Posts published in “Defense and Foreign Policy”

What the Korean War Can Teach Us about Ending Russia’s War on Ukraine

What the Korean War Can Teach Us about Ending Russia’s War on Ukraine

By John R Guardiano on August 5, 2023

In Ukraine, President Biden is drawing exactly the wrong lessons from President Truman’s mishandling of the Korean War in 1951.

Opponents of American aid to Ukraine often tout the Korean War as a model for ending the war in Ukraine. The United States, it is argued, wisely refrained from “escalating” in Korea, instead signing an armistice that ended the conflict, thus allowing for a cold but endurable peace.

The Communists retained control of North Korea, but failed to achieve their objective of conquering all of Korea.

In the same way, argue the opponents of American aid to Ukraine, Russia should be allowed to retain control of Crimea, the Donbas, and other parts of southeastern Ukraine nominally or firmly in its control.

This will allow a free, sovereign, and independent Ukraine to coexist alongside Russian-occupied Ukraine—just as free, sovereign, and independent South Korea has coexisted for decades alongside Communist North Korea.

Then and only then, they insist, can the war end and peace be realized or achieved.

In fact, the Korean War is instructive to American policymakers, but not in the ways that opponents of American aid to Ukraine think.

The Korean War is an example of American self-deterrence that needlessly prolonged the war and the horrific human cost of that war. The United States eschewed a relatively quick victory for a bloody and prolonged stalemate or tie.

For this reason, the Korean War is a cautionary tale of what America should not do when aiding and abetting a country fighting for its survival against a tyrannical foe.

For starters, the war dragged on for three long, inconclusive, and interminable years in which American casualties mounted. Why? Because U.S. President Harry Truman refused to pursue victory out of a misguided fear of “escalation” and “World War III.”

Truman and Biden. Most historians today laud Truman’s caution and restraint in Korea—just as most observers today laud Biden’s caution and restraint in Ukraine. But Truman was wrong then and Biden is wrong today.

Truman is seen as wise because he is juxtaposed against U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who failed to anticipate the Chinese intervention in Korea, and whose insubordination and bellicosity subsequently resulted in his dismissal by Truman.

Biden, likewise, is seen as wise because he is juxtaposed against Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Putin and his henchmen often intimate that he might use nuclear weapons. Zelensky, meanwhile, is constantly beseeching Biden to send Ukraine more and more advanced weapons.

For this reason, Biden is often seen as wiser and more sober-minded than Putin and Zelensky. Truman, too, is typically remembered as more rational and level-headed than MacArthur.

Limited or Total War? But the choice between a prolonged war of indecision on the one hand and a global nuclear conflagration on the other hand is a silly and fallacious choice that did not exist then and does not exist now.

“Between the extremes of Truman’s restraint and the possibility of global war,” write Rep. Michael Gallagher (R-Wisconsin) and Aaron MacLean, “numerous options existed.

Truman’s decision to renounce nuclear threats and to restrict combat operations to Korea and its airspace prolonged the war and, paradoxically, extended the period in which it could have escalated.

In truth, shortly after MacArthur had been relieved of his command by Truman on Apr. 11, 1951, the United States was well on its way to routing the Chinese and North Koreans, reuniting the Korean peninsula, and ending the war with Korea wholly free and intact.

However, Truman and his military appointees on the Joint Chiefs of Staff put the kibosh on Lieutenant General James Van Fleet’s May 28, 1951, request “for a major offensive into North Korea to complete the destruction of the Chinese Armies,” reports Robert B. Bruce in Army History magazine (Winter 2012).

Instead of military victory, the United States pursued a negotiated solution in Korea and thus gave Communist forces a sanctuary in North Korea. As a result, the war dragged on for two more long years and at a horrific human cost.

In Ukraine, Biden, too, has called for a negotiated solution, while deliberately withholding from Ukraine advanced weapons—including, for instance, long-range precision artillery, tanks, jets, and aircraft, which would allow the Ukrainians to more quickly and aggressively attack Russian positions and drive Russian forces out of Ukraine.

Biden also has refused to use U.S. air and naval forces to safeguard the shipment of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. The reason: he fears “escalation” and “World War III.”

But in truth, Russia is exhausted militarily and is in no position to “escalate” its war on Ukraine.

Sure, Russia has nuclear weapons, but the use of tactical or battlefield nukes serves no military purpose and gives Russia no battlefield edge other than shock value.

Korea 1951. And the same was true of Chinese and North Korean forces in June 1951. They were exhausted, militarily, and did not even possess nuclear weapons. Russia, a North Korean ally and supporter, did have nuclear weapons, but in numbers dwarfed by the United States.

Moreover, although Russian leader Joseph Stalin conceived of the Korean War as a way to expand Communist influence and control, internationally, Russia was not directly involved in the Korean War and had no intention of becoming involved, as its focus was on Europe.

Ironically, as Gallagher and MacLean note, the Korean War ended only when former World War II Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected president (in 1952) and “contemplated and discussed the possibility of escalation, even approving the development of war plans that involved the use of nuclear weapons.”

Then, too, Stalin died on Mar. 5, 1953. This was significant because Stalin was the foremost obstacle to peace in Korea. He had “insisted that the war continue despite the misgivings of Chinese and North Korean leaders,” writes Mark Kramer.

Putin, likewise, is the foremost obstacle to peace in Ukraine. Thus his death, resulting in regime change in Russia, certainly would greatly enhance the prospects of a peace agreement.

The bottom line: President Truman’s mismanagement of the Korean War 72 years ago does, indeed, hold lessons for President Biden as he manages the war in Ukraine today. But those lessons teach Biden what not to do.

Unfortunately, our president is drawing the exact opposite conclusion and the result is a needlessly prolonged war of indecision at a horrific human cost to innocent Ukrainians.

One of the chief lessons of the Korean War is that the fear of “escalation” against a weak and exhausted military enemy is a catastrophic mistake. In truth, the risk of “escalation” rises if the war is allowed to drag on and the enemy is permitted to regroup.

Ditto “World War III”. That was not a realistic concern in 1951 and it is not a realistic concern today, in 2023. However, by allowing the North Korean regime to survive, Truman increased the risk of World War III significantly in the intervening decades.

Likewise, in Ukraine. If Russia is not clearly and explicitly defeated, militarily, and expelled from all of Ukraine, it will regroup and resume its fight in Ukraine at a later date when it is better prepared. “World War III” then becomes more likely.

In short, there is no substitute for victory and there is no reason not to pursue victory. That was true in Korea 1951 and it is true in Ukraine 2023.

Feature photo credit: President Biden (L), courtesy of the Associated Press and President Harry S. Truman (R), courtesy of Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, published in NPR.

Reagan Would Have Supported NATO Membership for Ukraine Now

Reagan Would Have Supported NATO Membership for Ukraine Now

By John R Guardiano on July 9, 2023

So-called New Right Republicans betray the Reagan legacy that defeated the Soviets and won the Cold War.

In the 1980s, as Russian leaders rattled their nuclear saber and warned of the risk of nuclear war, President Ronald Reagan acted to strengthen and solidify the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Reagan gave material aid and rhetorical comfort to the anti-Communist Polish trade union movement, Solidarity; and he deployed Pershing II and cruise missiles to Europe to counter the Soviet threat.

Reagan also spoke truth to Russian power, declaring that

the only morality they recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat… [in order to] advance the cause of socialism.

The Soviet Union collapsed and fell apart, thanks in large part to Reagan’s policy of peace through strength and his refusal to be cowed and intimidated by Russian threats.

Russia’s War on Ukraine. Today, unfortunately, Russia is ruled by a man, Vladimir Putin, who laments the demise of the Soviet Union, and who is determined to resurrect the Russian empire. And NATO again is on the frontlines of the fight for freedom, as a neighboring, non-member state, Ukraine, fights to free itself of attempted Russian conquest and subjugation.

Ukraine, understandably, seeks membership in NATO. No country under NATO’s umbrella, after all, has been invaded or subjugated by Russia. By contrast, countries outside of NATO’s umbrella—i.e., Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus—have been invaded and subjugated by Russia.

Ukraine does not expect NATO membership today, but would like today a pledge of NATO membership at the conclusion of its war with Russia. Ukrainians believe that would be the surest way to deter future Russian aggression and ensure the peace.

The ‘New Right’. Yet in the face of the Russian threat, the only thing some so-called conservative Republicans can offer up is the antithesis of Reagan. These faux conservatives push not for a real and lasting peace through strength. Instead, they advocate for a false and temporary peace through fear and appeasement.

Presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy, for instance, calls NATO membership for Ukraine “sheer lunacy” that will increase “the risk of nuclear war with Russia itself.”

Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah) goes even further: “If Ukraine were a NATO ally,” he writes, “we’d have to go to war with Russia under Article V of the NATO Treaty… We don’t want war with Russia.”

“Absolutely not,” agrees Senator Rand Paul (R-Kentucky). “This [NATO membership for Ukraine] is exactly wrong—as usual… [A] war with Russia [is] something no one should want.”

As when Reagan was president, no one, of course, wants the United States to be immersed in a direct war with Russia. The question, then as now, is how to avert and avoid war, while protecting ourselves, our interests, and our allies worldwide.

Deterrence. Reagan believed in deterrence; and deterrence, in turn, required a credible American and allied military threat.

That’s why Reagan deployed the Pershing II and cruise missiles to Europe: to strengthen the NATO alliance. And that’s why he armed the Afghan mujahideen: to bleed and weaken the Soviet Union and to stop what was then widely perceived to be Russia’s quest for a warm water port.

For this same reason, deterrence, it is in the American national interest to arm Ukraine and to admit Ukraine into NATO.

Putin’s Russia is an enemy of the United States, which works assiduously to undermine American interests worldwide. Ukraine, by contrast, seeks to be part of the West and a part of the liberal order through which the West has grown and prospered mightily since at least the end of the Second World War.

NATO. Concerns by right-wing isolationists (or non-interventionists), such as Ramaswamy, Lee and Paul, that admitting Ukraine into NATO would force the United States into a direct shooting war with Russia are utterly fallacious.

As Randy Scheunemann and Evelyn Farkas point out, NATO’s Article 5—which holds “that an attack against one ally is considered an attack against all allies”—does “not mandate a specific response by member states.”

The United States and other NATO countries retain the right to decide how to support Ukraine, irrespective of whether Ukraine is a member of NATO.

For this reason, the United States and NATO, in planned coordination with Ukraine, could decide that by doing what they are now doing, arming Ukraine, they are fulfilling their Article 5 obligations.

Winning. What, then, is the value of NATO membership if it doesn’t change what is happening in Ukraine now?

Simple: it sends an unmistakable message of (long-term) support to Ukraine; it strengthens Ukrainian resolve; and it tells the Russians that, insofar as NATO is concerned, Ukraine will forever be a free, sovereign, and independent state.

In other words: there will be no negotiated settlement that rewards Russian aggression with the surrender of Ukrainian territory and people.

Equally important, after this war ends and a ceasefire is declared, NATO membership for Ukraine will deter renewed Russian aggression and prevent future wars.

This is something that President Reagan would have understood. It’s beyond disappointing that so-called “new right” Republicans just don’t get it.

Feature photo credit: Three leading isolationists or non-interventionists: Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah), courtesy of Shutterstock/Rolling Stone; GOP presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy, courtesy of Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images/NPR; and Sen. Rand Paul (R-Kentucky), courtesy of Tom Brenner/New York Times.

What Prigozhin’s Armed Rebellion Means for the Future of Russia and Ukraine

What Prigozhin’s Armed Rebellion Means for the Future of Russia and Ukraine

By John R Guardiano on June 26, 2023

Commentators routinely say we know nothing. In truth, we know a lot—about the role of NATO, the fear of “escalation,” and Putin’s likely successor.

The ramifications of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s aborted rebellion against the Russian military are still playing out and won’t be fully known for many weeks and possibly many months. However, the rebellion underscores or illuminates three key points of longstanding historical significance:

First, Putin’s war on Ukraine had nothing to do with NATO, NATO expansion, or phantom NATO threats to Russia.

Second, fears that Putin might “escalate” the conflict if the West somehow “provokes” him by fully arming Ukraine are misplaced and misguided.

Third, we can see the type of leader who might succeed Putin. The successor most likely will be an autocrat who is hostile to the West; but he also will be someone the West can tolerate or live with—provided Ukraine wins and Russia loses the war.

*******

First, Putin’s war on Ukraine had nothing to do with NATO, NATO expansion, or phantom NATO threats to Russia.

Many prominent observers have bought into this lie and it remains widely touted; but it was always a ruse used by Putin to try and legitimize his illegal and unprovoked war on Ukraine. Now, Prigozhin himself admits as much.

“The Armed Forces of Ukraine were not going to attack Russia with NATO,” Prigozhin admits in a video uploaded to Telegram Friday, June 23. “The war was needed for a bunch of scumbags to triumph and show how strong of an army they are.”

Prigozhin, reports the New York Times,

described his country’s invasion of Ukraine as a “racket” perpetrated by a corrupt elite chasing money and glory without concern for Russian lives. He also challenged the Kremlin’s claim that Kyiv had been on the verge of attacking Russian-backed separatist territory in Ukraine’s east when Russia invaded.

“The war wasn’t needed to return Russian citizens to our bosom, nor to demilitarize or denazify Ukraine,” Mr. Prigozhin said, referring to Mr. Putin’s initial justifications for the war. “The war was needed so that a bunch of animals could simply exult in glory.”

Second, fears that Putin might “escalate” the conflict if the West somehow “provokes” him by fully arming Ukraine are misguided and misplaced.

As we observed back in February, the Biden administration’s fear of “escalation” never made any sense. Russia has no real ability to “escalate,” militarily, and our objective ought to be to bring the war to a swift and decisive conclusion.

The real danger is a long, costly and drawn-out war or stalemate caused by American self-deterrence and our continued refusal to provide Ukraine with long-range precision weaponry, such as the the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and F-16 fighter jets.

This point has been underscored by Putin’s response to Prigozhin’s armed rebellion. As Michael McFaul points out:

Putin talked tough in his national address [June 24]. He sounded like someone preparing for a big fight. But when faced with the difficult decision of trying to stop Wagner mercenaries with major force, he backed down. In this game of chicken, we swerved off the road. He didn’t escalate. He didn’t need a face-saving off-ramp to declare victory.

When facing the possibility of really losing to Wagner mercenaries coming into Moscow, he instead capitulated. Rather than doubling down with overwhelming force to crush the mutiny, Putin accepted humiliation instead.

He was the rat trapped in the corner that so many Putinologists have told us to fear. But he didn’t lash out and go crazy. He didn’t take the riskier path of fighting a civil war. He negotiated…

The lesson for the war in Ukraine is clear. Putin is more likely to negotiate and end his war if he is losing on the battlefield, not when there is a stalemate.

Those who have argued that Ukraine must not attack Crimea for fear of triggering escalation must now reevaluate that hypothesis. The sooner Putin fears he is losing the war, the faster he will negotiate.

Third, we can see the type of leader who might succeed Putin. The successor most likely will be an autocrat who is hostile to the West; but he also will be someone the West can tolerate or live with—provided Ukraine wins and Russia loses the war.

No one has any illusions that a liberal reformer will emerge from the sewer of Russian politics. For the most part, the liberals have all fled the country. Russia, moreover, has no real liberal political tradition or history.

Even prominent dissident Alexei Navalny is a committed Russian nationalist, albeit, as Stephen Kotkin points out, “one who also says out loud that the war was a terrible idea and is hurting Russia.”

Navalny and Prigozhin, in fact, are two different types of nationalists who could could conceivably succeed Putin.

“…An authoritarian Russian nationalist who recognizes the war is a mistake and, whether fully intentionally or not, effectively ends the war, or at least the current active phase of it—that’s the one kind of person who could threaten [and succeed] Putin,” Kotkin explains.

This successor, he adds, would “recognize the separate existence of a Ukrainian nation and state”—not because he is a “good guy” or a liberal reformer, but simply because he bows to the political and military reality brought about by a war that his predecessor, Putin, and not he, foolishly started.

The bottom line: the role, or lack thereof, of NATO expansion in the run-up to the war; the significance, or lack thereof, of military “escalation” in the prosecution of the war; and the type of Russian ruler who succeeds Putin after the war—these three issues have all been brought into stark relief as a result of Prigozhin’s aborted rebellion against the Russian military.

Stay tuned. The best (or at least the most intriguing) is yet to come.

Feature photo credit: Russian dictator Vladimir Putin (L) and Wagner Group mercenary head Yevgeny Prigozhin (R), courtesy of the Toronto Star.

The Russia Nuclear Weapons Excuse for American Appeasement

The Russia Nuclear Weapons Excuse for American Appeasement

By John R Guardiano on June 24, 2023

It’s gained currency, especially on the Trumpian Right, as a result of the Wagner Group insurrection, but it remains a dangerous and specious idea.

The Wagner Group’s armed rebellion against the Russian military has inspired hope that Russian dictator Vladimir Putin might soon be ousted from power and, with that, Russian forces withdrawn from all of Ukraine.

Yet, this good news has been met with skepticism by some, especially right-wing apologists for Donald Trump, who warn that Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons; and that political instability in Russia might result in “loose nukes,” which could threaten the world with nuclear armageddon.

The Trumpians. For this reason, say the Trumpians, the United States should be wary of “regime change” in Russia. The implication is that we are better off with the devil we know (Putin) than the devils we don’t know (Wagner head Yevgeny Prigozhin and perhaps other warlords who might rule over different parts of a fractured and divided Russia).

As Rebekah Koffler, a former U.S. defense intelligence officer, told Fox News this morning:

There’s a real threat of an armed insurrection in Russia, which possesses six thousand nuclear weapons. A lot of them are pointing at the U.S. homeland. And any kind of instability [in Russia] is not good for anyone.

The Chimera of ‘Stability’. But should American foreign policy really be wedded to Russian status quo “stability” because of a fear that Russian nukes might end up lost, unaccounted for, and in the hands of a deranged warlord?

Of course, it goes without saying that the United States has a vital national interest in ensuring that Russian nuclear weapons are retained and controlled by a legitimate, responsible, and competent state actor. But there is real reason to doubt that the Putin government is any of those things.

The Russian dictator has regularly brandished his country’s arsenal of nuclear weapons, while intimating that he is prepared to use nukes in Ukraine. That is hardly responsible behavior.

As for competence, does the Russian invasion of Ukraine strike anyone as a case study in military competence? And Putin’s legitimacy rests on a mountain of fear, graft, and oppression that has few rivals in the 21st Century.

Appeasing Putin. In short, there is no reason for the United States to embrace or prop up Putin. He does not warrant American support or appeasement. An alternative Russian ruler or rulers could be worse; but if so, it would be a mater of degree not kind.

Moreover, a new, successor regime (or regimes) might be much better for the Russian people and the West.

At the very least, Putin’s ouster from power would weaken Russia and provide the impetus for a possible Russian withdrawal from all of Ukraine. The 1917 Russian Revolution, remember, precipitated the Russian withdrawal from World War I.

A stubborn and ill-advised commitment to status quo “stability,” however, precludes any possibility of positive change within Russia.

Farfetched Scenarios. Finally, suppose the farfetched scenario came true. A dangerous warlord took over part of Russia and assumed control of a “lost” nuke or nukes. Does this mean he can, willy-nilly, detonate his nukes and ignite “World War III”?

No, not at all. Nuclear weapons, after all, are not like a handgun or a rifle. One person cannot simply pick them up, lock-and-load, and fire away. That’s not at all how they work.

An entire series of military and technical experts within the chain of command would have to assent to their use and set in motion the process for their employment and detonation. That’s much easier said than done.

That is why, throughout the Cold War, nuclear weapons never paralyzed American presidents, Republicans and Democrats, into inaction and appeasement vis-à-vis Russia.

American policymakers understood that although nuclear weapons were a quite serious matter, they cannot and do not give our enemies a trump card or veto power over the United States.

Nuclear Weapons. Yet, this doesn’t stop Trump and his acolytes from acting as if nuclear weapons were just discovered yesterday and must, therefore, necessarily upend international relations as they have been been practiced since at least the mid 20th Century.

“First come the tanks and then come the nukes,” Trump declared five months ago. “I think we’re at the most dangerous time maybe in, in many, many years—maybe ever—because of the power of nuclear,” he added.

Never mind the fact that nuclear weapons have been around for some 75 years and yet somehow, we’ve managed to avoid a nuclear war while still winning the Cold War and liberating Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

And never mind the fact that modern-day missile defense technologies render the use of nuclear weapons more suspect and problematic than ever before. As Trump sees it, “the power of nuclear” renders all previous history irrelevant to modern-day challenges.

Trump, of course, is not serious. He is simply fear-mongering in a transparent attempt to win votes and political praise.

The truth is: nuclear weapons do not give U.S. policymakers any reason to appease Putin. And Russia would be better off, and the American national interest would be served, were the Russian dictator to be ousted from power.

True, Putin’s successor might be worse, but Russia would be weakened and its ability to control Crimea and parts of eastern and southern Ukraine likely would be dealt a deathblow.

The bottom line: the United States cannot control who rules Russia. However, by aiding Ukraine, we can help to ensure that whoever rules Russia has limited room for destructive maneuver. American action, not American appeasement, is what history demands.

Feature photo credit: Donald Trump, courtesy of Evan Vucci/AP in The New Yorker.

Why Winning—in Ukraine and Elsewhere—is Key to a Successful U.S. Foreign Policy

Why Winning—in Ukraine and Elsewhere—is Key to a Successful U.S. Foreign Policy

By John R Guardiano on March 1, 2023

Sending F-16s to Ukraine is critical for many reasons, but mostly because it underscores America’s commitment to ensuring Ukraine wins.

A successful American foreign policy hinges on winning and succeeding in the international arena. After all “nothing succeeds like success. Countries follow the strong or successful horse,” we’ve argued.

Conversely, failure breeds more failure. A good example of this is the Biden administration’s disastrous surrender of Afghanistan to the Taliban. That fiasco led directly to the Russia-Chinese “no limits” partnership and Putin’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine.

Moreover, a big reason China has not yet provided Russia with weapon systems and armaments is because Russia looks like a loser in Ukraine, and China is reticent to throw good money after bad.

But if it looks like Russia can hang on and effect a prolonged stalemate in Ukraine, then China is more likely to come to Russia’s aid. And, if that happens, a wider and larger-scale war in multiple theaters of operation—aka “World War III”—also becomes more likely.

Ukraine. For this reason, it is critical that the Biden administration overcome its misplaced fear of “escalation” and focus on winning in Ukraine.

That means moving expeditiously to arm Ukraine with the full suite of weapon systems—fighter jets, helicopters, long-range artillery, Predator drones, et al.—needed to conduct a combined arms offensive that will finish off the Russian military and end this war.

Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colorado), a former Army Ranger who now serves on the House Foreign Affairs and Intelligence committees, agrees. As he told CNN’s Erin Burnett yesterday (Feb. 28, 2023):

What I’m concerned about is the escalation of failure. If Russia wins this [war] and conquers Ukraine, what message does that send to autocrats, to dictators, around the world? To China? … If we fail, that’s escalatory in and of itself, and that’s not something I’m willing to accept.

F-16s. Crow is one of five military veterans in Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike, who have signed a letter urging the Biden administration to send F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. The Ukrainians have pleaded for these aircraft, but the Biden administration has balked for fear of “provoking Putin.”

Team Biden says F-16s are too complicated to operate and will take too long for the Ukrainians to master in time for the current fight. But as Rep. Crow points out, U.S. military pilots who have actually trained with the Ukrainians say they can become proficient with the aircraft in three to six months.

That’s “much faster than I’ve been told by other folks in the administration,” Crow said.

And the reason we know this is because we have had a nine-year partnership between the California Air National Guard and the Ukrainian Air Force.

For nine years, they’ve been flying and training with the Ukrainians—over 1,000 training engagements in that time. And they’re telling us: ‘The Ukrainians know these systems. They know how to train. They’re capable of getting this done.’

Middle East. And it’s not only in Ukraine that the administration needs to focus on winning. Walter Russell Mead warns:

The U.S. is much closer to getting involved in another Middle East war than most in Washington understand… Minimizing this danger requires rapid and sweeping policy change from an administration still struggling to comprehend the most serious international crisis since the late 1930s…

The best way to avoid war, and to minimize direct American engagement should war break out, is to ensure that our Middle East allies have the power to defend themselves. We must make it unmistakably clear that we will ensure our allies win should hostilities break out. Nothing else will do [emphasis added].

As Vince Lombardi famously put it: “winning isn’t everything; it’s the only thing.” Certainly, it’s the critical and necessary thing to prevent war and preserve the peace.

Feature photo credit: Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colorado), courtesy of NBC’s Today Show.