Ukraine as well.

(The U.S. military advises Ukrainian soldiers via Zoom or Microsoft Teams; and it trains Ukrainian soldiers at American and NATO military bases in the United States and Europe, but outside of Ukraine.)

Cold War. Another historical precedent that people, including Dougherty, fall back upon is the Cold War. Thus whenever Putin engages in nuclear saber rattling, many Western analysts talk about the importance of learning lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis and providing Putin with an “off-ramp.”

But during the Cold War, Ukraine was part and parcel of the Soviet Union. Today, by contrast, it is a free, sovereign, and independent country.

The Cuban Missile Crisis, likewise, involved a country (Cuba) that was firmly ensconced in the Soviet orbit. Ukraine, by contrast, is a Western democracy (or aspiring Western democracy) valiantly and heroically seeking to free itself of Russian domination or attempted Russian domination.

For these and other reasons, the strategic and military calculus has radically and necessarily changed from the Cold War to the present day.

Maintaining the balance of power between two superpowers is no longer at issue, as it was during the Cold War. Instead, what matters most is protecting the territorial integrity of independent nation-states like Ukraine.

World War I is another inapt historic precedent. There, competing alliances involving multiple countries led to an unforeseen escalatory spiral that soon engulfed all of Europe, Japan and the United States.

Today, by contrast, Russia fights alone, albeit with the help of Iranian drones. Thus any conceivable world war involving multiple countries would mean only one thing: NATO’s intervention and Russia’s swift and decisive defeat in Ukraine.

Russia knows this, which is why there will no World War I-like escalatory spiral in Ukraine.

World War II. That leaves World War II, which is arguably the most apt and helpful historical precedent for understanding Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Then as now, you had a country hellbent on imperialist conquest and domination. Hitler was determined to establish the Third Reich; Putin is determined to establish a new Russian empire. Then as now the only thing that might stop the dictator is timely Western aid and resolve.

In the 1930s, the West failed and the result was World War II. Today, thanks to the heroic resistance of Ukraine, the West is doing much better; and so, a larger-scale war might yet be averted. Time will tell and we will see.

The bottom line: history can both distort and clarify our understanding of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Not all historical precedent, after all, is equally valid and equally relevant.

Seeing the war through the prism of inapposite conflicts that are fundamentally different leads to misunderstanding and bad analysis. However, similar wartime dynamics from previous eras can be telling and instructive.

Anti-interventionists like Dougherty misfire because they are like old generals who fight the last war. They don’t realize that the conflict has fundamentally changed. The Cold War is over and Ukraine is neither Iraq nor Afghanistan.

Instead, Ukraine is more like Poland or Czechoslovakia in the late 1930s, but with more of a fighting chance if only the West will act with a greater sense of dispatch, or what Martin Luther King, Jr. called “the fierce urgency of now.”

Feature photo credit: Poland 1939, courtesy of Amazon.com.

The New U.S. Command to Aid Ukraine is a Good But Insufficient First Step

The New U.S. Command to Aid Ukraine is a Good But Insufficient First Step

By John R Guardiano on October 1, 2022

Now increase defense spending, put ‘boots on the ground’ in Ukraine, and move U.S. troops out of Germany and into Poland and the Baltic States.

The New York Times reports that the Pentagon is establishing a new command to arm Ukraine over the long haul. This is a good thing, because arming Ukraine and ensuring that it has all means necessary to defeat Russian aggression is and ought to be an American priority.

As we’ve noted, Ukraine today is at the epicenter of the fight for Western Civilization. This means that their fight is our fight, and their victory will be our victory.

The threat from Russia, moreover, is not going away anytime soon, even after each and every last Russian is expelled from all of Ukraine. Thus American-Ukrainian defense cooperation and engagement will be required for many years and several decades.

The close relationships that the U.S. military has with the militaries of Japan, South Korea, Israel, and Australia is the model we should emulate. And there are other lessons we must heed.

Robust military aid must be procured and delivered quickly, and American and NATO armories must be replenished pronto through a long-overdue increase in defense spending.

The Times reports that 18 new High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launchers (HIMARS) will be delivered to Ukraine directly from the manufacturer, Lockheed Martin. However, these will take “a few years” to arrive in country.

Sorry, but that isn’t good enough. This delay underscores the Biden administration’s overly timid approach to arming Ukraine. It also underscores the disconcerting lack of available munitions in American and NATO armories.

Defense Spending. The fact remains: the United States and NATO simply are not spending enough on defense. We weren’t spending enough before Russia invaded Ukraine, and we still aren’t spending enough after the fact.

Witness the fact that few NATO countries meet their pre-war pledge to spend a mere two percent of GDP on defense.

The United States spends between three and four percent of its GDP on defense, but that is dramatically less than it spent at the height of the Cold War (roughly 5-10 percent of GDP, according to Brookings Institution defense scholar Michael E. O’Hanlon).

There is no “substitute for military strength,” explains Elliott Abrams, ” and we do not have enough. It should be crystal clear now that a larger percentage of GDP will need to be spent on defense.”

America and NATO must place “boots on the ground” in (western) Ukraine.

The Times also notes that America and NATO had “boots on the ground” in Ukraine after Russia’s first invasion there in 2014. Western military advisers played a crucial role in strengthening and professionalizing the Ukrainian military.

However, when, earlier this year, Russia threatened to invade Ukraine again, America and NATO meekly and foolishly pulled their military advisers out of the country, and they have not returned since.

To be sure, a relative few Ukrainian soldiers have journeyed to Poland, Germany, Britain and the United States for training. But as the Times observes:

With no U.S. troops currently in Ukraine, providing support by phone or computer has been challenging, American officers say.

“It is much more difficult now to communicate with our allies and partners,” Maj. Gen. Steven G. Edwards, the head of U.S. Special Operations forces in Europe, said at a security forum this month.

“Teleconference is good, but it’s not nearly the same as what we had before.”

The American and NATO phobia about “boots on the ground” must end. In reality, having “boots on the ground” in Ukraine for several years goes a long way toward explaining the surprising success of the Ukrainian military.

Iraq-Afghanistan Distortion. But again, because of the American tendency to see Ukraine through the prism of Iraq and Afghanistan, policymakers feared that, if U.S. troops remained in Ukraine, they would end up fighting and dying there.

This fear might have made sense early on in the war when Russia was attempting to enter Kyiv. However, it made no sense several weeks into the conflict after the Russians were repulsed and forced to withdraw to eastern Ukraine.

When, in April 2022, the United States sent its diplomatic personnel back into Kyiv, it should have sent back in U.S. military advisers as well. We still should.

“World War III.” The fear that this might “provoke Putin” or cause “World War III,” as President Biden has suggested, is ludicrous. Putin knows America and NATO arm and advise Ukraine. Whether we do so in western Ukraine or Germany is a distinction without a difference in his eyes and meaningful only in Paris and Berlin, not Moscow.

Moreover, Russia demonstrated early on in this conflict that it is in no position to pick a fight with the United States or any NATO country.

Russian military incompetence and ineptitude is demonstrable and obvious. The West, not Russia, has the whip hand. We should act like it—not to “provoke Putin,” but to defend and liberate all of Ukraine.

Relocate NATO headquarters out of Brussels and into Warsaw; and, more importantly, redeploy the 38,000 U.S. troops now in Germany into Poland and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).

During the Cold War, it made sense to station hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops in West Germany. A Russian invasion there, after all, was a real possibility. However, this makes zero sense today, when the threat is not to Germany, but to Poland and the Baltic States.

Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania also are geographically much closer to Ukraine. Thus deploying U.S. and NATO troops there will facilitate Western aid to that besieged and battered country.

The bottom line: if NATO is serious about deterring Russia and defending against the Russian threat, then it must reposition its forces accordingly. The Cold War is over and new cold war has begun.

The Biden administration recognizes this, which is why it wisely has established a new command to aid Ukraine. But more can and must be done:

Increase defend spending to meet this new threat; put U.S. military trainers back on the ground in Ukraine; and reposition American and NATO forces eastward where the Russian threat now lies.

Feature photo credit: Wisconsin National Guard “Lt. Col. Clay Salmela, the chaplain with Task Force Juvigny, congratulates a Ukrainian soldier upon completion of initial entry training at Starychi Military Base near Combat Training Center–Yavoriv, Ukraine. Image by Cpl. Jared Saathoff / Wisconsin National Guard Public. Ukraine, 2020,” courtesy of the Pulitzer Center, Feb. 12, 2020.