Posts tagged as “American Presidents”

The Presidential Politics of Biden’s Aversion to Winning in Ukraine and Gaza

The Presidential Politics of Biden’s Aversion to Winning in Ukraine and Gaza

By John R Guardiano on June 16, 2024

George H. W. Bush lost the White House in 1992. Biden’s foreign policy failures are setting him up for a similar election day defeat.

At the 1992 Democratic National Convention, then-Georgia Governor Zell Miller derided President George H.W. Bush as a man who “talks like Dirty Harry but acts like Barney Fife.”

It was a cheap shot and an unfair characterization of President Bush, who had masterfully orchestrated the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union, the liberation of Eastern Europe, and the destruction of the Iraqi Army in Kuwait.

Nonetheless, this colorful charge had political resonance and it helped to sink Bush in the 1992 presidential election, which he lost to Bill Clinton.

But while the charge was unwarranted when leveled against Bush in 1992, it is justified when leveled against Joe Biden in 2024. Biden talks a good game, but lacks policy follow-through. He talks the talk, but doesn’t walk the walk.

Biden’s policy toward Ukraine and Israel are illustrative examples. Biden talks about the importance of “standing with Ukraine” and “supporting Israel.” He champions the transatlantic alliance.

While commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Normandy invasion, for instance, Biden warned:

Democracy is more at risk across the world than at any point since the end of the World War Two—since these beaches were stormed in 1944.

Now, we have to ask ourselves: Will we stand against tyranny, against evil, against crushing brutality of the iron fist?”

Will we stand for freedom? Will we defend democracy? Will we stand together?

Unfortunately, Biden’s actions don’t match his rhetoric. During World War II, what distinguished the transatlantic alliance was its commitment to winning the war and defeating the Axis powers.

Standing with our allies for freedom was a means to an end, not an end in itself. Yet for Biden, the means (standing with our allies) appears to be the end that he seeks, and winning is never mentioned or really pursued.

In short, Biden lacks the courage of his supposed (rhetorical) convictions. The policy result: self-deterrence and half-measures that undermine our allies, weaken our alliances, and embolden our enemies.

In Ukraine, for instance, Biden has steadfastly refused to allow Ukraine to use American long-range weapon systems, the Army Tactical Missile System (ATAMS), to strike Russian targets within Russia. This has given Russia a coveted sanctuary, or safe base of operations, from which they have repeatedly struck Ukraine civilian and military targets.

Recently, Biden finally and belatedly relented, somewhat. He has allowed Ukraine to strike a very limited number of Russian military sanctuaries within Russia. However, he did this only after the Ukrainian military risked being overrun and forced to cede significant territory, cities and population centers to Russia.

Even today, the Institute for the Study of War notes that Biden’s policy change “has reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum.” In other words, 84 percent of Russian sanctuaries remain off limits to the Ukrainian military.

Israel, too, has seen its hands tied by Biden, who has threatened to withhold military assistance if Israel pushes too far too fast in its effort to destroy Hamas. Biden has sought a diplomatic solution to the conflict that will appease both Israel and Hamas.

But as Matthew Continetti points out:

The war in Gaza won’t end with another ceasefire or food package or humanitarian pier. The war will end when Israel completes its task of destroying Hamas as a military force… America’s role in this task is to help our ally Israel by supplying military aid and assistance…

The problem with Biden’s aversion to winning in Ukraine and Gaza is that it is prolonging these horrific conflicts and giving America’s enemies, Russia and Hamas, reason to think they can win by outlasting us.

China and Iran, meanwhile, are watching and taking note. Does the United States lack the will to win? Will it tire of the fight? Is it a dependable ally? How committed is it, really, to the so-called rules based international order? Can it be forced to back down if bloodied?

Unfortunately, because of Biden’s weak and tepid foreign policy—because of his reluctance to articulate and implement a winning strategy in both Ukraine and Gaza—the answers to these questions are not reassuring. Deterrence is failing and Biden is courting further war and conflict as a result.

The president needs to take a page from his hero, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who committed himself to the “unconditional surrender” of Germany and Japan during World War II.

Only by winning in Ukraine and Gaza can Biden win reelection in 2024. Otherwise, like President Bush in 1992, he’s going down.

Feature photo credit: Presidents George H. W. Bush and Joe Biden, courtesy of the White House and PBS, respectively.

What the Korean War Can Teach Us about Ending Russia’s War on Ukraine

What the Korean War Can Teach Us about Ending Russia’s War on Ukraine

By John R Guardiano on August 5, 2023

In Ukraine, President Biden is drawing exactly the wrong lessons from President Truman’s mishandling of the Korean War in 1951.

Opponents of American aid to Ukraine often tout the Korean War as a model for ending the war in Ukraine. The United States, it is argued, wisely refrained from “escalating” in Korea, instead signing an armistice that ended the conflict, thus allowing for a cold but endurable peace.

The Communists retained control of North Korea, but failed to achieve their objective of conquering all of Korea.

In the same way, argue the opponents of American aid to Ukraine, Russia should be allowed to retain control of Crimea, the Donbas, and other parts of southeastern Ukraine nominally or firmly in its control.

This will allow a free, sovereign, and independent Ukraine to coexist alongside Russian-occupied Ukraine—just as free, sovereign, and independent South Korea has coexisted for decades alongside Communist North Korea.

Then and only then, they insist, can the war end and peace be realized or achieved.

In fact, the Korean War is instructive to American policymakers, but not in the ways that opponents of American aid to Ukraine think.

The Korean War is an example of American self-deterrence that needlessly prolonged the war and the horrific human cost of that war. The United States eschewed a relatively quick victory for a bloody and prolonged stalemate or tie.

For this reason, the Korean War is a cautionary tale of what America should not do when aiding and abetting a country fighting for its survival against a tyrannical foe.

For starters, the war dragged on for three long, inconclusive, and interminable years in which American casualties mounted. Why? Because U.S. President Harry Truman refused to pursue victory out of a misguided fear of “escalation” and “World War III.”

Truman and Biden. Most historians today laud Truman’s caution and restraint in Korea—just as most observers today laud Biden’s caution and restraint in Ukraine. But Truman was wrong then and Biden is wrong today.

Truman is seen as wise because he is juxtaposed against U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who failed to anticipate the Chinese intervention in Korea, and whose insubordination and bellicosity subsequently resulted in his dismissal by Truman.

Biden, likewise, is seen as wise because he is juxtaposed against Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Putin and his henchmen often intimate that he might use nuclear weapons. Zelensky, meanwhile, is constantly beseeching Biden to send Ukraine more and more advanced weapons.

For this reason, Biden is often seen as wiser and more sober-minded than Putin and Zelensky. Truman, too, is typically remembered as more rational and level-headed than MacArthur.

Limited or Total War? But the choice between a prolonged war of indecision on the one hand and a global nuclear conflagration on the other hand is a silly and fallacious choice that did not exist then and does not exist now.

“Between the extremes of Truman’s restraint and the possibility of global war,” write Rep. Michael Gallagher (R-Wisconsin) and Aaron MacLean, “numerous options existed.

Truman’s decision to renounce nuclear threats and to restrict combat operations to Korea and its airspace prolonged the war and, paradoxically, extended the period in which it could have escalated.

In truth, shortly after MacArthur had been relieved of his command by Truman on Apr. 11, 1951, the United States was well on its way to routing the Chinese and North Koreans, reuniting the Korean peninsula, and ending the war with Korea wholly free and intact.

However, Truman and his military appointees on the Joint Chiefs of Staff put the kibosh on Lieutenant General James Van Fleet’s May 28, 1951, request “for a major offensive into North Korea to complete the destruction of the Chinese Armies,” reports Robert B. Bruce in Army History magazine (Winter 2012).

Instead of military victory, the United States pursued a negotiated solution in Korea and thus gave Communist forces a sanctuary in North Korea. As a result, the war dragged on for two more long years and at a horrific human cost.

In Ukraine, Biden, too, has called for a negotiated solution, while deliberately withholding from Ukraine advanced weapons—including, for instance, long-range precision artillery, tanks, jets, and aircraft, which would allow the Ukrainians to more quickly and aggressively attack Russian positions and drive Russian forces out of Ukraine.

Biden also has refused to use U.S. air and naval forces to safeguard the shipment of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. The reason: he fears “escalation” and “World War III.”

But in truth, Russia is exhausted militarily and is in no position to “escalate” its war on Ukraine.

Sure, Russia has nuclear weapons, but the use of tactical or battlefield nukes serves no military purpose and gives Russia no battlefield edge other than shock value.

Korea 1951. And the same was true of Chinese and North Korean forces in June 1951. They were exhausted, militarily, and did not even possess nuclear weapons. Russia, a North Korean ally and supporter, did have nuclear weapons, but in numbers dwarfed by the United States.

Moreover, although Russian leader Joseph Stalin conceived of the Korean War as a way to expand Communist influence and control, internationally, Russia was not directly involved in the Korean War and had no intention of becoming involved, as its focus was on Europe.

Ironically, as Gallagher and MacLean note, the Korean War ended only when former World War II Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected president (in 1952) and “contemplated and discussed the possibility of escalation, even approving the development of war plans that involved the use of nuclear weapons.”

Then, too, Stalin died on Mar. 5, 1953. This was significant because Stalin was the foremost obstacle to peace in Korea. He had “insisted that the war continue despite the misgivings of Chinese and North Korean leaders,” writes Mark Kramer.

Putin, likewise, is the foremost obstacle to peace in Ukraine. Thus his death, resulting in regime change in Russia, certainly would greatly enhance the prospects of a peace agreement.

The bottom line: President Truman’s mismanagement of the Korean War 72 years ago does, indeed, hold lessons for President Biden as he manages the war in Ukraine today. But those lessons teach Biden what not to do.

Unfortunately, our president is drawing the exact opposite conclusion and the result is a needlessly prolonged war of indecision at a horrific human cost to innocent Ukrainians.

One of the chief lessons of the Korean War is that the fear of “escalation” against a weak and exhausted military enemy is a catastrophic mistake. In truth, the risk of “escalation” rises if the war is allowed to drag on and the enemy is permitted to regroup.

Ditto “World War III”. That was not a realistic concern in 1951 and it is not a realistic concern today, in 2023. However, by allowing the North Korean regime to survive, Truman increased the risk of World War III significantly in the intervening decades.

Likewise, in Ukraine. If Russia is not clearly and explicitly defeated, militarily, and expelled from all of Ukraine, it will regroup and resume its fight in Ukraine at a later date when it is better prepared. “World War III” then becomes more likely.

In short, there is no substitute for victory and there is no reason not to pursue victory. That was true in Korea 1951 and it is true in Ukraine 2023.

Feature photo credit: President Biden (L), courtesy of the Associated Press and President Harry S. Truman (R), courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, published in NPR.

Reagan Would Have Supported NATO Membership for Ukraine Now

Reagan Would Have Supported NATO Membership for Ukraine Now

By John R Guardiano on July 9, 2023

So-called New Right Republicans betray the Reagan legacy that defeated the Soviets and won the Cold War.

In the 1980s, as Russian leaders rattled their nuclear saber and warned of the risk of nuclear war, President Ronald Reagan acted to strengthen and solidify the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Reagan gave material aid and rhetorical comfort to the anti-Communist Polish trade union movement, Solidarity; and he deployed Pershing II and cruise missiles to Europe to counter the Soviet threat.

Reagan also spoke truth to Russian power, declaring that

the only morality they recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat… [in order to] advance the cause of socialism.

The Soviet Union collapsed and fell apart, thanks in large part to Reagan’s policy of peace through strength and his refusal to be cowed and intimidated by Russian threats.

Russia’s War on Ukraine. Today, unfortunately, Russia is ruled by a man, Vladimir Putin, who laments the demise of the Soviet Union, and who is determined to resurrect the Russian empire. And NATO again is on the frontlines of the fight for freedom, as a neighboring, non-member state, Ukraine, fights to free itself of attempted Russian conquest and subjugation.

Ukraine, understandably, seeks membership in NATO. No country under NATO’s umbrella, after all, has been invaded or subjugated by Russia. By contrast, countries outside of NATO’s umbrella—i.e., Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus—have been invaded and subjugated by Russia.

Ukraine does not expect NATO membership today, but would like today a pledge of NATO membership at the conclusion of its war with Russia. Ukrainians believe that would be the surest way to deter future Russian aggression and ensure the peace.

The ‘New Right’. Yet in the face of the Russian threat, the only thing some so-called conservative Republicans can offer up is the antithesis of Reagan. These faux conservatives push not for a real and lasting peace through strength. Instead, they advocate for a false and temporary peace through fear and appeasement.

Presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy, for instance, calls NATO membership for Ukraine “sheer lunacy” that will increase “the risk of nuclear war with Russia itself.”

Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah) goes even further: “If Ukraine were a NATO ally,” he writes, “we’d have to go to war with Russia under Article V of the NATO Treaty… We don’t want war with Russia.”

“Absolutely not,” agrees Senator Rand Paul (R-Kentucky). “This [NATO membership for Ukraine] is exactly wrong—as usual… [A] war with Russia [is] something no one should want.”

As when Reagan was president, no one, of course, wants the United States to be immersed in a direct war with Russia. The question, then as now, is how to avert and avoid war, while protecting ourselves, our interests, and our allies worldwide.

Deterrence. Reagan believed in deterrence; and deterrence, in turn, required a credible American and allied military threat.

That’s why Reagan deployed the Pershing II and cruise missiles to Europe: to strengthen the NATO alliance. And that’s why he armed the Afghan mujahideen: to bleed and weaken the Soviet Union and to stop what was then widely perceived to be Russia’s quest for a warm water port.

For this same reason, deterrence, it is in the American national interest to arm Ukraine and to admit Ukraine into NATO.

Putin’s Russia is an enemy of the United States, which works assiduously to undermine American interests worldwide. Ukraine, by contrast, seeks to be part of the West and a part of the liberal order through which the West has grown and prospered mightily since at least the end of the Second World War.

NATO. Concerns by right-wing isolationists (or non-interventionists), such as Ramaswamy, Lee and Paul, that admitting Ukraine into NATO would force the United States into a direct shooting war with Russia are utterly fallacious.

As Randy Scheunemann and Evelyn Farkas point out, NATO’s Article 5—which holds “that an attack against one ally is considered an attack against all allies”—does “not mandate a specific response by member states.”

The United States and other NATO countries retain the right to decide how to support Ukraine, irrespective of whether Ukraine is a member of NATO.

For this reason, the United States and NATO, in planned coordination with Ukraine, could decide that by doing what they are now doing, arming Ukraine, they are fulfilling their Article 5 obligations.

Winning. What, then, is the value of NATO membership if it doesn’t change what is happening in Ukraine now?

Simple: it sends an unmistakable message of (long-term) support to Ukraine; it strengthens Ukrainian resolve; and it tells the Russians that, insofar as NATO is concerned, Ukraine will forever be a free, sovereign, and independent state.

In other words: there will be no negotiated settlement that rewards Russian aggression with the surrender of Ukrainian territory and people.

Equally important, after this war ends and a ceasefire is declared, NATO membership for Ukraine will deter renewed Russian aggression and prevent future wars.

This is something that President Reagan would have understood. It’s beyond disappointing that so-called “new right” Republicans just don’t get it.

Feature photo credit: Three leading isolationists or non-interventionists: Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah), courtesy of Shutterstock/Rolling Stone; GOP presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy, courtesy of Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images/NPR; and Sen. Rand Paul (R-Kentucky), courtesy of Tom Brenner/New York Times.

Wit and Humor are Ron DeSantis’s Keys to the White House

Wit and Humor are Ron DeSantis’s Keys to the White House

By John R Guardiano on October 22, 2022

Just ask Ronald Reagan, William F. Buckley, Jr., and Antonin Scalia.

Florida Governor Ron DeSantis is widely seen as the Republican Party’s strongest presidential candidate in 2024.

As a highly successful governor who is cruising to reelection in America’s third-most populous state, DeSantis has executive experience and a proven record of accomplishment that none of his likely GOP rivals (speechifying senators, mostly) can match.

There is, however, one thing that might hold DeSantis back and keep him from ever reaching the Oval Office: his lack of wit and a sense of humor.

“It’s not apparent to me that DeSantis has a sense of humor,” Dexter Filkins told Andrew Sullivan on The Dishcast. “He’s not a very jokey guy, at least not in public.”

Filkins knows of what he speaks. In June, he published the most insightful reportorial piece to date on Florida’s governor.

Filkins told Sullivan that, based on his reporting, DeSantis would wipe the floor with most of the Democrats who would likely run against him in any general election matchup. However, he warns, DeSantis’ “entire persona is strident and angry,” and the governor does not excel at small talk.

This is a glaring red flag and a real problem for DeSantis. Wit and a sense of humor, after all, are integral to political success, especially for conservative Republicans. Why?

Because conservative Republicans are seen as more hard-edged and tough-minded. A sense of humor thus helps to soften their image and humanize them in the public mind.

Social conservatives in particular run the risk of being caricatured as harsh and judgmental, rigid and dogmatic. Wit and humor can compellingly show otherwise and put the lie to this caricature.

Ronald Reagan. It is no accident, after all, that the most successful conservative politician in American history, the man who won reelection as president in an historic 49-state landslide, was Ronald Reagan.

Reagan had a wonderful sense of humor that endeared him to the American people, even those who strongly disagreed with his conservative political philosophy and public policies.

Consider, for instance, how the 73-year-old Reagan handled concerns about his advanced age during a 1984 presidential debate with Walter Mondale:

I want you to know that, also, I will not make age an issue of this campaign. I am not going to exploit, for political purposes, my opponent’s youth and inexperience.

As Politico reports: “Many members of the audience, gathered in the cavernous Municipal Auditorium in Kansas City, Mo., applauded and laughed. So did Mondale.”

And, as a result, Reagan won more than the debate. He won, by an overwhelming margin, a second term in the White House.

Buckley and Scalia. After Reagan, the next two greatest conservative public figures in recent decades are author and columnist William F. Buckley, Jr. and Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. And what distinguishes these two men aside from their towering intellects?

Their wit and sense of humor, which showcased a humanity and a warmth of personality that made them impossible to demonize.

When asked, for instance, what would be the first thing he would do “if he actually won his rollicking, long-shot campaign for mayor of New York City in 1965,” Buckley responded: “Demand a recount!”

As for Scalia, “he had a great sense of humor,” admits left-wing comedian Stephen Colbert:

People have actually broken down the transcripts for [Supreme Court] oral arguments and he told more jokes and got more laughs than any of the other justices.”

“In a big family,” quipped Scalia, the father of nine children, “the first child is kind of like the first pancake. If it’s not perfect, that’s okay. There are a lot more coming along.”

“We should start calling this law SCOTUScare,” he amusingly wrote in a dissent from a Supreme Court decision upholding the Affordable Care Act, aka Obamacare.

That quip even drew a chuckle from Chief Justice John Roberts, who had written the Court’s decision that aroused Scalia’s ire.

Ron DeSantis. If DeSantis wants to succeed at the highest level of American politics, if he wants to win the presidency and move America in a socially conservative and economically dynamic, free-market direction, then he has no more urgent task than to emulate Reagan, Buckley, and Scalia.

He needs to understand that for a conservative Republican especially, having and demonstrating wit and a sense of humor are of paramount importance.

Wit and Humor. To be sure, wit and humor are not things that can be instantly conjured up and created. They take time, effort, and practice. They are a reflection of life and personality, playfulness and camaraderie, joy, triumph, anguish, and even pain.

“Humor: a difficult concept to learn,” Spock tells Admiral Kirk in Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan. “It is not logical.”

True, but wit and humor can be developed. Jokes can be incorporated into political stump speeches. Witty remarks can be crafted and used out on the campaign trail. A politician can consciously cultivate a more joyful public persona that wins converts even as it disarms critics.

And make no mistake: this matters, politically. Why? Because, as one website helpfully explains:

Humor is a great leveler. It is almost impossible to remain angry with someone who is making you laugh.

Donald Trump. Exactly, and yet, this is precisely what Donald Trump did not do. Trump did not disarm his critics. He did not make people laugh in recognition of his humanity.

To the contrary: Trump angered and repelled too many voters by his insistence on being “tough” (read: nasty and unpresidential) and refusing to show “weakness” (read: humanity). Consequently, a record number of voters turned out to vote in 2020 precisely so they could vote against Trump.

Ditto the 2018 election cycle, which flipped the House of Representatives from Republican to Democratic control. A critical mass of voters turned out to vote Democrat for Congress because Trump so angered and repelled them.

DeSantis needs to avoid Trump’s mistake or politically fatal character flaw. He needs to show voters that he cares; that he has a heart; that he’s human; and that he is worthy of leading this great nation. And the best way, the most effective way, to achieve this is through wit and humor.

Is there a political market for this? Absolutely.

Consider, for instance, the astounding success of the The Babylon Bee, a conservative Christian satirical website, as well as the sky-high ratings of Fox News’ Greg Gutfield, whose late-night show is tops in the nation.

Gutfield! is “beating CBS’ The Late Show with Stephen Colbert, NBC’s The Tonight Show with Jimmy Fallon, and ABC’s Jimmy Kimmel Live—with FNC outpacing the broadcast networks even through their fall premieres,” Forbes reports.

As for The Babylon Bee, it is the most popular satirical site on the Internet, with more than 20 million page views per month, reports Ben Shapiro. “Fake news you can trust,” is the site’s witty tagline.

Conclusion. Politics and culture increasingly intersect. The political marketplace is waiting for a conservative Republican politician who can do politically what The Babylon Bee is doing journalistically and Greg Gutfield is doing for late-night television or streaming.

DeSantis has crucial executive experience and a highly successful track record as governor. These make him a compelling Republican presidential candidate.

But he is wants to be a winner and not just a contender, DeSantis will have to demonstrate that he can make people smile and laugh, even as he himself smiles and laughs. He will have to showcase a sense of humor that, thus far, has been conspicuously absent in his public appearances.

Can he do it? Yes, but only if he works at it. Only if he consciously makes liberal use of humor to achieve conservative political ends.

Only if recognizes that a politician elevates himself through self-deprecation, not self-promotion; and that while successful public figures take ideas seriously, they do not take themselves too seriously. Just ask Ronald Reagan, William F. Buckley, Jr., and Antonin Scalia.

Feature photo credit: (L-R): Author and columnist William F. Buckley, Jr., President Ronald Reagan, and Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, courtesy of National Review, FramedArt.com, and YouTube, respectively.

Biden Erred by Diplomatically Engaging Putin

Biden Erred by Diplomatically Engaging Putin

By John R Guardiano on January 27, 2022

U.S. diplomatic efforts have helped Putin while doing little to deter him.

Theodore Roosevelt famously said American foreign policy should “talk softly and carry a big stick.” Unfortunately, President Biden has turned Roosevelt’s maxim on its head. He has talked loudly and carried a twig.

Case in point: Ukraine. Biden and his foreign policy team have raised the alarm because Putin has amassed troops and equipment along the Russian-Ukraine border and Russia seems poised to invade Ukraine.

As a result, Team Biden has engaged in direct, one-on-one negotiations with Russia. They also have agreed to Russian demands that we respond in writing to Putin’s request for “security guarantees” vis-a-vis NATO and Ukraine.

Of course, Russia’s bellicose and threatening behavior toward its neighbors—including several NATO countries—is alarming and needs to be forcefully addressed and confronted.

But Biden’s rush toward diplomacy and engagement with Russia ignores how this actually strengthens Putin politically and elevates his standing, both domestically and abroad.

Putin, as Russia expert Leon Aron explains in a recent Remant podcast with Jonah Goldberg, craves international recognition and status. He craves being treated as an international leader whom other great powers—especially the United States—must contend with.

The Russian people, too, Aron says, wish to see their country and its leader placed on a par with the world’s dominant countries—especially the United States.

So what Biden has unwittingly done, argues Aron, is to elevate and strengthen Putin’s standing domestically, within Russia, as well as his standing vis-a-vis other countries.

How should the United States have responded to Putin’s menacing behavior? With far fewer words and certainly no high-profile meetings and summits. Or, as Roosevelt put it, “talk softly and carry a big stick.” As Aron explains:

It would have been enough to issue a statement at the Pentagon or State Department level: We are monitoring the situation, but the Kremlin has the right to conduct maneuvers on Russian territory.

That would have taken all of the wind out of Putin’s sails. But instead, Putin was given exactly what he wanted: calls from the White House, emergency meetings, a NATO-Russia Council meeting, and so on.

Every meeting with the American president— whether virtually, by phone, or even better, in person—is a colossal domestic gain for any Russian leader: it has been like this since Stalin. Only one country matters to Russia, and that’s the United States.

In his first year alone, Joe Biden has taken part in seven or eight rounds of talks with Putin. This is unprecedented in history. An absolute record and a big mistake. The United States should have reacted differently.

What Biden should have done is quietly provide Ukraine with advanced military equipment for both offensive and defensive purposes.

He should have strategically embedded U.S. military advisers into Ukraine for reconnaissance and intelligence, while redeploying our 34,000 U.S. troops from Germany into Poland and the Baltic States: Latvia, Lithuanian, and Estonia.

And Biden should have done this last spring, when Putin first began amassing troops and equipment along the Russian-Ukraine border.

That would have been a Roosevelian “big stick.” That would have sent a loud and clear message. That would have helped to deter Putin while protecting Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

Instead, Biden dithered and delayed because of a misplaced fear of provoking and antagonizing Putin.

Moreover, Aron says,

the U.S. also made a strategic mistake right from the start when it announced that it would neither exclude Russia from the SWIFT Agreement nor impose an import embargo on Russian oil and gas.

Those would have been the only two sanction options that would really hit the Kremlin hard. And they are the ones that were ruled out straight away.

Unfortunately, in international affairs, talk is anything but cheap. Talk can be costly and talk can have deleterious strategic consequences. For this reason, as we are painfully learning through Biden’s belated and voluble response to Putin, it is far better to “talk softly and carry a big stick.”

Feature photo credit: Presidents Joseph Biden and Theodore Roosevelt, courtesy of the Associated Press via SkyNews and Pach Bros via Wikpedia, respectively.