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The Ground Truth about Sending American and NATO Troops to Ukraine

The Ground Truth about Sending American and NATO Troops to Ukraine

By John R Guardiano on February 19, 2022

Ruling out American and NATO troop deployments to Ukraine has made war there more likely.

One of the biggest obstacles to deterring Russian Dictator Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine has been the American and NATO phobia of deploying “boots on the ground”—that is, combat soldiers who can advise and reinforce the Ukrainian military in Ukraine.

President Biden, in fact, expressly has ruled out such a deployment. And American politicians, left and right, Democrats and Republicans, unanimously have echoed Biden’s insistence that American combat troops will not and must not deploy to Ukraine.

Their obvious concern is that this would pit American troops against Russian troops and result in “World War III” or even a nuclear war. This concern is superficially understandable, but seriously misplaced.

Deterrence Not War. The point of such a deployment, of course, is not to wage a war against Russia; it is to deter or prevent Russia from waging a war against Ukraine. And it is difficult to see how you do this without a credible threat of destroying invading Russian military units should Putin seek to attack Ukraine.

The threat of economic sanctions almost certainly is not enough.

As we have observed, Putin is dismissive of economic sanctions and for good reason: America and NATO are unwilling to inflict the type of serious economic sanctions that would cripple the Russian economy, because this also would hurt the West Europeans, who depend on Russian fuel exports.

What about a potential war with Russia? Does anyone seriously believe Putin would launch a war against Ukraine if that meant a war against the United States military and allied NATO militaries?

Putin may be covetous of Ukraine, but he is not stupid or reckless. He knows full well that the Russian military is no match for NATO. His invading forces would be destroyed and would suffer heavy casualties in any face-off with NATO in Ukraine—provided NATO is forward-deployed, positioned, and prepared for this contingency.

Historical Precedent. Putin remembers that Russian military units were decimated by American military units in Syria during the Trump presidency in 2018, and it wasn’t even close.

Recall as well the experience of West Berlin at the height of the Cold War in 1950s and early 1960s. The Soviets then often intimated that they intended to use military force to dislodge American and NATO forces from Berlin; yet they never did so. Why?

Because even then, with a comparatively much greater military force than they now have relatively speaking, the Russians were not suicidal. They dared not to attack an ensconced and prepared American and NATO military force.

As retired Army Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg explained to Fox News’ Martha MacCallum:

Putin has said repeatedly [that] he has no intention of engaging NATO. He knows it’s  a suicidal event if he does so. In fact, he knows, it’s the end of Russia if he does that. So he’s not going to get anywhere close to NATO.

Ukraine Today. True, Ukraine is not a member of NATO; however, the 2004 Budapest Memorandum obligates the United States to support Ukraine in the event that its sovereignty or territorial integrity is threatened.

Moreover, as Putin himself acknowledges, his designs extend well beyond Ukraine.

Putin seeks to expel NATO from all of Eastern Europe. And, as the geography of the region clearly demonstrates, he will have a much greater ability to achieve this if he can draw in closer to Poland, Romania, Moldova, Hungary, and Slovakia, first by subjugating Ukraine.

In other words, if America and NATO don’t stop Putin in Ukraine, they almost certainly will have a more difficult time doing so in the rest of Eastern Europe.

The bottom line: no one wants a war in Ukraine. But the way to stop a war from happening is to deter Putin. And the way to deter Putin is to make it militarily suicidal for him to attack Ukraine.

This, in turn, requires that American and NATO policymakers abandon their phobia about deploying “boots on the ground”—that is, combat soldiers who can advise and reinforce the Ukrainian military in Ukraine.

American and NATO failure to realize this geo-strategic truth has made a war in Ukraine far more likely, far more dangerous, and far more costly to our collective security.

Feature photo credit: The geography of Europe shows that if Russia takes Ukraine, all of Eastern Europe is at heightened risk of Russian subjugation. Map courtesy of ZCTrading via EBay.

The Critical Military Strategy to Stop Putin and Save Ukraine

The Critical Military Strategy to Stop Putin and Save Ukraine

By John R Guardiano on February 13, 2022

Economic sanctions are not enough. Russians must be killed on a daily basis in a sustained insurgency financed and supported by America and NATO.

According to the Daily Mail, one prominent Russian official said yesterday that Vladimir Putin “doesn’t give a s**t” about the risk of Western economic sanctions if Russia invades Ukraine.

That official, Viktor Tatarintsev, Russia’s ambassador to Sweden, told the Aftonbladet newspaper: “The more the West pushes Russia, the stronger the Russian response will be.”

That’s probably true, especially since the economic sanctions that would hurt Russia’s ruling oligarchic elite the most are off the table.

Economic Sanctions. The West, for instance, could bar Russia from the global banking system by denying it access to SWIFT, the international network of financial institutions that underlie cross-border trade and investment worldwide.

Such a move would devastate the Russian economy, but also hurt the West Europeans, who depend on Russian gas and  commodities. Which is why, sadly, Russian SWIFT denial is off the table.

President Biden has unwisely ruled out the use of American ground troops in Ukraine. However, this doesn’t mean he necessarily has precluded any and all military options.

In fact, any deterrence strategy that is designed to stop Russian subjugation of Ukraine must have a military component. And that military component must be widely telegraphed and loudly trumpeted to have a full deterrent effect.

The West’s military strategy must be to maximize the number of invading Russians killed, maimed, and crippled on a daily basis over a period of years. To bleed Russia in an asymmetric war of attrition.

To wage a guerrilla war that saps the Russian will to fight and to occupy foreign lands. To send Russians home in body bags each and every day. To make their occupation of Ukraine, or any other free and independent state, a living hell.

This is eminently doable—especially with American military aid and assistance.

Russian, after all, was utterly incapable of subduing Afghanistan in the 1980s. American military aid to the Afghan mujahideen made the Russian occupation there untenable.

Too many Russian boys were coming home in body bags; and so, the Soviets gave up and abjectly withdrew. The price of occupation was too high; the cost too great.

A similar stiff-armed resistance to any Russian occupation would form in western Ukraine. Ukrainians there despise Putin’s Russia. They seek Ukrainian independence and to align their country with the West.

Ukrainian Insurgency. A “Russian invasion would be deeply unpopular and Kremlin forces would find themselves operating in a hostile environment ideal for asymmetric warfare,” writes Andriy Zagorodnyuk, a former Ukrainian minister of defense who left office in 2020.

In fact, armed and capable militias already exist in western Ukraine and would eagerly take the fight to the Russians. American military advisers should work with these militias and other remnants of the Ukrainian military, so that Ukraine can wage an effective guerrilla war against Russia.

Of course, no one expects Ukraine to  defeat Russia militarily, because it can’t. Ukraine is overmatched. But success in a guerrilla war depends on political success, not outright military victory.

Politically, Ukraine can win by ensuring that Russia pays a high, exorbitant, and ongoing price for invading and occupying their country.

The key to success lies in ensuring that, each and every day, Russians are killed, maimed, and crippled. The casualty and death toll matters, not battlefield victories.

Russia cannot sustain an unceasing daily death toll. Putin may be a dictator, but his legitimacy as the Russian ruler, and the legitimacy of his government, still requires popular acquiescence.

This acquiescence will quickly dissipate if Russians come home each and every day for months on end in body bags: dead, maimed, and crippled.

American Support. The good news is that, according to press reports, American Green Berets and other U.S. Special Forces have been working closely with their Ukrainian counterparts to prepare them for a guerrilla war against Russia.

The U.S. Sun reports:

Behind the scenes, several hundred US Green Beret special forces have been working with the Ukrainians to ensure Russia faces a bloodbath in the country.

The CIA has also been working on secret training that has taught the Ukrainians how “to kill Russians”, a former agency official has said.

And Ukrainian forces are already being equipped with anti-tank weapons by the UK, which guerrilla forces would use to create killing zones for massed Russian armoured forces.

“By combining serving military units with combat veterans, reservists, territorial defense units and large numbers of volunteers,”Zagorodnyuk writes,

Ukraine can create tens of thousands of small and highly mobile groups capable of attacking Russian forces. This will make it virtually impossible for the Kremlin to establish any kind of administration over occupied areas or secure its lines of supply.

Of course, the success of any Ukrainian insurgency depends in large measure on how much material support it receives from the United States and other NATO countries.

And the deterrent effect of any potential Ukrainian insurgency depends on how well that insurgency is trained and resourced, and how real or credible it appears to Putin and his generals.

The bottom line: the economic sanctions that America and NATO have conjured up likely will do little to stop or stymie Russian efforts to subjugate Ukraine.

But what might well cause Putin to say “nyet” is the possibility of a real and sustained insurgency financed and supported indefinitely by America and NATO.

We haven’t heard much about it, unfortunately; but let’s hope and pray that Putin and his generals have. It may be Ukraine’s only chance to retain its independence—and it may be Europe’s only chance for peace.

Feature photo credit: The U.S. Sun.

America First—In Ukraine, Asia, and Elsewhere

America First—In Ukraine, Asia, and Elsewhere

By John R Guardiano on February 6, 2022

Some on the Right have learned the wrong military lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Congressional Republicans overwhelmingly believe the United States should support Ukraine and check Russian imperialism. However, there are a few noisy pols, egged on by a small contingent of conservative journalists, who beg to differ. Why?

Because they are isolationists or non-interventionists who recall the Iraq War and vow “never again.”

Fox News host Tucker Carlson, for instance, told the New York Times that his skepticism about U.S. efforts to support Ukraine stem largely from “regrets about his own role in promoting the Iraq War.”

The American Conservative’s Helen Andrews, likewise, laments “seeing a lot of the good-old neocons, like, the same folks from the Iraq War, coming back and getting back in the saddle again, and saying exactly the same things that they did last time.”

Their rhetoric now, she warns, “is not that different from what it was in the Iraq War.”

This skepticism of U.S. military intervention is understandable given the unsatisfactory conclusion of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. What, then, ought to be the lessons learned from these two most recent conflicts and how do they apply to the situation now unfolding in Ukraine?

  • Nation-Building. First, nation-building is difficult and laborious and ought not be undertaken unless we are prepared for many years, and perhaps decades, of military and diplomatic engagement.

But here’s the thing: Ukraine is not Iraq or Afghanistan. It is far more advanced and developed.

A functioning nation-state and a legitimate government already exist. These do not need to be built from scratch. We are not trying to create something new and unique; we are trying to assist something old and established. 

  • Military Occupation. Second, military occupation of a country can precipitate adverse political repercussions, which can be self-defeating—especially if the ultimate goal is simply to eliminate a threat and leave.

But here’s the thing: no one is proposing that the United States invade or occupy Ukraine.

  • U.S. Military Advisers. Third, small numbers of U.S. military advisers embedded with indigenous forces are a decisive force multiplier. They can dramatically improve indigenous military capabilities and strengthen their will to fight and win.

Afghanistan. The most vivid and memorable example of this, of course, was the initial war in Afghanistan (2001), where small numbers of CIA officers worked closely with the Northern Alliance to drive the Taliban from power.

The Afghanis did most of the fighting and dying; but their military capabilities and will to fight were immeasurably strengthened by the presence of U.S. military advisers.

This same dynamic played out at the end of the war in Afghanistan.

By President Trump’s final year in office, the United States had withdrawn just about all of its troops from Afghanistan, but crucially, retained a small contingent of advisers who helped to buck up the Afghan national military.

Again, the Afghans did almost all of the fighting and dying.

True, this did not result in a classic military victory; however, it did achieve a modus vivendi that kept the Taliban at bay. And many informed military observers, such as Bing West, believe this modus vivendi could have been sustained indefinitely at minimal cost.

The defeat of ISIS, likewise, was achieved with U.S. military airpower and U.S. military advisers playing a crucial support role for Kurdish and Iraqi forces, who did almost all of the fighting and dying.

Since at least 2015, the United States and its NATO allies have advised and trained with Ukraine’s military, albeit on a very limited and circumscribed basis, and far removed from the front lines of combat.

A more robust and strategic military advisory role could be a decisive force multiplier, just as it was in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This does not mean, obviously, that the United States should invade or occupy Ukraine. Nor does it mean that the United States should wage war on Russia.

What it does mean is that the United States should forward deploy to Ukraine and Eastern Europe critical military personnel and weapons systems to buck up our allies and strengthen their military capabilities.

This is the essence of deterrence. It is what Ronald Reagan meant by “peace through strength.”

Lessons Learned. So yes, there are important lessons to be learned from our recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, they are not the lessons of isolationism and non-interventionism that some on the Right seem to have internalized.

Instead, the lesson is this: while the United States can be too heavy-handed militarily, it also can be too averse to military engagement, and neither extreme is wise or good.

For without American military engagement, nothing good in the world ever happens. Our enemies take advantage of our absence to promote a world order that harms our interests and benefits them.

Middle Course. For this reason, we must steer a middle course between isolationism or non-interventionism and military invasion and occupation.

We must remain militarily engaged on the frontiers of freedom—in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and the South China Sea—to keep our enemies, the enemies of freedom, on their heels, at bay, and on the defensive.

America: first, last, and always.

Feature photo credit: Tucker Carlson, courtesy of The Independent, and Helen Andrews, courtesy of HerAndrews.com.

Biden Erred by Diplomatically Engaging Putin

Biden Erred by Diplomatically Engaging Putin

By John R Guardiano on January 27, 2022

U.S. diplomatic efforts have helped Putin while doing little to deter him.

Theodore Roosevelt famously said American foreign policy should “talk softly and carry a big stick.” Unfortunately, President Biden has turned Roosevelt’s maxim on its head. He has talked loudly and carried a twig.

Case in point: Ukraine. Biden and his foreign policy team have raised the alarm because Putin has amassed troops and equipment along the Russian-Ukraine border and Russia seems poised to invade Ukraine.

As a result, Team Biden has engaged in direct, one-on-one negotiations with Russia. They also have agreed to Russian demands that we respond in writing to Putin’s request for “security guarantees” vis-a-vis NATO and Ukraine.

Of course, Russia’s bellicose and threatening behavior toward its neighbors—including several NATO countries—is alarming and needs to be forcefully addressed and confronted.

But Biden’s rush toward diplomacy and engagement with Russia ignores how this actually strengthens Putin politically and elevates his standing, both domestically and abroad.

Putin, as Russia expert Leon Aron explains in a recent Remant podcast with Jonah Goldberg, craves international recognition and status. He craves being treated as an international leader whom other great powers—especially the United States—must contend with.

The Russian people, too, Aron says, wish to see their country and its leader placed on a par with the world’s dominant countries—especially the United States.

So what Biden has unwittingly done, argues Aron, is to elevate and strengthen Putin’s standing domestically, within Russia, as well as his standing vis-a-vis other countries.

How should the United States have responded to Putin’s menacing behavior? With far fewer words and certainly no high-profile meetings and summits. Or, as Roosevelt put it, “talk softly and carry a big stick.” As Aron explains:

It would have been enough to issue a statement at the Pentagon or State Department level: We are monitoring the situation, but the Kremlin has the right to conduct maneuvers on Russian territory.

That would have taken all of the wind out of Putin’s sails. But instead, Putin was given exactly what he wanted: calls from the White House, emergency meetings, a NATO-Russia Council meeting, and so on.

Every meeting with the American president— whether virtually, by phone, or even better, in person—is a colossal domestic gain for any Russian leader: it has been like this since Stalin. Only one country matters to Russia, and that’s the United States.

In his first year alone, Joe Biden has taken part in seven or eight rounds of talks with Putin. This is unprecedented in history. An absolute record and a big mistake. The United States should have reacted differently.

What Biden should have done is quietly provide Ukraine with advanced military equipment for both offensive and defensive purposes.

He should have strategically embedded U.S. military advisers into Ukraine for reconnaissance and intelligence, while redeploying our 34,000 U.S. troops from Germany into Poland and the Baltic States: Latvia, Lithuanian, and Estonia.

And Biden should have done this last spring, when Putin first began amassing troops and equipment along the Russian-Ukraine border.

That would have been a Roosevelian “big stick.” That would have sent a loud and clear message. That would have helped to deter Putin while protecting Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

Instead, Biden dithered and delayed because of a misplaced fear of provoking and antagonizing Putin.

Moreover, Aron says,

the U.S. also made a strategic mistake right from the start when it announced that it would neither exclude Russia from the SWIFT Agreement nor impose an import embargo on Russian oil and gas.

Those would have been the only two sanction options that would really hit the Kremlin hard. And they are the ones that were ruled out straight away.

Unfortunately, in international affairs, talk is anything but cheap. Talk can be costly and talk can have deleterious strategic consequences. For this reason, as we are painfully learning through Biden’s belated and voluble response to Putin, it is far better to “talk softly and carry a big stick.”

Feature photo credit: Presidents Joseph Biden and Theodore Roosevelt, courtesy of the Associated Press via SkyNews and Pach Bros via Wikpedia, respectively.

To Save Ukraine, Call Out Germany

To Save Ukraine, Call Out Germany

By John R Guardiano on January 23, 2022

German-Russian collusion was a problem in the 1930s and it is a problem today.

One would think that, after starting two world wars and planning and executing the genocide of European Jews and the mass murder of millions of non-Jews, Germany would feel a sense of moral obligation toward the Ukrainians and East Europeans now threatened by Russian military imperialism.

But alas, one would be wrong. Germany, in fact, has been working to appease Putin’s Russia:

In truth, Germany has a soft spot for Russia and is especially soft on Russian military imperialism and tyranny.

This Germanic weakness dates back to at least the 1930s, with the signing of the notorious 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in which Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany sanctioned each other’s imperialist ambitions.

This axis of evil, if you will, resulted in Russian and German military invasions of Poland, Finland, parts of Romania, and the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. With the exception of Finland, these countries then were enslaved for decades by the Nazis and the Communists.

Germany Today. Of course, Germany today is not the same country that it was when Adolf Hitler ruled. It is a free and democratic country. And while Russia is not free, it is a far cry from the Soviet totalitarian state that it was under Joseph Stalin.

Still, for countries as for people, old habits die hard. Russia still harbors a desire to subsume Ukraine and to dominate its neighbors. Germany, meanwhile, maintains a disconcerting moral indifference to the plight of other European countries.

Shame Germany. What should the United States and other freedom-loving countries like Great Britain do? Simple: call out and shame Germany. Call a spade a spade. Tell it like it is. Be publicly frank and blunt.

Let every nation know: Germany is actively facilitating the Russian military conquest of Ukraine. Germany cares more about Russian oil and gas than it does about the the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other European countries.

Germany is not a good or reliable ally. Germany is morally obtuse and indifferent.

Redeployment. And then immediately announce plans to redeploy all 34,000 U.S. military troops from Germany into Poland and the Baltic states, where they are most needed, most welcome, and will do the most geo-strategic good.

Then and only then might we avert a Russian military invasion of Ukraine.

Feature photo credit: from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, a photo by the Associated Press:  “(Left to right:) German diplomat Friedrich Gaus, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, Sovet leader Joseph Stalin, and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in the Kremlin on August 23, 1939.”