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Trump’s Ignorance of the Taliban Undermines America’s Negotiating Posture in Afghanistan

As we’ve explained, pursuing a diplomatic solution in Afghanistan after nearly 19 years of fighting makes sense, but only if we are clear-eyed and sober-minded about who the Taliban are and what they are about.

And only if we maintain a firm and steadfast commitment to the legitimately elected government of Afghanistan and are willing to walk away from negotiations if the Taliban renege on their agreements and act in bad faith.

Unfortunately, as we reported Monday, President Trump appears to have little to no understanding of the Taliban, and the only thing he seems firm and steadfast about are bugging out of Afghanistan and withdrawing U.S. troops there.

Weakness. Trump’s palpable and pathetic rhetorical weakness vis-à-vis the Taliban undermines America’s diplomatic leverage and make it immeasurably more difficult to secure an enduring and sustainable agreement which protects U.S. security interests and the Americans homeland.

This is especially true give that the Taliban do not view negotiations in the same way as we do. For the United States and other democracies, negotiations are a means to reconcile differences and arrive at a mutually beneficial accord or modus vivendi

Not so for the Taliban. As Gen. Jack Keane (Ret.), told the Heritage Foundation Jan. 28, 2020:

The Taliban leadership position is very clear. Their top priority is to get the United States to sign an agreement to withdraw completely. They are willing to make just about any statement to get that, any promise to get that.

They’ll do a ceasefire to get that. They’ll promise negotiations with the Afghans to get that. And why do they want that?

In their words, it’s a massive boost to the movement. It amounts to a  U.S. admission of defeat, and it guarantees the legitimacy of their Islamic Emirate, which is what they call Afghanistan.  

They believe the agreement will help tip the military and diplomatic balance in favor of the Taliban, and help them to eventually overthrow the Afghan government. [That is] something they have never, ever given up [on].

The [Taliban] leaders are explicit. The agreement with the United States is a means of taking control of the Afghan government, not reaching a political settlement…

They don’t want a political settlement. They don’t want to share power. They don’t want to participate in a democracy.

Why is that? They’re very practical. [Some] 85% of the country reject the Taliban [and have rejected them] for 19 years. This in the most unpopular insurgency in modern times.

“The Taliban,” writes Bloomberg’s Eli Lake, “has always considered itself Afghanistan’s legitimate government in exile. This is why it sends its minions to attack polling places during elections, as it did last year.”

In short, the Taliban are not a legitimate political faction that simply wants a place at the decision-making table. To the contrary: they are hardcore fanatics, who have never wavered in their goal of reconquering all of Afghanistan and establishing a so-called Islamic Emirate there.

Yet, Trump acts like the Taliban are just another negotiating partner; and that negotiating a peace deal with them is no different, really, than negotiating a real estate deal with a mob boss or union official in Atlantic City. You split the differences and everyone walks away happy and content.

Negotiations. But that’s not how the Taliban think. They think that negotiations are a way for them to impose their will on a weak American president who wants out of Afghanistan, and to overthrow what they see as an illegitimate government in Kabul that has no right to rule.

It would help America’s negotiating posture if Trump showed some indication that he understands this. Instead, he repeats discredited Taliban propaganda that they are “tired of fighting.”

No, Mr. President, the Taliban are not tired of fighting. The Taliban fight—and negotiate—to win. And their continued fighting is the real obstacle to peace in Afghanistan.

Feature photo credit: France 24.

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