Posts published in “Russia’s War on Ukraine”

What Prigozhin’s Armed Rebellion Means for the Future of Russia and Ukraine

What Prigozhin’s Armed Rebellion Means for the Future of Russia and Ukraine

By John R Guardiano on June 26, 2023

Commentators routinely say we know nothing. In truth, we know a lot—about the role of NATO, the fear of “escalation,” and Putin’s likely successor.

The ramifications of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s aborted rebellion against the Russian military are still playing out and won’t be fully known for many weeks and possibly many months. However, the rebellion underscores or illuminates three key points of longstanding historical significance:

First, Putin’s war on Ukraine had nothing to do with NATO, NATO expansion, or phantom NATO threats to Russia.

Second, fears that Putin might “escalate” the conflict if the West somehow “provokes” him by fully arming Ukraine are misplaced and misguided.

Third, we can see the type of leader who might succeed Putin. The successor most likely will be an autocrat who is hostile to the West; but he also will be someone the West can tolerate or live with—provided Ukraine wins and Russia loses the war.

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First, Putin’s war on Ukraine had nothing to do with NATO, NATO expansion, or phantom NATO threats to Russia.

Many prominent observers have bought into this lie and it remains widely touted; but it was always a ruse used by Putin to try and legitimize his illegal and unprovoked war on Ukraine. Now, Prigozhin himself admits as much.

“The Armed Forces of Ukraine were not going to attack Russia with NATO,” Prigozhin admits in a video uploaded to Telegram Friday, June 23. “The war was needed for a bunch of scumbags to triumph and show how strong of an army they are.”

Prigozhin, reports the New York Times,

described his country’s invasion of Ukraine as a “racket” perpetrated by a corrupt elite chasing money and glory without concern for Russian lives. He also challenged the Kremlin’s claim that Kyiv had been on the verge of attacking Russian-backed separatist territory in Ukraine’s east when Russia invaded.

“The war wasn’t needed to return Russian citizens to our bosom, nor to demilitarize or denazify Ukraine,” Mr. Prigozhin said, referring to Mr. Putin’s initial justifications for the war. “The war was needed so that a bunch of animals could simply exult in glory.”

Second, fears that Putin might “escalate” the conflict if the West somehow “provokes” him by fully arming Ukraine are misguided and misplaced.

As we observed back in February, the Biden administration’s fear of “escalation” never made any sense. Russia has no real ability to “escalate,” militarily, and our objective ought to be to bring the war to a swift and decisive conclusion.

The real danger is a long, costly and drawn-out war or stalemate caused by American self-deterrence and our continued refusal to provide Ukraine with long-range precision weaponry, such as the the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and F-16 fighter jets.

This point has been underscored by Putin’s response to Prigozhin’s armed rebellion. As Michael McFaul points out:

Putin talked tough in his national address [June 24]. He sounded like someone preparing for a big fight. But when faced with the difficult decision of trying to stop Wagner mercenaries with major force, he backed down. In this game of chicken, we swerved off the road. He didn’t escalate. He didn’t need a face-saving off-ramp to declare victory.

When facing the possibility of really losing to Wagner mercenaries coming into Moscow, he instead capitulated. Rather than doubling down with overwhelming force to crush the mutiny, Putin accepted humiliation instead.

He was the rat trapped in the corner that so many Putinologists have told us to fear. But he didn’t lash out and go crazy. He didn’t take the riskier path of fighting a civil war. He negotiated…

The lesson for the war in Ukraine is clear. Putin is more likely to negotiate and end his war if he is losing on the battlefield, not when there is a stalemate.

Those who have argued that Ukraine must not attack Crimea for fear of triggering escalation must now reevaluate that hypothesis. The sooner Putin fears he is losing the war, the faster he will negotiate.

Third, we can see the type of leader who might succeed Putin. The successor most likely will be an autocrat who is hostile to the West; but he also will be someone the West can tolerate or live with—provided Ukraine wins and Russia loses the war.

No one has any illusions that a liberal reformer will emerge from the sewer of Russian politics. For the most part, the liberals have all fled the country. Russia, moreover, has no real liberal political tradition or history.

Even prominent dissident Alexei Navalny is a committed Russian nationalist, albeit, as Stephen Kotkin points out, “one who also says out loud that the war was a terrible idea and is hurting Russia.”

Navalny and Prigozhin, in fact, are two different types of nationalists who could could conceivably succeed Putin.

“…An authoritarian Russian nationalist who recognizes the war is a mistake and, whether fully intentionally or not, effectively ends the war, or at least the current active phase of it—that’s the one kind of person who could threaten [and succeed] Putin,” Kotkin explains.

This successor, he adds, would “recognize the separate existence of a Ukrainian nation and state”—not because he is a “good guy” or a liberal reformer, but simply because he bows to the political and military reality brought about by a war that his predecessor, Putin, and not he, foolishly started.

The bottom line: the role, or lack thereof, of NATO expansion in the run-up to the war; the significance, or lack thereof, of military “escalation” in the prosecution of the war; and the type of Russian ruler who succeeds Putin after the war—these three issues have all been brought into stark relief as a result of Prigozhin’s aborted rebellion against the Russian military.

Stay tuned. The best (or at least the most intriguing) is yet to come.

Feature photo credit: Russian dictator Vladimir Putin (L) and Wagner Group mercenary head Yevgeny Prigozhin (R), courtesy of the Toronto Star.

The Russia Nuclear Weapons Excuse for American Appeasement

The Russia Nuclear Weapons Excuse for American Appeasement

By John R Guardiano on June 24, 2023

It’s gained currency, especially on the Trumpian Right, as a result of the Wagner Group insurrection, but it remains a dangerous and specious idea.

The Wagner Group’s armed rebellion against the Russian military has inspired hope that Russian dictator Vladimir Putin might soon be ousted from power and, with that, Russian forces withdrawn from all of Ukraine.

Yet, this good news has been met with skepticism by some, especially right-wing apologists for Donald Trump, who warn that Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons; and that political instability in Russia might result in “loose nukes,” which could threaten the world with nuclear armageddon.

The Trumpians. For this reason, say the Trumpians, the United States should be wary of “regime change” in Russia. The implication is that we are better off with the devil we know (Putin) than the devils we don’t know (Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin and perhaps other warlords who might rule over different parts of a fractured and divided Russia).

As Rebekah Koffler, a former U.S. defense intelligence officer, told Fox News this morning:

There’s a real threat of an armed insurrection in Russia, which possesses six thousand nuclear weapons. A lot of them are pointing at the U.S. homeland. And any kind of instability [in Russia] is not good for anyone.

The Chimera of ‘Stability’. But should American foreign policy really be wedded to Russian status quo “stability” because of a fear that Russian nukes might end up lost, unaccounted for, and in the hands of a deranged warlord?

Of course, it goes without saying that the United States has a vital national interest in ensuring that Russian nuclear weapons are retained and controlled by a legitimate, responsible, and competent state actor. But there is real reason to doubt that the Putin government is any of those things.

The Russian dictator has regularly brandished his country’s arsenal of nuclear weapons, while intimating that he is prepared to use nukes in Ukraine. That is hardly responsible behavior.

As for competence, does the Russian invasion of Ukraine strike anyone as a case study in military competence? And Putin’s legitimacy rests on a mountain of fear, graft, and oppression that has few rivals in the 21st Century.

Appeasing Putin. In short, there is no reason for the United States to embrace or prop up Putin. He does not warrant American support or appeasement. An alternative Russian ruler or rulers could be worse; but if so, it would be a mater of degree not kind.

Moreover, a new, successor regime (or regimes) might be much better for the Russian people and the West.

At the very least, Putin’s ouster from power would weaken Russia and provide the impetus for a possible Russian withdrawal from all of Ukraine. The 1917 Russian Revolution, remember, precipitated the Russian withdrawal from World War I.

A stubborn and ill-advised commitment to status quo “stability,” however, precludes any possibility of positive change within Russia.

Farfetched Scenarios. Finally, suppose the farfetched scenario came true. A dangerous warlord took over part of Russia and assumed control of a “lost” nuke or nukes. Does this mean he can, willy-nilly, detonate his nukes and ignite “World War III”?

No, not at all. Nuclear weapons, after all, are not like a handgun or a rifle. One person cannot simply pick them up, lock-and-load, and fire away. That’s not at all how they work.

An entire series of military and technical experts within the chain of command would have to assent to their use and set in motion the process for their employment and detonation. That’s much easier said than done.

That is why, throughout the Cold War, nuclear weapons never paralyzed American presidents, Republicans and Democrats, into inaction and appeasement vis-à-vis Russia.

American policymakers understood that although nuclear weapons were a quite serious matter, they cannot and do not give our enemies a trump card or veto power over the United States.

Nuclear Weapons. Yet, this doesn’t stop Trump and his acolytes from acting as if nuclear weapons were just discovered yesterday and must, therefore, necessarily upend international relations as they have been been practiced since at least the mid 20th Century.

“First come the tanks and then come the nukes,” Trump declared five months ago. “I think we’re at the most dangerous time maybe in, in many, many years—maybe ever—because of the power of nuclear,” he added.

Never mind the fact that nuclear weapons have been around for some 75 years and yet somehow, we’ve managed to avoid a nuclear war while still winning the Cold War and liberating Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

And never mind the fact that modern-day missile defense technologies render the use of nuclear weapons more suspect and problematic than ever before. As Trump sees it, “the power of nuclear” renders all previous history irrelevant to modern-day challenges.

Trump, of course, is not serious. He is simply fear-mongering in a transparent attempt to win votes and political praise.

The truth is: nuclear weapons do not give U.S. policymakers any reason to appease Putin. And Russia would be better off, and the American national interest would be served, were the Russian dictator to be ousted from power.

True, Putin’s successor might be worse, but Russia would be weakened and its ability to control Crimea and parts of eastern and southern Ukraine likely would be dealt a deathblow.

The bottom line: the United States cannot control who rules Russia. However, by aiding Ukraine, we can help to ensure that whoever rules Russia has limited room for destructive maneuver. American action, not American appeasement, is what history demands.

Feature photo credit: Donald Trump, courtesy of Evan Vucci/AP in The New Yorker.

Why Winning—in Ukraine and Elsewhere—is Key to a Successful U.S. Foreign Policy

Why Winning—in Ukraine and Elsewhere—is Key to a Successful U.S. Foreign Policy

By John R Guardiano on March 1, 2023

Sending F-16s to Ukraine is critical for many reasons, but mostly because it underscores America’s commitment to ensuring Ukraine wins.

A successful American foreign policy hinges on winning and succeeding in the international arena. After all “nothing succeeds like success. Countries follow the strong or successful horse,” we’ve argued.

Conversely, failure breeds more failure. A good example of this is the Biden administration’s disastrous surrender of Afghanistan to the Taliban. That fiasco led directly to the Russia-Chinese “no limits” partnership and Putin’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine.

Moreover, a big reason China has not yet provided Russia with weapon systems and armaments is because Russia looks like a loser in Ukraine, and China is reticent to throw good money after bad.

But if it looks like Russia can hang on and effect a prolonged stalemate in Ukraine, then China is more likely to come to Russia’s aid. And, if that happens, a wider and larger-scale war in multiple theaters of operation—aka “World War III”—also becomes more likely.

Ukraine. For this reason, it is critical that the Biden administration overcome its misplaced fear of “escalation” and focus on winning in Ukraine.

That means moving expeditiously to arm Ukraine with the full suite of weapon systems—fighter jets, helicopters, long-range artillery, Predator drones, et al.—needed to conduct a combined arms offensive that will finish off the Russian military and end this war.

Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colorado), a former Army Ranger who now serves on the House Foreign Affairs and Intelligence committees, agrees. As he told CNN’s Erin Burnett yesterday (Feb. 28, 2023):

What I’m concerned about is the escalation of failure. If Russia wins this [war] and conquers Ukraine, what message does that send to autocrats, to dictators, around the world? To China? … If we fail, that’s escalatory in and of itself, and that’s not something I’m willing to accept.

F-16s. Crow is one of five military veterans in Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike, who have signed a letter urging the Biden administration to send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. The Ukrainians have pleaded for these aircraft, but the Biden administration has balked for fear of “provoking Putin.”

Team Biden says F-16s are too complicated to operate and will take too long for the Ukrainians to master in time for the current fight. But as Rep. Crow points out, U.S. military pilots who have actually trained with the Ukrainians say they can become proficient with the aircraft in three to six months.

That’s “much faster than I’ve been told by other folks in the administration,” Crow said.

And the reason we know this is because we have had a nine-year partnership between the California Air National Guard and the Ukrainian Air Force.

For nine years, they’ve been flying and training with the Ukrainians—over 1,000 training engagements in that time. And they’re telling us: ‘The Ukrainians know these systems. They know how to train. They’re capable of getting this done.’

Middle East. And it’s not only in Ukraine that the administration needs to focus on winning. Walter Russell Mead warns:

The U.S. is much closer to getting involved in another Middle East war than most in Washington understand… Minimizing this danger requires rapid and sweeping policy change from an administration still struggling to comprehend the most serious international crisis since the late 1930s…

The best way to avoid war, and to minimize direct American engagement should war break out, is to ensure that our Middle East allies have the power to defend themselves. We must make it unmistakably clear that we will ensure our allies win should hostilities break out. Nothing else will do [emphasis added].

As Vince Lombardi famously put it: “winning isn’t everything; it’s the only thing.” Certainly, it’s the critical and necessary thing to prevent war and preserve the peace.

Feature photo credit: Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colorado), courtesy of NBC’s Today Show.

The ‘America First’ Case for Victory in Ukraine

The ‘America First’ Case for Victory in Ukraine

By John R Guardiano on February 26, 2023

Neither Ukraine nor the United States should settle for anything less than the complete expulsion of each and every last Russian from all of Ukraine.

If, like Andrew C. McCarthy, you think that Russian annexation of some portion of Ukraine is inevitable, then it makes some sense to argue (as he does) that “the sooner that happens, the better…” The war, after all, is horrific and costly—in lives lost, dollars consumed, and weapons destroyed.

But virtually every military analyst of note disagrees with McCarthy. They look at this past year of war and conclude, contra McCarthy, that, if adequately armed in a quick and timely fashion, Ukraine can, indeed, drive Russia out of all of Ukraine (Crimea included) by the end of this year.

“Ukraine is fully capable of defeating Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression and eliminating Russia’s military ability to conquer Ukraine,” writes Mason Clark.

A satisfactory end to the war—a lasting conclusion that will secure Ukrainian territory and sovereignty and harden Ukraine against future Russian aggression—is achievable with sustained and substantial Western support.

Ukraine can fully liberate their country “if we get the proper weapons to them on time,” adds retired Gen. Jack Keane, one of the authors of the successful “surge” in Iraq.

Cost. McCarthy’s constrained and distorted vision of a successful end state in Ukraine is reinforced by his understandable concern about the cost of the war for the United States.

According to U.S. estimates, the tab for Ukraine aid so far is $113 billion; the Zelensky regime, factoring in assurances it says it have been given, says the total is more like $196 billion.

Are we willing to pay that much annually for another two or five or eight years? If so, what are we prepared to cut to persist in that level of aid? If we’re not prepared to cut anything, is the plan to have our children and grandchildren pay the freight?

Some $100 billion to $200 billion is, indeed, a lot of money, but McCarthy never asks three crucial questions:

what are we getting for our money;
how do these vast sums of money compare with the overall defense budget; and
how will American money spent today in Ukraine affect future U.S. defense expenditures in Europe and Asia?

These questions are crucial because they provide context, perspective, and understanding for dollars figures which are otherwise meaningless.

Russia. McCarthy acknowledges that Russia is an enemy of the United States. That is obviously and demonstrably true. He also points out that “it is not in America’s vital interests to be drawn into a war with Russia over Ukraine…”

McCarthy means a hot or shooting war involving American troops or American-operated weapons systems: because America long ago was “draw into a war with Russia over Ukraine.”

Americans aren’t fighting that war; Ukrainians are. But make no mistake: we are “drawn in” and involved in a big way: through the provision of weapons systems and armaments, battlefield intelligence, and military training.

A direct war with Russia obviously ought to be avoided. A direct war with any country ought to be avoided if at all possible. But McCarthy and other critics overstate and hype the danger of a direct conflict involving American and Russian forces.

The Russian military, after all, has shown itself to be utterly incompetent and incapable of waging a combined arms offensive. And tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons give the Russians no military benefit or advantage in Ukraine.

Ditto strategic nuclear weapons, which would risk the destruction of Moscow—a risk Putin and his fellow apparatchiks haven’t taken and won’t take, since it is wildly disproportionate to what is at stake in Ukraine.

America v. Russia. We should also remember that the only time in recent memory when American and Russian forces squared off was in Syria back in 2018.

Then Secretary of Defense James Mattis ordered the Wagner Group mercenaries “annihilated.” And so they were: without any real difficulty or trouble by a vastly superior American military force.

Did this precipitate “World War III”? No, of course not. The Russians realized they what they were up against and wisely stood down.

For this reason, it is highly doubtful that, had America established a “no-fly zone” in Ukraine to stop Russian war crimes and prevent innocent Ukrainian civilians from being slaughtered, Russia would have had any recourse other than to accept it.

The Russian Air Force, after all, by and large has been a non-factor in this conflict.

Benefits. In any case, here is how Gen. Keane and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas)Gen. Keane and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) answer the first two key questions—”what are we getting for our money” and “how do these vast sums of money compare with the overall defense budget”—re: American aid to Ukraine:

With just over $30 billion in U.S. security assistance, which is about 3% of the U.S. defense budget, Ukraine has crippled the military of America’s second-greatest adversary without placing a single U.S. servicemember in harm’s way.

That is a fairly good return on our investment. To complain, as McCarthy does, that it costs too much is to ignore crucial clarifying context and perspective, as well as the clear and obvious benefit to the United Staters of crippling the Russian military in Ukraine.

McCarthy also ignores the cost of appeasement, while discounting the financial rewards of a Ukrainian victory. Like the Biden administration, McCarthy says that “Putin is not winning,” and that that is a good enough outcome for the United States.

But “not winning” is not synonymous with “losing” or “lost.” And unless and until Russia is shown, conclusively, to have lost in Ukraine, Putin will simply spin any annexation of Ukrainian territory as a win, husband his resources, rebuild Russia’s military, and plan for his next attack on Ukraine.

This point is made well by National Review in its editorial against which McCarthy rails:

It’s true that the continued provision of assistance to Ukraine has added to our already-strained government finances, but we should remember that there will be no peace dividend in the event of a Russian victory, only further and ruinously expensive geopolitical destabilization…

In victory, a vindicated, hungry Russia would look to capitalize on its conquest. It would rebuild and reconstitute its military, financed on the profits of a petrofuel-based economy freed from the restraints of Western sanctions, the lifting of which would of course be a precondition for a Russian-accepted peace deal.

In one or two or five years’ time, there would be further Russian provocations, more Kremlin claims on disputed border lands, more chances for Putin’s little green men to ply their trade inside the frontiers of Russia’s neighbors.

Conversely, a humiliated and defeated Russia, chastened by its resounding defeat in Ukraine, would have no choice but to look inward and set about the long and arduous task of rebuilding their country. And Putin himself likely would not survive such a defeat.

To be sure, given Russia’s decrepit political culture, Russia may not get a better ruler or dictator; but it almost certainly would get a more realistic and accommodating dictator, and that would benefit America and the West.

As for Ukraine, McCarthy and other critics fear that it will become a costly American dependent.

But Ukraine will require billions of dollars in American aid for many years to come regardless of whether we see them through to victory or force them to give up territory to Russia. However, it will be far less costly for the West if the Russian threat has been crushed and stymied for a generation.

McCarthy and other critics also discount the tremendous benefits to the United States of a Ukrainian victory. The reality is that Ukraine can and should aspire to be the Israel of Eastern Europe—and not just militarily, but economically and technologically.

Like Israel, Ukraine almost certainly will be a military force to be reckoned with. Battle hardened and on edge always because of the Russian threat, Ukraine almost certainly will be NATO’s tip of the spear, thus relieving the United States of an otherwise heavy military burden.

And, if they embrace free market reforms, Ukraine has demonstrated that it has the capacity to become an economic and technological powerhouse, just as Israel has become. In this way, Ukraine will help to keep the peace in Europe, while the United States focuses on Asia and the growing threat from China.

China. Finally, McCarthy discounts the notion that China would draw inspiration from a protected stalemate in Ukraine, given the strong level of U.S. and allied support there. But again, “not losing” is not synonymous with “winning” or “won.”

Nothing succeeds like success. Countries follow the strong or successful horse.

A Ukrainian victory over Russia made possible by steadfast American support is a powerful deterrent to China because its demonstrates that the United States plays to win. Settling for a prolonged stalemate that Russia can plausibly spin as a win signals a lack of resolve and staying power.

The bottom line: McCarthy and other critics of American aid to Ukraine want to see the war end sooner rather than later. Supporters of Ukraine and the Ukrainians themselves feel the same way. This war is horrific and costly. But the way to end the war is to quickly and adequately arm Ukraine so that they can drive each and every last Russian out of their country.

McCarthy and his fellow editors at National Review to the contrary notwithstanding, this is achievable and within a matter of months, not years—but only if the Biden administration overcomes its misguided fear of “escalation” and accelerates the delivery of much-needed weapon systems to Ukraine.

American Interests. McCarthy and other critics also say that U.S. foreign policy should be focused on protecting American interests, not Ukrainian interests. But right now, this is a distinction without a difference.

Russia is, as National Review acknowledges, “an implacable foe of the United States and the international order.” And so, a Russian defeat there serves the interests of both countries, and the sooner the better.

Feature photo credit: “Ukrainian soldiers take part in a training exercise some 10 kilometers away from the border with Russia and Belarus in the northern Ukrainian region of Chernihiv,” Feb. 2, 2023, Kyodo via AP Images, courtesy of the Harvard Gazette.

Only a Quick Ukrainian Victory Can Avert ‘World War III’

Only a Quick Ukrainian Victory Can Avert ‘World War III’

By John R Guardiano on February 20, 2023

Ironically but predictably, Biden’s timidity in arming Ukraine is increasing the possibility of a larger-scale war involving not just Russia, but China and Iran.

The concern, articulated this weekend by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, that China is giving serious consideration to providing lethal aid to Russia for its war on Ukraine has raised anew the possibility of “World War III,” or a larger-scale war that involves not just Russia and Ukraine, but their confederates, China and Iran.

Of course, no one, save for the enemies of freedom, wants a larger-scale war on three different fronts: in Europe over Ukraine; in Asia and the first island chain surrounding Taiwan; and in the Middle East over Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.

But unfortunately, China and Iran are formally aligned with Russia and are working to prolong the war in Ukraine. Both countries realize that if America and the West are tied up in Europe, they will be less capable of responding to threats in Asia and the Middle East.

Which is why we have argued, forcefully, for the United States to fully and quickly arm Ukraine, so as to bring about a swift Ukrainian victory and a thorough Russian defeat. The Biden administration, however, has had other ideas.

Misplaced Fear. The administration has feared “provoking Putin” and doing anything that might “escalate” the conflict and thereby precipitate “World War III.” Of course, these fears never made any sense.

Putin, after all, does not need to be “provoked.” He already is hellbent on subjugating all of Ukraine, and nothing other than Russia’s outright military defeat will disabuse him of this notion. For the entire past year’s duration of the war, remember, he has consistently shown no interest in diplomacy, “off-ramps,” or compromise of any sort.

As for “escalation,” that presupposes an ability to “escalate,” militarily; but Russia has no such ability. It already has thrown its entire military apparatus at Ukraine, including an estimated 97% of the entire Russian army, which is now in Ukraine, reports British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace.

Yes, of course, Russia has a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons; but tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons give Russia no military benefit or advantage other than shock value and frightening the West.

Meanwhile, there are real and consequential downside risks to being the first country since World War II to use nuclear weapons. Russia would become a pariah nation everywhere and would antagonize especially India and China, which currently buy its oil and provide Russia with significant non-lethal aid.

Strategic nuclear weapons are also a nonstarter. Russia is not about to risk a strategic nuclear war and the destruction of Moscow for the sake of conquering Ukraine. It hasn’t done so thus far and it won’t do so in the future because Ukraine, unlike Moscow, is not part of Russia and Putin knows it.

As for “World War III,” this conjures up images of a long, drawn-out war involving multiple countries in different theaters of operation similar to how World Wars I and II were fought. But what has been most notable about the first year of this war is that Russia fights alone and in Ukraine only.

Certainly, this was the case for the first six months of the war.

Before the war began, China and Russia signed an agreement pledging “no limits” to their mutual support. Yet China thus far has refrained from providing Russia with military weapon systems and battlefield assistance. Iran began providing Russia with cheap drones six months into the war.

The problem is that the longer this war drags on interminably, the more likely it is that it metamorphoses into “World War III.” The more likely it is that China and Iran opt to step-up or increase their support for Russia. And the more likely it is that both countries opt to open up new fronts: in Asia and the Middle East, respectively.

After all, when, earlier on in the conflict, a Russian defeat looked possible and perhaps even likely, it made eminent sense for China to avoid actively supporting Russia. What good would that do? Why back a loser? Why throw good money after bad?

China’s Shifting Calculus. But now that a Russian defeat looks less likely and not at all imminent, China’s calculus has undoubtedly changed. If the war can be prolonged indefinitely, then America, NATO, Europe, and the West can be kept occupied, and drained militarily and economically. That certainly would serve China’s interests, especially as it considers acting to subjugate Taiwan.

Ditto for the mullahs in Iran as they seek to dominate the Middle East. If America and the West are bogged down in Europe, that gives them less ability to oppose Iranian hegemony in the Middle East.

For these reasons, it behooves the Biden administration to act with a sense of urgency in aiding Ukraine.

A long war is morally unconscionable because it means more death, destruction, and misery. But a long war also increases the likelihood of a true world war fought in three different theaters of operation. And this is a war the United States is unprepared to fight, given its disgraceful lack of a defense industrial base.

Seth Jones reports, for instance, that in a war with China over the Taiwan Strait,

the United States would likely run out of some munitions—such as long-range, precision-guided munitions—in less than one week… [And] it would take an average of 8.4 years to replace Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) inventories at surge production rates.

The bottom line: “World War III” was never a possibility so long as the United States was committed to a swift Ukrainian victory. But utterly misplaced fears about “provoking Putin” and “escalating” the conflict have caused the Biden administration to play for a tie, not a win, in Ukraine.

The result has been a long and protracted war with no end in sight; and this, ironically, is making a true “World War III” scenario an increasing possibility.

As Luke Coffey puts it: “Right now we are arming Ukraine so it can survive. We need to start arming Ukraine so it can win.” The and only then might we avert disaster. Then and only then might we avert “World War III.”

Feature photo credit, courtesy of the Express. The axis of evil (L-R): Iranian mullah/president Ebrahim Raisi, Chinese dictator Xi Jinping, and Russian dictator Vladimir Putin are all being empowered by the Biden administration’s timidity in arming Ukraine.