The risk of nuclear war is minimal and cannot be an excuse for American and NATO inaction as innocent Ukrainians are slaughtered and Ukraine is destroyed.
The West and, indeed, the world is united in its revulsion over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and perpetration of war crimes to bring that proud nation to heel.
Yet, whenever anyone dares to propose that the United States and its NATO allies intervene to stop the horrific slaughter of innocent men, women, and children, the councils of caution ominously warn that we must sit on our hands because Vladimir Putin has nuclear weapons and intervening could mean “World War III.”
Now, of course, no one can completely discount the possibility of nuclear war should America and NATO intervene in Ukraine. That is a risk in any conflict involving countries armed with nuclear weapons.
But a fair-minded analysis must conclude that the risk is quite small; and that, short of invading Russia, the United States and its NATO allies can and should legitimately use military power to stop the slaughter of innocent Ukrainians.
First, some military and historical perspective: Both the United States and Russia have had nuclear weapons for the past 70+ years. Yet, despite being engaged in a Cold War for nearly four decades (roughly 1950-1990), both countries never engaged in a nuclear exchange, let alone a nuclear war.
Does this mean a nuclear war now or in the future is an impossibility? No, of course not. But this historical record is a compelling precedent and reason for optimism.
In truth, the Russians realize, no less than us, that a nuclear war would mean the annihilation of their country and ours. As Alexander Vindman explains:
I can say from my significant experience dealing with the highest levels of Russia’s military leadership that it has no interest in a bilateral confrontation with the U.S.
Russian leaders have zero desire for nuclear war, and they understand that they would inevitably lose in a conventional war. However, Russia excels at compelling the U.S. to self-deter.
Exactly. And Vindman, unlike many Western commentators, knows of what he speaks. He served as the director for European affairs for the National Security Council when Trump was president.
History. Some commentators, such as the New York Times’ Ross Douthat, note that when, in 1956, the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, America and NATO stood down. Likewise, in 1968, when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia, the West stood down.
Why? Because we did dared not risk a nuclear conflagration with Russia.
But those are fallacious and misplaced historical analogies, because during the Cold War, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were Soviet satellite states.
Ukraine, by contrast, is a free and sovereign state. And, through its fierce and heroic resistance to Russian military domination today, Ukraine shows that it has absolutely no desire to forfeit its sovereignty and independence to Russia.
“When the Ukrainians are willing to spill their blood, seemingly without limit, in a wholly admirable cause, American hesitation is heartbreaking,” writes Eliot A. Cohen, a professor at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
Nuclear weapons, he adds,
are why the United States should refrain from attacking Russia directly, not why it should fear fighting Russians in a country they invaded.
Only a few years ago, the United States Air Force killed Russian Wagner mercenaries by the hundreds in Syria; American and Russian pilots tangled in the skies over Korea and possibly Vietnam.
Nuclear deterrence cuts both ways, and the Russian leadership knows it. Vladimir Putin and those around him are ill-informed but not mad, and the use of nuclear weapons would threaten their very survival.
Military Doctrine. Other commentators, such as David French, note that Russian military doctrine reportedly allows for the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield; and that Russia has a huge numerical advantage in tactical nukes.
Maybe so, but military doctrine is not some rigid and inviolable instruction that mandates strategic and tactical decisions; rather, it is a guide for military decision-makers.
Moreover, Putin’s use of tactical or battlefield nukes would risk a counterstrike that could utterly destroy Moscow and other Russian cities, and Putin knows this.
It’s also important to note that although Putin is a dictator, the Russian state necessarily involves many more people, functionaries, and decision-makers.
Thus an order to use nuclear weapons would have to pass through several hands in addition to Putin’s; and there is no reason to think that everyone in and around Putin is irrational and suicidal.
