Posts published in “Defense and Foreign Policy”

Why ‘America First’ National Security Hawks Can No Longer Support Trump

Why ‘America First’ National Security Hawks Can No Longer Support Trump

By John R Guardiano on September 24, 2022

No one should be under any illusions that a second Trump administration would be anywhere near as hawkish as the first Trump administration.

Republicans who believe in a strong national defense and an assertive U.S. foreign policy, and who supported President Trump in the 2016 and 2020 general elections, cannot pull the lever for him again in 2024.

Why? Because of Trump’s own statements about Ukraine, Putin, Iran, and Russia. And because, in a second Trump administration, Trump almost certainly will be more isolationist and accommodating of Russian President Vladimir Putin and other anti-American dictators.

Perennial “never Trumpers” will say, of course, that they were never fooled. “America First,” they say, had tainted origins dating back to the 1930s before the Second World War. But whatever the history of the “America First” movement, there is no denying that, in his first administration, Trump was no isolationist.

To the contrary, thanks to Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, National Security Advisers H.R. McMaster, John Bolton, and Robert C. O’Brien, Deputy National Security Adviser Matthew Pottinger, Ambassador Nikki Haley, Senator Lindsey Graham, and others, Trump often acted in a strong, Reaganesque fashion.

Trump 2017-2021. Thus he ordered and oversaw the quick destruction of ISIS, adoption of the historic and path-breaking Abraham Accords, and the killing of Iranian General Qassem Suleimani.

Trump withdrew from the fatally flawed Iran nuclear deal and Paris climate accord. He recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and launched retaliatory missile strikes at Syria to degrade its chemical weapons program.

And, perhaps most historic, long-lasting, and consequential: Trump became the first president to recognize that China posed the greatest strategic threat to American national security since the Soviet Union a generation ago during the Cold War.

Thus he began the necessary process of decoupling the U.S. economy from China’s, a process that will play out over the next two decades.

Now, to be sure, there are plenty of things about Trump’s foreign policy that deserve condemnation. He shamelessly, for instance, abandoned our Kurdish allies in Syria, while setting the stage for Biden’s disastrous withdrawal and surrender in Afghanistan.

Trump’s China policy also was lacking. He foolishly withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and failed to build and sustain an anti-China alliance on the world stage. Trump also was late to recognize the threat from COVID, mostly because he was too eager to reach a trade deal with China.

‘America First’ means…? But that’s exactly the point: “America First” was always a jump ball policy-wise in Trump’s first administration. It could mean either hawkish or dovish positions, depending on who proved most influential with The Donald. The two factions competed for Trump mindshare.

But that almost certainly won’t be the case in a second Trump administration. The hawks have mostly moved on. In fact, many of them—Ambassador Nikki Haley and National Security Adviser John Bolton, for instance—moved on well before Trump had completed his first term.

Trump’s isolationists supporters, meanwhile, have grown more vocal, more strident, and more influential. They also have big and consequential megaphones, thanks to Fox News and social media.

Ukraine. Tucker Carlson, for instance, rails regularly and often against American support for Ukraine. Laura Ingraham calls the war a costly disaster and a diversion from the real “America First” agenda.

Other prominent and influential Trump supporters call for the United States to negotiate a “compromise solution” that will end the war and bring peace to Ukraine. As a result, Trump now says that he would bring Putin and Zelensky to the negotiating table to end the war.

The problem is that by negotiating with Putin, Trump serves to legitimize and strengthen Putin. And any negotiated settlement now would result in the formal annexation of Ukrainian territory by Russia.

This is an obvious nonstarter. But who would convince Trump otherwise?

Maybe Senator Graham, but he would do so from the Senate and would face the opposition of a bevy of new isolationist Trump administration officials like Russian accommodationist Douglas Macgregor. The hawks have moved on and, for the most part, will be gone in a second Trump administration.

Trump 2025-2029. And it’s not just Ukraine, but NATO, Israel, and our Gulf States allies as well that would be endangered in a second and more isolationist Trump administration.

Trump has often flirted with withdrawing from NATO and he might well do so given a second term.

This, obviously, would be disastrous for American national security. It would immeasurably strengthen Putin’s hand and threaten the peace and security of Europe, especially Eastern Europe, in a way not seen since the 1930s just prior to the Second World War.

Trump also has expressed his desire to reach a deal with Iran. “I would have had a deal done with Iran one week after the [2020] election,” he boasts.

True, in his first term, Trump imposed severe sanctions on Iran, but given Trump’s eagerness to show that he is a great dealmaker, and given the absence of hawkish advisers in a second Trump administration, it is all too easy to see Trump agreeing to a bad deal that strengthens the hand of the mullahs and paves the way for their acquisition of nuclear weapons.

In short, no one should be under any illusions that Trump’s foreign policy in a second term would the same as it was in his first term of office.

To the contrary: there are deep-seated and disquieting reasons to believe exactly the opposite: that Trump’s foreign policy would swerve wildly and recklessly to the left precisely to appease his most fervent and fevered isolationist supporters on the populist right.

Conclusion. For this reason, no one seriously committed to a strong national defense and an assertive U.S. foreign policy can possibly support former President Trump in 2024. The stakes are too high; the risks are too great; and the resultant damage would be too deep-seated and widespread.

In 2024, “America First” necessarily means “Donald Trump last and never again.”

Feature photo credit: YouTube screen shots of “America First” national security hawks Ambassador Nikki Haley (L) and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (R), courtesy of Fox News.

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Is No Template for 2022 Ukraine

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Is No Template for 2022 Ukraine

By John R Guardiano on September 23, 2022

Pretending otherwise will result in NATO negotiating with itself, appeasing Putin, and abandoning Ukraine.

Washington Post foreign policy columnist David Ignatius thinks the 1962 Cuban missile crisis might offer clues on how President Biden can simultaneously achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives in Ukraine, while also giving Russian dictator Vladimir Putin an “off-ramp,”or some “face-saving way out” of his dire predicament.

Ignatius, of course, is rightly concerned about Putin’s threat to use tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. However, the historical template that he cites is misplaced and decidedly unhelpful.

Simply put, 2022 Ukraine is not 1962 Cuba, and pretending that it might be will lead President Biden and other policymakers astray.

For starters, Russian missiles in Cuba were a direct threat to the American homeland. Which means they were an existential threat to the United States. Tactical or battlefield nukes in Ukraine, by contrast, do not threaten the American homeland. Nor do they threaten any NATO country.

Russian tactical nukes do threaten Ukraine, obviously. But pretending that they spell worldwide armageddon is hyperbolic and untrue.

Second, when Russia deployed nukes in Cuba, the West had reason to believe it was facing a formidable military and economic power. No one has any such illusions about Russia today.

As the Financial Times notes, “the Russian economy is not globally significant, though individual sectors such as oil and gas do matter.” The Russian military, meanwhile, has show itself in Ukraine to be utterly incompetent and incapable of waging war, and it now teeters on the verge of collapse.

Russia does have the world’s largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, and that is, indeed, worrisome. However, Russia never has launched a nuclear strike against a NATO country because it knows that would result in an immediate retaliatory strike against Moscow.

Deterrence worked throughout the Cold War and deterrence will work today—if President Biden and other NATO leaders do not waver and remain resolved and determined.

Third, in 1962 Cuba, Russian dictator Nikita Khrushchev was looking for an off-ramp. In 2022 Ukraine, by contrast, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin, clearly is not—something Ignatius himself admits.

Instead, by word and by deed, Putin has demonstrated that he interested in gobbling up as much of Ukraine as he possibly can now, while husbanding his resources for its complete subjugation later.

Given this reality, it is beyond futile to try and give Putin something he clearly does not want. We end up negotiating not with Putin, but with ourselves. This results in more self-defeating self-deterrence and appeasement.

Fourth, 1962 Cuba was a communist territory firmly ensconced in the Soviet orbit. 2022 Ukraine, by contrast, is a Western democracy valiantly and heroically seeking to free itself of Russian domination or attempted Russian domination.

For this reason, it arguably made sense for President Kennedy to pledge (as he did) that the United States would not invade Cuba or intervene in Cuban internal affairs in exchange for the removal of Russian missiles there.

But given the very different status of Ukraine today, any substantive concession that the United States or NATO pledges to Russia re: Ukraine will result in the unconscionable abandonment of that country and its people. This is and ought to be a nonstarter.

Ukraine’s entry into the EU and NATO, for instance, is more necessary and inevitable now than it was before the Russian invasion.

Fifth, like many observers, Ignatius laments Ukraine’s determination to defeat Russia on the battlefield and drive Russia out of all of Ukrainian territory. He laments this because Ignatius would like to see Ukraine give Putin something Russian can crow about and call a victory. That, after all, would make a “face-saving compromise” possible.

But the only thing a “face-saving compromise” can possibly mean is giving some Ukrainian territory to Russia and abandoning millions of Ukrainians to the tender mercies of Russian rule and domination.

Given all that we know about Russian rule, this is truly unconscionable and wrong. It also violates a fundamental principle, the territorial integrity of nations, that underlies the international order.

The danger of rewarding Russian military aggression should be obvious. The precedent established will inevitably result in other countries (China perhaps) unilaterally using military might to redraw the world’s national boundaries and territorial claims.

Sixth, Ignatius suggests that Ukraine is still poised to lose to Russia. He says that Ukraine “needs a reality check about its longer-term battlefield prospects”

This is a remarkable statement. It might have made sense back in February, when Western intelligence estimated that the Ukrainian Army would quickly crumble, Kyiv would fall within days, Zelensky would flee the country, and Russian rule would be established.

In fact, as we now know, nothing of the sort happened. In fact, the opposite has happened. David has heroically beaten back Goliath. And David might well defeat Goliath if America and NATO stop slow-walking their delivery of aid to the Ukrainian military out of an utterly misplaced fear of “provoking” or “cornering” Putin.

“Despite the large quantities [of military aid] flowing to Ukraine,” writes Eliot A. Cohen,

the fact remains that it is not enough, and that the logistical system can handle more…

Some capable countries, [i.e., Germany], are unwilling to give at scale…

Most other countries, including the United States, continue to refrain from the level of industrial mobilization necessary. It is too much business as usual…

Some of the hesitancy, too, has stemmed from a patronizing wariness about Ukrainian capabilities. Yet if we have learned anything in this war, it is that the Ukrainians, smart and driven as they are, can absorb even the most advanced systems fast, and exploit them shrewdly.

At this point, they know more about high-intensity warfare than we do.

Exactly. There is a time and a place to negotiate and to try and offer one’s adversary an “off-ramp” or a “face-saving way out.” That worked in 1962 Cuba. It will not work in 2022 Ukraine. The differences between these two times and places are too stark, and pretending that they’re not will lead President Biden and other policymakers astray.

What America and NATO must now do is accelerate their military aid to Ukraine to ensure Russia’s utter and abject defeat.

At the same time, the West must ensure that Russia is under no illusions. Russian use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine will result in the swift demise of the Russian military there via conventional NATO military means.

Then and only then can a real and lasting peace be achieved.

Feature photo credit: Russian dictators Vladimir Putin (2022) and Nikita Khrushchev (1962), courtesy of the The Telegraph.

How to Prevent a Nuclear War in Ukraine

How to Prevent a Nuclear War in Ukraine

By John R Guardiano on September 21, 2022

Deterrence, strength, and resolve are critical now, not weakness and fear.

With the Russian military reeling from massive casualties, defeats, and a surprise Ukrainian counteroffensive, Vladimir Putin has resorted, once again, to nuclear saber-rattling. Putin himself warned today that he is “not bluffing” about his willingness to use nukes. A key Putin ally, meanwhile, threatened London with a nuclear strike.

Of course, such talk is utterly reckless and dangerous and ought to draw worldwide condemnation. But how should the West—and specifically the United States and NATO—respond? Well, we need to remember several key things:

First, Russian nuclear saber-rattling is nothing new. It was commonplace in the Cold War and, unfortunately, remains a staple of Russian foreign policy today. Yet, despite decades of this reckless talk, Russia never actually resorted to using nukes; and there is little reason to believe it would resort to using nukes in Ukraine today.

Second, during the Cold War, Russian nuclear saber-rattling did not paralyze American presidents, Democrat and Republican, and it should not paralyze President Biden now. Nor did Russian nuclear saber-rattling paralyze NATO during the Cold War, and it should not paralyze NATO now.

The West cannot be intimidated and forced to back down each and every time Russia threatens to use nukes. If the West had respond in this way during the Cold War, the West would have lost the Cold War.

Third, Russian nuclear saber rattling is a reflection of Russian weakness, not Russian strength. As Dr. Mike Martin of King’s College in London points out in The Telegraph this morning:

The Ukraine war has already hollowed out much of the Russian armed forces. This includes the sending of its training battalions into combat, and so the trainers of these mobilised reservists are, in many cases, already dead.

As for equipment, very few Russian soldiers even get body armour, and so much equipment has been destroyed by the Ukrainians that they are already having to press Soviet-era equipment into service.

Most of it belongs in a museum not on a modern battlefield.

Putin is sending these people to their deaths. The Ukrainian armed forces have killed tens of thousands of professional Russian soldiers with the best equipment that Russia could supply. What will they do with this mobilised reserve?

…Putin has shown us this morning that he is not strong, but that he is weak.

Exactly. Russia is losing the war and its military faces the very real prospect of collapse. Putin is resorting to nuclear saber-rattling out of desperation.

Fourth, if Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, this will not change the course of the war. It will not reverse Russia’s battlefield losses or its inability to conquer Ukraine.

Instead, all it will do is result in a more horrific loss of life and the very real danger of nuclear contamination blowing back on Russian military forces and the Russian populace. Putin surely knows this, or at least his military advisers surely know this.

Fifth, Putin alone cannot launch nuclear weapons. He would need the buy-in of an entire military, and possibly civilian, chain of command. And it is by no means obvious that all of these officials would be so stupid and so reckless as do the unthinkable.

Sixth, if Russia becomes the first and only country to use nuclear weapons since the Second World War nearly 80 years ago, it will seal its fate as a country thoroughly isolated and shunned for two or three generations at least.

Russia currently enjoys the good offices of China, Turkey, Israel, and India. All of these good offices end the minute Russia crosses the nuclear threshold and does the unthinkable. Putin knows this, and it is a big reason why he is highly unlikely to employ nukes in Ukraine.

Seventh, the West does not have to respond in kind, with a retaliatory nuclear strike, if Russia employs nuclear weapons in Ukraine. In fact, the West should not do so and almost certainly will not do so.

Why? Because that is completely unnecessary from a military standpoint. NATO has more than sufficient conventional military means to destroy the Russian military in Ukraine and should do so if Putin launches a nuclear weapon there.

Moreover, by responding in kind, NATO and the United States cede the moral and diplomatic high ground in Ukraine. Why do so when that is completely unnecessary?

Ceding the moral and diplomatic high ground risks driving away China, Turkey, Israel, and India, all of whom can then say, in effect, “A pox on both your houses.”

Eighth, the only time the West should launch a nuclear strike on Russia is if Putin launches a nuclear strike on a NATO country.

In other words, if Russia nukes Warsaw or London, then the West responds in kind with a retaliatory nuclear strike on Moscow. But if Russia nukes Ukraine, then NATO enters the war, destroys the Russian military there, and quickly ends the war with conventional weapons.

That at least is what should happen. Let us hope and pray that that is what President Biden, Prime Minister Truss, and other NATO leaders are communicating privately to Russian government officials.

Ninth, the way to prevent nuclear war is through the time-tested method of deterrence, which served us well during the Cold War. Weakness and fear are provocative and could well result in a miscalculation by Putin.

The Russians should be under no illusions. If they use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, NATO will enter the war, quickly decimate and destroy the Russian military there, and end the war. And if Russia ever dared to launch a nuclear strike on a NATO country, it would result in the utter destruction of Moscow.

That is how we can and will prevent the unthinkable from ever happening. Pray for peace, but prepare for war.

Feature photo credit: YouTube screenshot of Russian dictator Vladimir Putin, courtesy of CNN.

Russian Nukes are No Reason to Scale Back Western Support for Ukraine

Russian Nukes are No Reason to Scale Back Western Support for Ukraine

By John R Guardiano on September 15, 2022

Nuclear weapons are not a military game changer in Ukraine and Putin and his generals know it.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive has sparked renewed fears that a desperate Vladimir Putin might resort to nuclear weapons; and that, to forestall this possibility, Ukraine should be careful not to beat back the Russians too far too fast. Otherwise, Putin might lash out and do the unthinkable.

As dovish New York Times’ columnist Ross Douthat put it:

The danger is that desperation might push Moscow toward nuclear brinkmanship—especially given the Russian strategic posture that envisions using tactical nuclear weapons to reverse battlefield defeats.

As the United States learned to its cost in the Korean War, when our push to the Yalu River reaped an unexpected Chinese intervention, the question of how far a victorious army should push is not an easy one, and whether in Crimea or the Donbas, there may be a line that’s perilous to cross.

Military historian Victor Davis Hanson agrees: The Ukrainians, he warns,

are getting very close to the Russian border, and that raises the question: You have an ailing dictator, [Vladimir Putin], with 7,000 nuclear weapons, the world’s largest arsenal. And there are some scenarios that we don’t think about.

Is he just going to say, “I lost 100,000 dead, wounded, and missing. I’m sorry. We lost,” and then quit. I don’t think so…

I think he’s going to say:

“You’re getting very close to the Russian border. You’re hitting targets with NATO and American weapons inside Russia. You’re attacking ships,” and we’re back to 1962, [the Cuban Missile Crisis].

And he’s going to do something dramatic [engage in nuclear brinksmanship if not the use of nuclear weapons].

Excuse me, but this is ludicrous and nonsensical. Douthat and Hanson are serious-minded analysts, but what they are doing here is unserious. It is scaremongering, not serious analysis.

Nuclear Weapons. First, what is at issue in Ukraine are tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons, not strategic nuclear weapons. No one is suggesting that Russia might launch nuclear weapons at the United States or any NATO country.

That would be suicidal for the Russians because it would invite, obviously, a devastating counterstrike that would destroy Moscow. Putin knows this and so, it won’t happen.

The question is: might Russia use tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons on Ukraine?

International Politics. Of course, no one can never say never, because leaders sometimes do stupid things and make horrendous mistakes. But such a move would make no military sense, and it would isolate Russia, politically, to an extent rivaled perhaps only by Kim Jong-un’s hermit kingdom in North Korea.

Russia currently enjoys the good offices of China, India, Israel, Turkey, and other countries that are trying to have it both ways vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine. Heck, even the Germans and the French sometimes suggest that they are ready, if not eager, to abandon Ukraine for the sake of “peace.”

All of these good offices end the minute Russia crosses the nuclear threshold and does the unthinkable. Putin knows this, and it is a big reason why he is highly unlikely to employ nukes in Ukraine.

Military Disadvantage. Moreover, Russia gains nothing, militarily, by using nuclear weapons.

“They [tactical nukes] don’t really do that much,” explains military analyst Ralph Peters. “You can do more in many cases,” he explains, “with a HIMARS, [the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System]…

A tactical nuclear weapon, he adds, “is not gonna stop the Ukrainians… and it won’t change the course of the war.” Again, Putin knows this, or at least his military advisers know this.

Russia also “would have to worry about the fallout coming from the [nuclear] explosion drifting onto Russian soldiers, pro-Russian separatists, and Russian citizens,” notes Brent M. Eastwood.

Finally, as former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Admiral James Stavridis observes, Putin’s use of a tactical nuclear weapon, “while highly unlikely… would probably bring NATO into the conflict with the creation of a no-fly zone.”

Of course, the last thing Putin and his military commanders want is a direct engagement with NATO. The Russian military is being beaten by Ukrainian citizen soldiers and would be quickly decimated were NATO to enter the conflict.

The bottom line: Putin has every reason not to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. And, to the extent he may be deluded on this score, it is important for the United States and NATO to disabuse him of his delusions: by communicating to him and his military commanders the inevitable consequences should he dare to cross the nuclear threshold and do the unthinkable.

In short, although Russia has the world’s largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, this is of no real political or military significance in Ukraine. What matters is that the Russian military is incompetent at waging war.

What matters is that the Russian economy is incredibly weak and anemic and cannot long sustain Putin’s war of conquest, war of choice.

What matters is that although public opinion polls suggest most Russians support Putin, the Russian people have no appetite for fighting in Ukraine, which is why Putin has not imposed a draft or mass mobilization of the populace.

Support Ukraine. The possibility of a nuclear war always exists, of course, but it is highly unlikely and should not be used as a pretext to scale back Western support of Ukraine and limit Ukrainian political and military objectives.

Ukraine should aim to drive every last Russian out of their country, and America and NATO should stand by the Ukrainians until this objective is achieved.

In other words: don’t listen to the scaremongers. They don’t know what they are talking about. Slava Ukraini.

Feature photo credit: YouTube screenshots of military historian Victor Davis Hanson (L) and New York Times‘ columnist Ross Douthat (R).

Bucha Should Cause the West to Accelerate Its Military Efforts in Ukraine

Bucha Should Cause the West to Accelerate Its Military Efforts in Ukraine

By John R Guardiano on April 5, 2022

A Ukrainian military victory, not Western legal action and a negotiated settlement, is what is needed now.

The gruesome images of mass graves and murder coming out of Bucha, Ukraine, have inspired calls for war criminal investigations and war crimes tribunals.

This is, obviously, necessary and appropriate. But what is conspicuously missing are calls for Russia’s military defeat and expulsion from Ukraine.

President Biden, for instance, called Putin a war criminal, who needs to stand trial; however, he did not call upon the West to redouble its efforts to ensure a Ukrainian victory on the battlefield. Instead, the President was silent and noncommittal about Western war aims in Ukraine.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stolenberg, likewise, said that “targeting and murdering civilians is a war crime. All the facts must be established and all those responsible for these atrocities must be brought to justice.”

True, but how can justice be served if Putin wins the war? Russia, obviously, must be defeated first before any war crimes tribunals can be convened.

Yet, like President Biden, in the wake of Bucha, NATO had nothing to say about altering the military balance of power to ensure Putin’s defeat.

Unfortunately, this is part of a troubling pattern or trend. Since this conflict began in February, Mr .Biden and his counterparts in Western Europe have been more worried about provoking Putin than in ensuring a Ukrainian win.

Consequently, they have been slow-walking military aid and assistance to Ukraine, while denying Ukrainian requests for heavy military equipment: tanks, armored vehicles, artillery systems, anti-ship missiles, military aircraft, et al.

“The [Biden] administration is not moving quickly enough,” said Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wisconsin), a member of the House Armed Services Committee, in an interview with Wall Street Journal Editorial Page Editor Paul Gigot.

There is more we can do to help [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelensky and put him in the strongest possible position going forward…

[But] the administration just continues to be guided by a fear of provoking Putin. That’s really what’s guided their efforts from the start. I think that’s why we’re somewhat behind the curve.

“The concern among Ukraine’s supporters on Capitol Hill and the Pentagon,” reports the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board

is that the Biden Administration doesn’t want Ukraine to go on offense. It wants a negotiated settlement as soon as possible.

France and Germany, the doves in the NATO coalition, are in a similar place. They worry that if Russia suffers even greater losses, Mr. Putin might escalate again and perhaps in more dangerous ways that drag NATO directly into the war.

In a sense, Mr. Putin with his threats is defining the limits of U.S. assistance to Ukraine.

‘World War III’. Washington Post columnist Jennifer Rubin sums up the conventional wisdom: “The bitter truth is that we will not risk a third world war to insist Russia fully retreat from all of Ukraine and purge itself of Putin.”

In truth, though, a wider war and a more dangerous conflagration—in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East—is more likely if Putin wins in Ukraine.

Dictators and bad actors—including China’s Xi Jinping, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, and Iran’s Ali Khamenei—will learn that the West can be rolled and that aggression pays.

An emboldened Putin, meanwhile, will continue to threaten nearby NATO countries, such as Poland and the Baltic states, but from a far stronger military position in Ukraine.

The bottom line: war crimes can be punished only after a war ends, and only after those responsible have been defeated on the battlefield.

Calling Putin a war criminal and insisting that he and his generals be tried in a war crimes tribunal is all well and good, but it mustn’t obscure the more immediate and pressing wartime exigency, which is to drive the Russians out of Ukraine.

Bucha should stiffen the spines of Western leaders to ensure that Ukraine wins and Russia loses. Punishing Putin and his generals for war crimes is no substitute for military victory and is impossible in any case without a military victory.

Feature photo credit: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, grief stricken after seeing the carnage caused by Russian war crimes in Bucha, courtesy of the New York Post.