Nuclear weapons are not a military game changer in Ukraine and Putin and his generals know it.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive has sparked renewed fears that a desperate Vladimir Putin might resort to nuclear weapons; and that, to forestall this possibility, Ukraine should be careful not to beat back the Russians too far too fast. Otherwise, Putin might lash out and do the unthinkable.
As dovish New York Times’ columnist Ross Douthat put it:
The danger is that desperation might push Moscow toward nuclear brinkmanship—especially given the Russian strategic posture that envisions using tactical nuclear weapons to reverse battlefield defeats.
As the United States learned to its cost in the Korean War, when our push to the Yalu River reaped an unexpected Chinese intervention, the question of how far a victorious army should push is not an easy one, and whether in Crimea or the Donbas, there may be a line that’s perilous to cross.
Military historian Victor Davis Hanson agrees: The Ukrainians, he warns,
are getting very close to the Russian border, and that raises the question: You have an ailing dictator, [Vladimir Putin], with 7,000 nuclear weapons, the world’s largest arsenal. And there are some scenarios that we don’t think about.
Is he just going to say, “I lost 100,000 dead, wounded, and missing. I’m sorry. We lost,” and then quit. I don’t think so…
I think he’s going to say:
“You’re getting very close to the Russian border. You’re hitting targets with NATO and American weapons inside Russia. You’re attacking ships,” and we’re back to 1962, [the Cuban Missile Crisis].
And he’s going to do something dramatic [engage in nuclear brinksmanship if not the use of nuclear weapons].
Excuse me, but this is ludicrous and nonsensical. Douthat and Hanson are serious-minded analysts, but what they are doing here is unserious. It is scaremongering, not serious analysis.
Nuclear Weapons. First, what is at issue in Ukraine are tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons, not strategic nuclear weapons. No one is suggesting that Russia might launch nuclear weapons at the United States or any NATO country.
That would be suicidal for the Russians because it would invite, obviously, a devastating counterstrike that would destroy Moscow. Putin knows this and so, it won’t happen.
The question is: might Russia use tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons on Ukraine?
International Politics. Of course, no one can never say never, because leaders sometimes do stupid things and make horrendous mistakes. But such a move would make no military sense, and it would isolate Russia, politically, to an extent rivaled perhaps only by Kim Jong-un’s hermit kingdom in North Korea.
Russia currently enjoys the good offices of China, India, Israel, Turkey, and other countries that are trying to have it both ways vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine. Heck, even the Germans and the French sometimes suggest that they are ready, if not eager, to abandon Ukraine for the sake of “peace.”
All of these good offices end the minute Russia crosses the nuclear threshold and does the unthinkable. Putin knows this, and it is a big reason why he is highly unlikely to employ nukes in Ukraine.
Military Disadvantage. Moreover, Russia gains nothing, militarily, by using nuclear weapons.
“They [tactical nukes] don’t really do that much,” explains military analyst Ralph Peters. “You can do more in many cases,” he explains, “with a HIMARS, [the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System]…
A tactical nuclear weapon, he adds, “is not gonna stop the Ukrainians… and it won’t change the course of the war.” Again, Putin knows this, or at least his military advisers know this.
Russia also “would have to worry about the fallout coming from the [nuclear] explosion drifting onto Russian soldiers, pro-Russian separatists, and Russian citizens,” notes Brent M. Eastwood.
Finally, as former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Admiral James Stavridis observes, Putin’s use of a tactical nuclear weapon, “while highly unlikely… would probably bring NATO into the conflict with the creation of a no-fly zone.”
Of course, the last thing Putin and his military commanders want is a direct engagement with NATO. The Russian military is being beaten by Ukrainian citizen soldiers and would be quickly decimated were NATO to enter the conflict.
The bottom line: Putin has every reason not to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. And, to the extent he may be deluded on this score, it is important for the United States and NATO to disabuse him of his delusions: by communicating to him and his military commanders the inevitable consequences should he dare to cross the nuclear threshold and do the unthinkable.
In short, although Russia has the world’s largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, this is of no real political or military significance in Ukraine. What matters is that the Russian military is incompetent at waging war.
What matters is that the Russian economy is incredibly weak and anemic and cannot long sustain Putin’s war of conquest, war of choice.
What matters is that although public opinion polls suggest most Russians support Putin, the Russian people have no appetite for fighting in Ukraine, which is why Putin has not imposed a draft or mass mobilization of the populace.
Support Ukraine. The possibility of a nuclear war always exists, of course, but it is highly unlikely and should not be used as a pretext to scale back Western support of Ukraine and limit Ukrainian political and military objectives.
Ukraine should aim to drive every last Russian out of their country, and America and NATO should stand by the Ukrainians until this objective is achieved.
In other words: don’t listen to the scaremongers. They don’t know what they are talking about. Slava Ukraini.
Feature photo credit: YouTube screenshots of military historian Victor Davis Hanson (L) and New York Times‘ columnist Ross Douthat (R).
