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Posts tagged as “Constitutional Law”

Three Reasons Conservatives Should Not Despair Over the Supreme Court’s Title VII Decision

In the wake of Bostock v. Clayton County, conservatives are disappointed and fearful. Here’s why they should temper their pessimism and perhaps even be optimistic.

The Supreme Court’s ruling Monday (June 15, 2020) in Bostock v. Clayton County has ignited understandable disappointment and fear among conservatives, especially religious conservatives.

Conservatives are disappointed that two generally conservative justices, Gorsuch and Roberts, sided with the Court’s four left-wing justices to find new and hitherto unknown meaning in Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964. Gorsuch, in fact, authored the majority opinion.

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination “because of” an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Now, however, because of the Court’s decision, Title VII also prohibits employment discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity.

For many Americans, especially those of a more secular bent, this is really not a big deal. After all, as David French observes at The Dispatch

A combination of company policies and state and local laws have led to workplaces that already refused to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. 

For religious institutions, however, the consequences are potentially dramatic.

Should Christian colleges and schools be subject to lawsuits for upholding church teachings on human sexuality?

Does this case mean that the law now views Christians as akin to klansmen, and thus brings religious institutions one step closer to losing their tax exemptions?

This is a legitimate concern. Every major religion that I am aware of—Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, certainly—contains longstanding proscriptions on sodomy and homosexual behavior.

But if these proscriptions are now considered unlawful discrimination, then what is to become of religious liberty in America?

This is hardly an academic matter. Religious liberty cases, in fact, are very much in dispute today, as religious institutions and religious believers who seek to live out their faith fight back against charges that they are unlawfully “discriminating” against gays and lesbians.

Whither Originalism? Moreover, if even conservative or originalist justices like Gorsuch and Roberts can essentially rewrite legislative statutes to comport with left-wing secular orthodoxy, then what is to become of the separation of powers, democratic self-rule, and the restoration of Constitutional government?

This, too, is a legitimate concern, as the courts continue to make legislative decisions that are well beyond their purview. The discovery of a hitherto unknown Constitutional right to homosexual marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) is the most recent example of this worrisome, decades-long trend.

Still, I think the pessimism that many conservatives feel right now—and which I share to a considerable extent—must be tempered by three important considerations.

1. Statutory Decision. Because Bostock v. Clayton County  is a statutory and not Constitutional decision of the Court, it can be altered, changed or modified by new Congressional legislation.

True, because the cultural zeitgeist is decidedly secular and hellbent on stopping anything that might conceivably be called “discrimination” against allegedly oppressed or disadvantaged groups, legislative changes to Title VII are unlikely.

That, however, doesn’t change the fact that, unlike the Court’s Constitutional decisions, Bostock v. Clayton County does not preempt and deny democratic decision-making by the American people.

Indeed, Congress still has the right and responsibility to define the parameters and limits of anti-discrimination law.

2. As French points out:

[In his decision], Justice Gorsuch goes out of his way to reassure that the guarantee of free exercise of religion “lies at the heart of our pluralistic society.”

Provisions in Title VII itself provide limited religious liberty protections, the First Amendment is of course still applicable, and—as Gorsuch notes—the Religious Freedom Restoration Act also acts as a “kind of super statute, displacing the normal operation of other federal laws.”

Moreover, there are a series of cases already on the court’s docket that are likely (based on judicial philosophy and court trends) to [protect religious liberty to a considerable extent].

In short, the First Amendment guarantee of religious liberty, specific provisions within Title VII itself, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act all may trump Bostock v. Clayton County in specific cases and controversies soon to come before the Court.

“Stay tuned!” says French.

A year from now, the jurisprudence could look largely like this: Secular employers are fully subject to each element of Title VII while religious employers enjoy a broad ministerial exception and a more robust free exercise clause.”

3. Textualist Decision. While there can be no doubt that the Court has written new meaning into Title VII—a meaning that no one who drafted or voted on the legislation in 1964 ever imagined—it did so for explicitly textualist reasons—that is, reasons grounded in the plain meaning of the statute itself.

This is very different from most left-wing jurisprudence (such as the infamous 1973 Roe v. Wade abortion-rights decision), which makes little or no pretense to being tethered or moored to the Constitution or legislation that it purports to interpret and apply.

So while conservatives certainly can lament the result of the Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, they should be comforted by the fact that the majority nonetheless reached its decision in an explicitly originalist manner.

This originalist argument may be a complete ruse. It may be, as Justice Alito declared in his forceful dissent, “a pirate ship [that] sails under a textualist flag,” while, in fact, representing “the theory that courts should ‘update’ old statutes so that they better reflect the current values of society.”

That may well be true. But just as hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue; so, too, is a faux textualism the tribute that left-wing or progressive justices pay to originalist or conservative justices.

In other words, although conservatives may have lost this particular case, we seem to have won the larger-scale war over Constitutional and statutory interpretation if even left-wing or progressive justices feel obligated to justify their decisions on explicitly textualist grounds.

This doesn’t mean that the Court will always decide in our favor; however, it certainly increases the likelihood that it will.

More importantly, the recognition by the Court that it must tether its decisions to specific provisions of the Constitution and close and faithful readings of legislative statutes acts as an inherent constraint on judicial activism.

This helps to contain the Court’s more wildly progressive impulses and desire to legislate from the bench. This, obviously is a good thing that portends well for future Court decisions.

The bottom line: don’t be too despairing over Bostock v. Clayton County. While the result in this case is regrettable and worrisome, all is not lost. This is one case that hinges on one statute. And while its effects will be longstanding and widespread, the damage can be contained by both Congress and the Court in future legislation and in future cases.

Congressional action is highly unlikely; but future Court decisions are inevitable and much more likely to protect religious liberty. The Court, meanwhile, seems to have accepted a more modest and limited role for itself by basing its decision on explicitly textualist grounds.

Granted, this modesty may not be apparent in this decision—a decision Justice Alito derides as a “brazen abuse of our authority to interpret statutes.”

Still, by acknowledging that its decisions must be tethered and moored to explicit Constitutional and legislative provisions, the Court implicitly recognizes that there are real limits to what it can do—limits that likely will become increasingly apparent over time.

Stay tuned.

Feature photo credit: Justice Neil Gorsuch in The Federalist.

Media Coverage of the Supreme Court’s Public Charge Decision Sows Confusion Over the Role of the Judiciary

The gnashing of teeth over the Supreme Court’s decision Monday to allow the Trump administration to “begin enforcing new limits on immigrants who are considered likely to become overly dependent on government benefit programs” shows that there is widespread confusion over the role of the judiciary.

The courts were never intended to be a super legislature where disputants who lose out in the political process can appeal for a rematch and ultimate victory. Public policy is supposed to be determined by the legislative branch of government and, to the extent that the Constitution and legislature allow it, the executive branch as well.

The judiciary simply has no role in formulating public policy, or at least is should not have such a role in the American system of government. “We the people” through our elected representatives, not nine unelected lawyers ensconced in Washington, D.C., are responsible for setting public policy.

Yet, media coverage has focused on the public policy implications of the Court’s ruling, with fulsome quotes from various left-wing interest groups who politick and litigate on behalf of open borders and unrestricted immigration. These advocates decried the allegedly negative effects of the Court’s ruling on immigrants.

“This rule is an all-out assault on legal immigration,” David Leopold, a former president of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, told the Washington Post.

“The public charge rule is the latest attack in the Trump administration’s war on immigrants,” [added] Stephen Yale-Loehr, an immigration expert at Cornell University’s law school.

But if the Trump administration’s new public charge rules are, indeed, an “all-out assault” in its “war on immigrants,” this is something that Congress can remedy. There is no need for the judiciary to intervene: that’s not the Court’s job.

Unsurprisingly, the hyperbolic rhetoric from partisans with a political agenda to grind doesn’t square with the facts, which are far more benign than these verbal volleys suggest.

“The policy would not apply to humanitarian programs for refugees and asylum recipients,” reports the Post. Moreover, an official with the U.S. Customs and Immigration Service

said the policy will not be applied retroactively to those who have used benefits in the past; it will apply only to those who receive taxpayer-funded benefits after the rule takes effect in mid-October.

What’s more,

the change will have little to no effect on those who already have permanent resident status who are seeking to become naturalized U.S. citizens. ‘Naturalization applicants are not subject to a new admissibility determination and therefore are not generally subject to public charge determinations,’ said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the official was not authorized to speak publicly.

So much for the “war on immigrants.” In truth, the new rules are a modest attempt to update the definition of a public charge, so that the definition accounts for both cash and non-cash federal assistance.

I say update because as social assistance programs have grown and expanded, they increasingly include many non-cash benefits such as Medicaid, food stamps, Meals on Wheels, the provision of housing, et al. 

Yet, in the past, when determining who might be a public charge, these non-cash benefits were ignored. That might have made sense several generations ago when non-cash benefits were miniscule and non-existent. However, it makes little sense today, as non-cash benefits occupy an increasingly prominent place in the social safety net.

Partisans can debate the particulars of the Trump administration’s policy changes. The devil, as they say, is in the details. The Wall Street Journal, for instance, while applauding the Court’s decision, argues that there are real problems with the administration’s public charge rules.

Perhaps, but the appropriate place to hash out the issue is in the policy-making branches of government—in Congress, principally, and, to a lesser extent, within the administration.

Doing so is no doubt laborious and difficult. Legislating isn’t easy and policy-making can be hard. But that is what liberty and self-government demand: hard work and effort, argument, persuasion, and consensus. A free and proud people should not want it any other way.

Feature photo credit: iStockphoto.com via National Public Radio.

The Suleimani Strike Comports with Both International and Constitutional Law

There have been a flurry of published articles declaring, ex cathedra, that the U.S. military strike against Iranian General Qassem Suleimani violates both international and Constitutional law. As we briefly explained in a previous post, this is not true.

The strike against Suleimani was defensive in nature; it occurred in a country, Iraq, where U.S. military personnel have been fighting and dying for 17 years; and it commenced only after a long-running series of Iranian military actions in Iraq, dating back over nearly two decades, that have resulted in the death of more than 600 Americans.

Iran, moreover, has been waging war against the United States for the past 40 years, ever since its 1979 revolution and seizure of 52 American hostages.

For ordinary people, enough said. Neither international law nor Constitutional law are suicide pacts. However, because media and academic partisans are out in force arguing that the strike was illegal, it is worth revisiting the issue.

International Law. First, international law is real and important because it promulgates rules and norms that govern international conflict and provide some predictability of action, thereby helping to minimize war crimes and atrocities. However, international law is much more malleable and subject to dispute and interpretation than domestic law, and it evolves organically over time to a far greater extent than domestic law.

That is because there is no international legislature and executive branch responsible for passing and implementing international law. Instead, international law develops over time based on treaties, customs and conventions, judicial decisions, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.

True, we have a United Nations, but the U.N. is not a unitary world government that rules the planet and whose decrees ipso facto have the force of law. Instead, the U.N. is a deliberative body, where countries argue, negotiate, and try to address problems and difficulties as best they can short of war.

U.N. resolutions sometimes have the force of law, but not always. The United Nations Charter adopted in 1945 is considered binding international law. However, other U.N. resolutions, such as ES-10/L.22, which denies that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, are more controversial and in dispute.

My point is this: anyone who insists that international law, or the application of international law, is clearcut, obvious, fixed, and unchanging is either lying or trying to use international law to pursue a political agenda.

And in fact, using international law for political purposes, as a tool of statecraft, is commonplace. This often is how international law evolves and develops. Countries try to promulgate rules and norms to justify their actions on the world stage. It’s called lawfare: “the strategy of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for, [or a complement to], traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.”

Thus for the United States—and certainly, for Trump administration officials determined to put “America First”—international law is not a problem to overcome, but rather a justification that must be embraced.

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, after all, specifically gives countries the right to self-defense. Everything else is legalistic background noise. And if some legal scholars don’t yet recognize the legitimacy of the Suleimani strike, they soon will, as international law adapts and evolves to reflect changes in weapons and war, as well as the geopolitical landscape.

Constitutional Law. As you would expect, because of the more fixed and settled nature of domestic law, U.S. Constitutional law is more discernible and straightforward: As we’ve previously observed, the President of the United States, as Commander in Chief, has a solemn responsibility to act with dispatch in defense of U.S. military personnel under attack. Failing to do so would be a dereliction of duty.

This is not “initiating a war” against Iran as some critics falsely and hyperbolically assert. Instead, it is wisely prosecuting a long-simmering war in Iraq. The Armed Forces of the United States, remember, have been deployed to Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government and in accordance with a 2002 Congressional authorization for the use of military force there.

“The power to declare war is different from the power to make war, which belongs to the president in his role as ‘commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,'” explain Constitutional scholars David David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey in The Wall Street Journal. “There are few constraints on that power when the president is defending Americans, civilian or military, against armed attack,” they note.

“Suleimani,” adds David French, a wartime attorney in the Army’s Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps, “was killed lawfully [and] in a properly constitutionally-authorized conflict… Trump’s action was constitutionally legitimate, and that matters. A lot.”

“It is a basic aspect of the law of armed conflict,” French adds, that opposing commanders are a legitimate target.

Soleimani had entered a theater of armed conflict not as a diplomatic guest of the Iraqi government, but rather as a co-belligerent with Shiite militias—the very militias that had attacked an American base and killed an American contractor and had days before attacked and burned part of the American embassy.

The bottom line: Americans need not feel guilty about our strike against Suleimani. It was morally and legally justified. He had it coming, and America’s enemies have been put on notice. With a nod to Liam Neeson, if you kill an American (or orchestrate the death of many Americans), we will look for you; we will find you; and we will kill you. Enough said.