Posts published in “Russia’s War on Ukraine”

Commentators routinely say we know nothing. In truth, we know a lot—about the role of NATO, the fear of “escalation,” and Putin’s likely successor.

The ramifications of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s aborted rebellion against the Russian military are still playing out and won’t be fully known for many weeks and possibly many months. However, the rebellion underscores or illuminates three key points of longstanding historical significance:

• First, Putin’s war on Ukraine had nothing to do with NATO, NATO expansion, or phantom NATO threats to Russia.

• Second, fears that Putin might “escalate” the conflict if the West somehow “provokes” him by fully arming Ukraine are misplaced and misguided.

• Third, we can see the type of leader who might succeed Putin. The successor most likely will be an autocrat who is hostile to the West; but he also will be someone the West can tolerate or live with—provided Ukraine wins and Russia loses the war.

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First, Putin’s war on Ukraine had nothing to do with NATO, NATO expansion, or phantom NATO threats to Russia.

Many prominent observers have bought into this lie and it remains widely touted; but it was always a ruse used by Putin to try and legitimize his illegal and unprovoked war on Ukraine. Now, Prigozhin himself admits as much.

“The Armed Forces of Ukraine were not going to attack Russia with NATO,” Prigozhin admits in a video uploaded to Telegram Friday, June 23. “The war was needed for a bunch of scumbags to triumph and show how strong of an army they are.”

Prigozhin, reports the New York Times,

described his country’s invasion of Ukraine as a “racket” perpetrated by a corrupt elite chasing money and glory without concern for Russian lives. He also challenged the Kremlin’s claim that Kyiv had been on the verge of attacking Russian-backed separatist territory in Ukraine’s east when Russia invaded.

“The war wasn’t needed to return Russian citizens to our bosom, nor to demilitarize or denazify Ukraine,” Mr. Prigozhin said, referring to Mr. Putin’s initial justifications for the war. “The war was needed so that a bunch of animals could simply exult in glory.”

Second, fears that Putin might “escalate” the conflict if the West somehow “provokes” him by fully arming Ukraine are misguided and misplaced.

As we observed back in February, the Biden administration’s fear of “escalation” never made any sense. Russia has no real ability to “escalate,” militarily, and our objective ought to be to bring the war to a swift and decisive conclusion.

The real danger is a long, costly and drawn-out war or stalemate caused by American self-deterrence and our continued refusal to provide Ukraine with long-range precision weaponry, such as the the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and F-16 fighter jets.

This point has been underscored by Putin’s response to Prigozhin’s armed rebellion. As Michael McFaul points out:

Putin talked tough in his national address [June 24]. He sounded like someone preparing for a big fight. But when faced with the difficult decision of trying to stop Wagner mercenaries with major force, he backed down. In this game of chicken, we swerved off the road. He didn’t escalate. He didn’t need a face-saving off-ramp to declare victory.

When facing the possibility of really losing to Wagner mercenaries coming into Moscow, he instead capitulated. Rather than doubling down with overwhelming force to crush the mutiny, Putin accepted humiliation instead.

He was the rat trapped in the corner that so many Putinologists have told us to fear. But he didn’t lash out and go crazy. He didn’t take the riskier path of fighting a civil war. He negotiated…

The lesson for the war in Ukraine is clear. Putin is more likely to negotiate and end his war if he is losing on the battlefield, not when there is a stalemate.

Those who have argued that Ukraine must not attack Crimea for fear of triggering escalation must now reevaluate that hypothesis. The sooner Putin fears he is losing the war, the faster he will negotiate.

Third, we can see the type of leader who might succeed Putin. The successor most likely will be an autocrat who is hostile to the West; but he also will be someone the West can tolerate or live with—provided Ukraine wins and Russia loses the war.

No one has any illusions that a liberal reformer will emerge from the sewer of Russian politics. For the most part, the liberals have all fled the country. Russia, moreover, has no real liberal political tradition or history.

Even prominent dissident Alexei Navalny is a committed Russian nationalist, albeit, as Stephen Kotkin points out, “one who also says out loud that the war was a terrible idea and is hurting Russia.”

Navalny and Prigozhin, in fact, are two different types of nationalists who could could conceivably succeed Putin.

“…An authoritarian Russian nationalist who recognizes the war is a mistake and, whether fully intentionally or not, effectively ends the war, or at least the current active phase of it—that’s the one kind of person who could threaten [and succeed] Putin,” Kotkin explains.

This successor, he adds, would “recognize the separate existence of a Ukrainian nation and state”—not because he is a “good guy” or a liberal reformer, but simply because he bows to the political and military reality brought about by a war that his predecessor, Putin, and not he, foolishly started.

The bottom line: the role, or lack thereof, of NATO expansion in the run-up to the war; the significance, or lack thereof, of military “escalation” in the prosecution of the war; and the type of Russian ruler who succeeds Putin after the war—these three issues have all been brought into stark relief as a result of Prigozhin’s aborted rebellion against the Russian military.

Stay tuned. The best (or at least the most intriguing) is yet to come.

Feature photo credit: Russian dictator Vladimir Putin (L) and Wagner Group mercenary head Yevgeny Prigozhin (R), courtesy of the Toronto Star.

Neither Ukraine nor the United States should settle for anything less than the complete expulsion of each and every last Russian from all of Ukraine.

If, like Andrew C. McCarthy, you think that Russian annexation of some portion of Ukraine is inevitable, then it makes some sense to argue (as he does) that “the sooner that happens, the better…” The war, after all, is horrific and costly—in lives lost, dollars consumed, and weapons destroyed.

But virtually every military analyst of note disagrees with McCarthy. They look at this past year of war and conclude, contra McCarthy, that, if adequately armed in a quick and timely fashion, Ukraine can, indeed, drive Russia out of all of Ukraine (Crimea included) by the end of this year.

“Ukraine is fully capable of defeating Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression and eliminating Russia’s military ability to conquer Ukraine,” writes Mason Clark.

A satisfactory end to the war—a lasting conclusion that will secure Ukrainian territory and sovereignty and harden Ukraine against future Russian aggression—is achievable with sustained and substantial Western support.

Ukraine can fully liberate their country “if we get the proper weapons to them on time,” adds retired Gen. Jack Keane, one of the authors of the successful “surge” in Iraq.

Cost. McCarthy’s constrained and distorted vision of a successful end state in Ukraine is reinforced by his understandable concern about the cost of the war for the United States.

According to U.S. estimates, the tab for Ukraine aid so far is $113 billion; the Zelensky regime, factoring in assurances it says it have been given, says the total is more like $196 billion.

Are we willing to pay that much annually for another two or five or eight years? If so, what are we prepared to cut to persist in that level of aid? If we’re not prepared to cut anything, is the plan to have our children and grandchildren pay the freight?

Some $100 billion to $200 billion is, indeed, a lot of money, but McCarthy never asks three crucial questions:

1. what are we getting for our money;
2. how do these vast sums of money compare with the overall defense budget; and
3. how will American money spent today in Ukraine affect future U.S. defense expenditures in Europe and Asia?

These questions are crucial because they provide context, perspective, and understanding for dollars figures which are otherwise meaningless.

Russia. McCarthy acknowledges that Russia is an enemy of the United States. That is obviously and demonstrably true. He also points out that “it is not in America’s vital interests to be drawn into a war with Russia over Ukraine…”

McCarthy means a hot or shooting war involving American troops or American-operated weapons systems: because America long ago was “draw into a war with Russia over Ukraine.”

Americans aren’t fighting that war; Ukrainians are. But make no mistake: we are “drawn in” and involved in a big way: through the provision of weapons systems and armaments, battlefield intelligence, and military training.

A direct war with Russia obviously ought to be avoided. A direct war with any country ought to be avoided if at all possible. But McCarthy and other critics overstate and hype the danger of a direct conflict involving American and Russian forces.

The Russian military, after all, has shown itself to be utterly incompetent and incapable of waging a combined arms offensive. And tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons give the Russians no military benefit or advantage in Ukraine.

Ditto strategic nuclear weapons, which would risk the destruction of Moscow—a risk Putin and his fellow apparatchiks haven’t taken and won’t take, since it is wildly disproportionate to what is at stake in Ukraine.

America v. Russia. We should also remember that the only time in recent memory when American and Russian forces squared off was in Syria back in 2018.

Then Secretary of Defense James Mattis ordered the Wagner Group mercenaries “annihilated.” And so they were: without any real difficulty or trouble by a vastly superior American military force.

Did this precipitate “World War III”? No, of course not. The Russians realized they what they were up against and wisely stood down.

For this reason, it is highly doubtful that, had America established a “no-fly zone” in Ukraine to stop Russian war crimes and prevent innocent Ukrainian civilians from being slaughtered, Russia would have had any recourse other than to accept it.

The Russian Air Force, after all, by and large has been a non-factor in this conflict.

Benefits. In any case, here is how Gen. Keane and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas)Gen. Keane and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) answer the first two key questions—”what are we getting for our money” and “how do these vast sums of money compare with the overall defense budget”—re: American aid to Ukraine:

With just over $30 billion in U.S. security assistance, which is about 3% of the U.S. defense budget, Ukraine has crippled the military of America’s second-greatest adversary without placing a single U.S. servicemember in harm’s way.

That is a fairly good return on our investment. To complain, as McCarthy does, that it costs too much is to ignore crucial clarifying context and perspective, as well as the clear and obvious benefit to the United Staters of crippling the Russian military in Ukraine.

McCarthy also ignores the cost of appeasement, while discounting the financial rewards of a Ukrainian victory. Like the Biden administration, McCarthy says that “Putin is not winning,” and that that is a good enough outcome for the United States.

But “not winning” is not synonymous with “losing” or “lost.” And unless and until Russia is shown, conclusively, to have lost in Ukraine, Putin will simply spin any annexation of Ukrainian territory as a win, husband his resources, rebuild Russia’s military, and plan for his next attack on Ukraine.

This point is made well by National Review in its editorial against which McCarthy rails:

It’s true that the continued provision of assistance to Ukraine has added to our already-strained government finances, but we should remember that there will be no peace dividend in the event of a Russian victory, only further and ruinously expensive geopolitical destabilization…

In victory, a vindicated, hungry Russia would look to capitalize on its conquest. It would rebuild and reconstitute its military, financed on the profits of a petrofuel-based economy freed from the restraints of Western sanctions, the lifting of which would of course be a precondition for a Russian-accepted peace deal.

In one or two or five years’ time, there would be further Russian provocations, more Kremlin claims on disputed border lands, more chances for Putin’s little green men to ply their trade inside the frontiers of Russia’s neighbors.

Conversely, a humiliated and defeated Russia, chastened by its resounding defeat in Ukraine, would have no choice but to look inward and set about the long and arduous task of rebuilding their country. And Putin himself likely would not survive such a defeat.

To be sure, given Russia’s decrepit political culture, Russia may not get a better ruler or dictator; but it almost certainly would get a more realistic and accommodating dictator, and that would benefit America and the West.

As for Ukraine, McCarthy and other critics fear that it will become a costly American dependent.

But Ukraine will require billions of dollars in American aid for many years to come regardless of whether we see them through to victory or force them to give up territory to Russia. However, it will be far less costly for the West if the Russian threat has been crushed and stymied for a generation.

McCarthy and other critics also discount the tremendous benefits to the United States of a Ukrainian victory. The reality is that Ukraine can and should aspire to be the Israel of Eastern Europe—and not just militarily, but economically and technologically.

Like Israel, Ukraine almost certainly will be a military force to be reckoned with. Battle hardened and on edge always because of the Russian threat, Ukraine almost certainly will be NATO’s tip of the spear, thus relieving the United States of an otherwise heavy military burden.

And, if they embrace free market reforms, Ukraine has demonstrated that it has the capacity to become an economic and technological powerhouse, just as Israel has become. In this way, Ukraine will help to keep the peace in Europe, while the United States focuses on Asia and the growing threat from China.

China. Finally, McCarthy discounts the notion that China would draw inspiration from a protected stalemate in Ukraine, given the strong level of U.S. and allied support there. But again, “not losing” is not synonymous with “winning” or “won.”

Nothing succeeds like success. Countries follow the strong or successful horse.

A Ukrainian victory over Russia made possible by steadfast American support is a powerful deterrent to China because its demonstrates that the United States plays to win. Settling for a prolonged stalemate that Russia can plausibly spin as a win signals a lack of resolve and staying power.

The bottom line: McCarthy and other critics of American aid to Ukraine want to see the war end sooner rather than later. Supporters of Ukraine and the Ukrainians themselves feel the same way. This war is horrific and costly. But the way to end the war is to quickly and adequately arm Ukraine so that they can drive each and every last Russian out of their country.

McCarthy and his fellow editors at National Review to the contrary notwithstanding, this is achievable and within a matter of months, not years—but only if the Biden administration overcomes its misguided fear of “escalation” and accelerates the delivery of much-needed weapon systems to Ukraine.

American Interests. McCarthy and other critics also say that U.S. foreign policy should be focused on protecting American interests, not Ukrainian interests. But right now, this is a distinction without a difference.

Russia is, as National Review acknowledges, “an implacable foe of the United States and the international order.” And so, a Russian defeat there serves the interests of both countries, and the sooner the better.

Feature photo credit: “Ukrainian soldiers take part in a training exercise some 10 kilometers away from the border with Russia and Belarus in the northern Ukrainian region of Chernihiv,” Feb. 2, 2023, Kyodo via AP Images, courtesy of the Harvard Gazette.